The Mission Press Center was part of JUSPAO until 1968 when it was separated.
JUSPAO carried out extensive campaigns to induce North Vietnamese troops
to surrender. The bulk of money and attention was focused on the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) program to encourage Viet Cong to
"rally" to the cause of the Republic of Vietnam. Begun in 1963 and administered
by JUSPAO after its formation in 1965, the Chieu Hoi campaign resulted in billions of
leaflets, millions of posters, magazines, and leaflets, and thousands of hours of
loudspeaker exhortations encouraging Viet Cong defection; this is said to have been the
largest propaganda campaign in history, with over 10 billion leaflets dropped in 1969
alone. In addition to offering amnesty and good treatment, monetary rewards were offered
and paid to defectors who turned in weapons. Rewards were offered to third parties who
induced Viet Cong to defect, with special bonuses for mass defections. These schemes were
highly successful and were extended through 1969, but were terminated on 31 December 1969,
probably because of abuses in awarding the money. We should also mention the Dai Doan
Ket Program. This was a Chieu Hoi program aimed at middle and higher cadre in the Viet
Cong. Most officers had come from the peasantry and it was believed that they would not
rally to the Government just to be returned to the peasant class. This program promised to
accept high-ranking returnees and place them in responsible positions.
There were numerous command and control problems at JUSPAO just as there were in the
field PSYOP groups and battalions. Colonel William E. Linn was the Chief of Policy, Plans
and Research and later the Assistant Director for Field Operations from March 1968 to
April 1969. He wrote a PSYOP After-Action Report on 6 June 1969 that details the
problems and recommendations for solving them. I will just mention a few of the more
important ones. COL Linn is particularly disturbed that JUSPAO was never warned in advance
about major policy shifts, and if given advance notice, was not allowed to utilize the
information for PSYOP. He gives as example the bombing halts of March 1968 and October
1968. On both occasions JUSPAO was ready to tell the Vietnamese people why the bombing was
halted. Because they had no guidance or permission they were unable to do so. As a result:
An interesting complaint is that although JUSPAO in theory is in general charge of
PSYOP, they are not cleared to know what black operations are being performed by MACV-SOG.
He worries that the two agencies might be sending different messages to the enemy:
Finally, a complaint that I have seen in almost every PSYOP after-action since the
Korean War is the training of personnel. Linn says:
Curiously. Linn supports his own argument. His signature block shows that he was a
“Colonel, Field Artillery.”
Thomas C. Sorensen tells us more about special JUSPAO teams in The Word War,
Harper & Row, N.Y., 1968:
Bob Fulton was the Executive Officer for Regional Service Center (RSC) in Manila, (part
of the United States Information Agency (USIA). He told me about the printing plant:
There was no U.S. Army PSYOP commander, although JUSPAO was represented at
command level through a coordinating committee.
The President of the United States directed in 1970 that an Ad Hoc PSYOP Committee on
Vietnam be formed to provide direction for and coordination of psychological warfare
against the Vietnamese Communists. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group proposed the following
objectives for more effective coordination of psychological operations against the
Vietnamese Communists.
Other decisions relating to a psychological warfare strategy, as well as other
decisions covering major issues in the conduct of our psychological warfare against the
Vietnamese Communists, were to be referred to the President for approval. Additional
recommendations were to persuade the Communist Party leadership to change its policies;
increase internal tensions, doubts, and policies; and motivate the Vietnamese people to
question the wisdom of the North Vietnamese Government. The proposed targets were the top
Party leadership, the Party apparatus, the North Vietnamese people, and Communist forces
in the north and south. The themes developed for each target were designed to convince
them that the war could not be won and policies must be changed, to increase war weariness
and discouragement among troops and the population, and to cause resentment and tension
between northerners and southerners.
Under President Nixon’s plan of Vietnamization; giving the war to the South
Vietnamese, PSYOP units began to disband. The 4th PSYOP Group disbanded in 12 October
1971.
Meanwhile, in an attempt to get the North Vietnamese to the peace table the United
States began the bombing of the North. This campaign was called Operation FIELD GOAL, a
psychological operation against North Vietnam from July 1972 to the cease-fire in January
1973. The original plan for directing PSYOP against NVN existed in 1965 under the code
name FACT SHEET. Originally conceived by JUSPAO as a threat campaign, its main message
threatened increased bombing if the North Vietnamese continued to support their
government's policies. Later, the program was renamed FRANTIC GOAT and was redirected to
inform the people of North Vietnam of the actual progress of the war and of the intentions
of the government of the Republic of Vietnam and its Allies. The total number of leaflets
dropped by all aircraft types during FIELD GOAL operations from 1 July 1972 to 28 January
1973 was 660,649,000. This was an average of slightly over 94 million per month compared
to the desired 240 million.
The 5th, 7th, and 13th Air Forces, provided delivery and logistics support. The
Strategic Air Command (SAC) was tasked to provide B-52s or drone aircraft when authorized
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The Army's 7th Psychological Operations Group in
Okinawa, provided the packaged leaflets, handling and loading, and information on tile
wind-borne characteristics of the leaflets.
The Location of U.S. PSYOP Units
U. S. Army Major Michael G. Barger wrote a thesis entitled “Psychological
Operations Supporting Counterinsurgency: 4th PSYOP Group in Vietnam.” In it, he gave
a chronology of PSYOP in Vietnam. We mention some of the more important dates here:
The vast majority of Vietnam leaflets bore codes or designations. For the most part
they are simple to read. In general, the originating unit placed its number first, then
the number of the leaflet (for that year), and finally the year itself. So, we would
expect to find leaflets starting with 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 244, 245, 246, etc. A leaflet will
generally have a code like 6-250-68 which indicates that it was the 250th leaflet produced
(or distributed) in 1968 by the 6th PSYOP Battalion. An American leaflet with no code is
probably one produced by Special Forces prior to 1967.
Early JUSPAO leaflets had the code "SP" (Special Project) before the leaflet
number. For example, SP-2250. JUSPAO removed the "SP" when it became clear that
it identified the leaflet as American in origin. The later leaflets would have only a
numerical code like "4450." This was explained in an issue of the 4th PSYOP
Group monthly magazine Credibilis of 10 January 1968 which explained the change
thusly:
The earliest numbered leaflets (before they were marked with a unit number) simply
showed a numerical and a year. For instance, leaflets in the I Corps Tactical Zone
Leaflet Catalog – Joint Psywar Civil Affairs Center, have codes like
“79-66” or “183-66.” The catalog calls them “the 66 series”
but it seems clear these were produced by the 244th PSYOP Company. Later on, unit
designations were added. Number coded leaflets starting with "4-" are Fourth
PSYOP Group. Number coded leaflets starting with "6-" are Sixth PSYOP Battalion,
"7-" are Seventh PSYOP Battalion, "8-" are Eighth PSYOP Battalion, and
"10-" are Tenth PSYOP Battalion. Higher numbered leaflets are usually the earlier PSYOP Companies; "19-" are the
19th PSYOP Company and curiously we sometimes see that “19” as the middle number
of a leaflet like 6-19-67, “244-” are the 244th PSYOP Company, "245-"
are the 245th PSYOP Company and "246-" represents the 246th PSYOP Company. I
have not seen leaflets starting "24-", but there may be some printed by the 24th
PSYOP Company.
In addition, there were a number of special codes. Leaflets dropped along the Ho Chi
Minh Trail as part of the "Trail Campaign" had the letter “T” at the
front. An example is “T80.” If the “T”s was at the end of the code
like 95T it indicated that the leaflet was designed for another campaign but modified for
use on the trail. Leaflets dropped on North Vietnam during the Operation Fact Sheet or
Operation Frantic Goat of 1965-68 have very low numbers, from 1-151.
There are leaflets in the Lao language designed by the Lao Government with
American help and printed by U.S. PSYOP units during the Vietnam War that
have very low code numbers preceded by a period. Examples are .1, .110, and
.530. There are other codes such as "A" (the basic form of a leaflet when
there is more than one variation following variations would be B, C. D, etc);
"H" (handbill), "P" (poster) and "R" at the end
of the leaflet (reprint or revision -
found only on B-52 post-strike leaflets like 146-66-R)
and letters like “a,” “b,” and “c,” at the end of the
numbers which indicate versions, revisions or one of a series. The code “NP” was
the newspaper Nhan Van (Human Knowledge).
“ATF” leaflets were printed by the Australians. In addition, there are other
codes such as “F” we cannot identify. “HQ” was the headquarters of the
6th Battalion, later the 4th Group for leaflet use in South Vietnam.
“L” at the end of a leaflet indicates it was printed on a light paper to make
use of light prevailing winds (16-pound paper instead of the normal 20-pound paper),
“M” (leaflets seem to be all in the Cambodian language), we don't know much
about the “NT series (NT3, NT4 etc.),” “P,” was original for PAVN
(People's Army of Vietnam), now NVA, and targeted NVA inside South Vietnam “Q,”
“R” followed by a single digit like R-4 indicates a scrap leaflet designed for
various campaigns. "R" within the body or at the end of the leaflet indicates a
revision, and example is 146-66-R. “S” (in Vietnamese or Lao) for
“slam” such as "S-3 or S12,
[One official document
explained this as:
SEEKING throughout the Panhandle
for enemy concentration; LOCATING specific enemy targets and focusing
reconnaissance agencies on the specific area; ANNIHILATING the enemy forces,
equipment, and installations in the target area and MONITORING afterwards to
ensure complete annihilation and deny to the enemy any further use]
which later became the trail campaign "T-01 or T-013", “S” at the
end of a leaflet like 116S indicates a summer leaflet on 16-pound paper
(116S). “SPC”
(For
the North Vietnamese in Laos or Cambodia or on the way down the Ho Chi Minh
Trail) “V,” “X,” another scrap leaflet used without regard to
dissemination characteristics, so they are leaflets just printed in blank spaces on sheets
to utilize the paper more efficiently. The letters “N” and “P” after
the numbers such as following the 245 of the 245th PSYOP Battalion indicate Nha Trang or
Pleiku locations. In the same way, some units have more than one printing facility so a
number will be added at the end of the unit number, such as “8(1)” which
indicates the Pleiku Detachment of the 8th PSYOP Battalion.
We should point out that apparently nobody bothered to record the meaning of the codes
or who printed the leaflets during the war. Some we have been able to decipher by unit,
language or message, but many are still unknown today. There may be a reason for the
mystery. We were told that some of the codes were in regard to classified missions.
Leaflets printed by the Vietnamese Armed Forces or ARVN usually start with a
“DV” such as “DV15AH2268” or the letter “A” followed by
numbers or letters such as “A5V4.”
Other Vietnamese leaflets start with D.S.V. which we believe is dan su vu
meaning “Civil Affairs.” An example is D.S.V./63/14
COLORS
The 4th PSYOP Group magazine Credibilis of July 1968 mentions the American
study of colors that might affect the Vietnamese in different ways:
The Product Development Center (PDC) Group is studying the
wonderful world of color to determine what effects different shades have on
the Vietnamese. Captain Capers G. Barr III, group PDC plans officer, said
the results of the study, expected to be completed this summer, will be used
in the development of group PSYOP materials.
Questionnaires concerning the impact of red, green, yellow, blue,
orange, and purple color have been distributed to the group's battalions.
They will be completed by more than 450 Hoi Chanhs, POWs, refugees,
civilians, and Vietnamese armed forces troops insuring a broad cross section
response.
With help from the interviewees, the in-depth study hopes to shed
light on three areas: the meaning, if any, associated with each color, the
emotional response each color might evoke and the preferred hue of each
color. Anticipating the outcome of the study, Captain Barr said, “We will
attempt to use colors in our leaflets and posters that have a definite
impact.”
He admitted, however, that the study may discover that “a color is
just a color” to Vietnamese.
The question arose once again the Credibilis of December
1968 in an article titled, “Shades of Meaning.” It says that 250
questionnaires were sent out to each of the group’s four battalions with 759
useable responses returned. I have edited this for brevity.
Questions were asked such as, “what color do you equate with
happiness?” The most common answer to this question was “blue.” Another
section depicted various shades of color and asked which one the reader
preferred. The results must be used with care since matters can become more
complicated. For example, red is associated by many Vietnamese with blood
and war. But, during Tet, small gifts of money are presented in a red
envelope. Purple meant love to some Vietnamese and sadness to others. A set
of 10 sample leaflets will be designed that can either be printed in either
black and white or color to check their effect on finders. By 19 December, a
non-technical “how to do it” report will be available to the battalions. A
full-scale analysis will be available later.
They
must have found something of interest, because
about 1970 I first saw a Military Assistance Command Vietnam and 4th PSYOP Group chart
of the colors that were good and bad to use on leaflets for Vietnam. The PhDs and cultural
experts had done 760 surveys and printed out a chart showing what colors were safe and
trusted and which ones were to be avoided if possible. I don't know if this chart was
helpful at all but here are the colors and the alleged emotions they arouse in the
Vietnamese people. I doubt if this chart was used extensively.
Black - Death, mourning, bad luck, danger, fear, the Viet Cong, war and sadness.
Blue - Hope, family, good luck, happiness, love and peace.
Green - Hope, family, good luck, happiness, prosperity and peace.
Purple - Love and sadness,
Red - Blood, anger, danger, death, fear, the Viet Cong and war.
White - Purity, peace and chastity.
Yellow - Skin color, the GVN, prosperity and nobility.
Pink - Love.
In the Monthly Operations Report of the 7th PSYOP Group dated 10 May 1971 we
see another mention of color:
Results of interviews conducted in Kontum indicate that the significance of
color varies greatly from one place to another and from one Montagnard tribe
to another. Consequently, no standard color pattern can be applied
uniformly.
Other Units Involved with Leaflets Although not PSYOP.
The II Field Force Vietnam Leaflet Catalog
Several Units oversaw large areas or large amounts of troops. They often
were involved in PSYOP and printed their own catalogs. One was the II Field
Force Vietnam. We know from their catalog that in 1968 they first used the
246th PSYOP Company, and later the 6th PSYOP Battalion to print leaflets.
Our research shows that they supported combat units such as the 25th
Infantry Division, the 101st Airborne Division, the Civil Operations and
Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), and the 9th Infantry Division.
Leaflet 6-144-68
This is a typical leaflet from the II Field Force Vietnam printed by the 6th
PSYOP Battalion. It is meant to turn the Vietnamese populace away from the
Viet Cong with te title “The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army has been
defeated.” 50,000 copies were printed. The leaflet was approved by the IIFFV
on 9 May 1968. The front of the leaflet shows the local villagers telling
the Viet Cong guerrillas to go away. Even their dog barks at the Viet Cong.
The text is:
Go away, we don't want your kind of liberation.
The text on the back is:
Dear Compatriots,
On 4 May 1968 the VC and NVA Forces launched their offensive on provinces,
cities, towns, and the Capital City of Saigon. They thought that they would
win over the GVN and Allied Forces as well as gain the people's support in
this attack. But they were defeated as the people had turned away from them
and helped the Government destroy the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese army.
Since 4 May 1968 till now there have been over 3,000 Viet Cong killed
including some NVA Soldiers. Regarding the enemy attack on the city of
Saigon, the GVN Forces have appropriately reacted against the attackers. The
infiltrated VC Troops were nearly destroyed by GVN or Allies. There are
still a minority of battered NLF Troops hiding on the outskirts of the city
who are being surrounded and will be hunted down.
The I Corps Tactical Zone Leaflet Catalog.
There were four tactical zones in Vietnam It is possible that each zone had
their own leaflet catalog, but I have only seen this one. Notice it is a
Joint PSYWAR (The title used in the Korean War) Civil Affairs Center.
The insignia at the left is Vietnamese so this catalog was sponsored by both
Vietnamese and American Commands. All the leaflets bear the number “66” at
the end so we assume this catalog was in use in 1966 before the large PSYOP
specialist units arrived in Vietnam.
Leaflet 150-66
This is a typical leaflet from the I Corps Tactical Zone. The front shows a
Viet Cong guerrilla in a farmer’s house firing out the window. To his right
we see U.S. fighter-bombers, a mortar, and two armed soldiers. The text
warns the people:
KEEP THE VIET CONG OUT OF YOUR HOMES.
The Viet Cong are very cruel and are cowards. They often use the people’s
homes as shelters to shoot at the toward the government troops. The people
are requested to inform the military authorities of the presence of Viet
Cong in their homes.
The back shows the home destroyed by explosives and says in part:
Because the Viet Cong fire from these homes, our soldiers, in self-defense
must fire back and thereby cause some destruction. The Viet Cong then can
print deceitful propaganda provoking the hate of the people against the
government soldiers….
III Corps PSYOP Detachment Leaflet and Tape Catalog
Although the catalog is not dated, we see that some leaflets mention attacks
that occurred in 1965, some leaflets are dated 1966, and toward the end of
the catalog we see leaflets from the 246th PSYOP Company. This gives us an
idea of when this all took part, just before the arrival of the PSYOP
companies in Vietnam. The introduction to this catalog says:
To improve the quality and reaction time of PSYOP support in the areas of
leaflet and loudspeaker operations, efforts are being made to standardize
much of the better-quality material as it is produced. A large percentage of
all such material can be categorized. Certain leaflets and tapes listed
herein are marked STANDARD. These leaflets and tapes are available in small
quantities for immediate delivery. Material included in this catalog that is
not marked STANDARD is intended as examples of output that may stimulate
ideas. In some cases, the non-standard leaflet may be appropriate to use
again with minor modifications.
However, any non-standard leaflet requested must be re-printed because the
stock level of such leaflets is not maintained. Any request for printed or
taped material should be forwarded to this detachment through normal
channels (telephone, message center, etc.). Requests for either STANDARD or
original material should be submitted on the “PSYOP Request Form.”
If a request is submitted via telephone, follow the format. All sections of
the request form should be as complete as possible. This procedure will
result in the production of better-quality material, the collection of
information, and assist in determining if a useful product is already
available in stock. The corps detachment, working jointly with Vietnamese
PSYOP units, has trained announcers, writers, artists, and intelligence
analysts. Except in unique situations, the finished product should be
determined by these specialists.
Several standard leaflets are depicted. Notice that in most cases the
leaflet has been taped to the page and the tape has discolored. It appears
as a dark rectangle over the leaflet. The first leaflet depicted is the
standard safe conduct pass, coded 893, which is shown elsewhere in this
article.
Leaflet 042
The second is job #042 which depicts a Viet Cong fighter facing massive U.S.
and Vietnamese armament and weapons.
The text on the back is:
The Viet Cong and their sympathizers can no longer survive in this area -
They are faced with the tremendous power of the Allied forces - on the side
of the government are swarms of aircraft, the most modern light and heavy
artillery and the deadliest personal weapons, all supported by unlimited
manpower and resources. This area is now being cleared and will be policed
by this powerful force. Victory for the Government of Vietnam is positive -
Defeat of the Viet Cong is inevitable.
Part II of the catalog is non-standard leaflets. These are various samples
that have been printed in the past and can be reprinted as needed.
Leaflet 072
This leaflet depicts a Vietnamese civilian pointing out Viet Cong guerrillas
hiding in the woods. The text on the front and back is:
We are
American soldiers who come to Vietnam as your friends. We are here to help
you in every way we can. We will stay until the Viet Cong are defeated and
you are able to live in peace and happiness. We can help you better if you
help us.
Do you know
where the Viet Cong are hiding? How many Viet Cong are there? Do you know
where Viet Cong weapons are hidden? Are there Viet Cong mines planted in the
area? Do you know where Viet Cong food is hidden? Please show me where. We
wish you and your family safety and much happiness.
Four-Color Leaflets
Leaflet 2575
We don’t see four-color leaflets too often. They require multiple runs
through the printing press and that makes them slow and expensive to print.
There are a group of these leaflets in the North Vietnam bombing campaign
article coded 100-104. They are all in a vertical format. The Joint U.S. Public
Affairs Office did a few of these in a horizontal format, and since we are
talking about color, I thought I would show some here. Notice
that both these leaflets have other code numbers like 8-798, and this
implies that the Vietnamese were also distributing them using their codes.
Both full-color leaflets were printed in July 1968.
The front of this leaflet shows Vietnamese people shopping on a crowded
street. At the right is a Chieu Hoi symbol and the text:
SOUTH VIETNAM ENJOYS PROSPERITY AND FREEDOM
Do you know that South Vietnam is enjoying prosperity and freedom while the
war is still going on? There is plenty of food, money, and clothes in the
South’s markets and citizens are free to buy whatever they want. That is the
result of the free and democratic regime of the South. If you have a chance
to get in touch with people, you will realize that fact.
Why continue to waste your youth in hardship while people in South Vietnam
do not want your struggle. Return to the people, rebuild a prosperous life
for yourself and contribute to the making of peace for your counter.
The back of this leaflet depicts photographs of people worshipping their
religion in various churches and temples. The text is:
THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ENJOY FREEDOM OF RELIGION. ALL RELIGIONS COEXIST
BEAUTIFULLY.
Leaflet 2576
The leaflet above depicts Vietnamese boys with their motorcycles, adults
shopping for material, and women at a poultry market. The back has two
photographs, one shows people shopping at a busy outdoor market and the
other a woman buying fruit from a stand piled high with different
delicacies. The text at the bottom front is:
THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM OFFERS PEOPLE OPPORTUNITIES TO HAVE A GOOD LIFE.
The “CC” Series
The code “CC” stood for the Combined Center of the IV Corps of the Army of
the Republic of Vietnam. It was one of four corps in the ARVN, and it
oversaw the Mekong Delta region of the country. The leaflets were printed
for the IV Corps by the U.S. 10th PSYOP Battalion, which was headquartered
in the 4th Combat Zone. These leaflets are very rare, and although I have
some documents that indicate there were at least 833 different leaflets and
posters printed (and likely more than that), I have only seen about one
dozen. And they all were printed in 1970. Several were all text and bore
messages and a space for a different enemy force to be named. I would have
expected these to be Viet Cong units, but they all seem to be North
Vietnamese Army units, including the 18B, 88th, 101D, and 273rd NVA
Regiments, and the 261B NVA Battalion. I have seen one poster that explains
the “Land to the Tiller” program where the farmers own their land and can
claim compensation for losses due to the fighting in the south. One leaflet
tells the NVA where to rally and another tells them that in 1969, 68,550
cadre and soldiers rallied to the Republic of Vietnam.
Leaflet CC-120-70
This tactical leaflet targets the 273rd NVA Regiment. It depicts a dead
soldier or very sick soldier on the ground. There are some small lines on the
drawing that could imply he was shaking, a symptom of malaria when the
victim feels cold. As a one-time medic I can tell you that a tell-tell sign
of malaria is the constant change from fever to chills. The text on the front is:
To members of the 273rd NVA Regiment,
We know that your unit has over 126 comrades coming down with malaria. Do
you know that malaria is a dangerous and devastating disease. It is hard to
cure and can incapacitate you. All throughout human history it has taken a
heavy toll of life and has drained the energy of man.
The text on the back explains that the Republic of Vietnam has excellent
medical facilities and is happy to treat any members of the NVA with the
best treatments available. It also points out that there is a Chieu Hoi
program and invites them to take advantages of it. The text is very
“gentile” and does seem to be written by Vietnamese for Vietnamese.
A lot of thought was given to these medical leaflets. The Viet Cong often
claimed that they had wonderful medical facilities in the bush. They spoke
of large hospitals holding up to 400 patients, underground hospitals dug
deep into the earth, and even medical evacuation of severely wounded
Communist troops to the North. The question in the mind of American PSYOP
specialists was, could they really treat malaria, dysentery, typhoid fever,
pneumonia, tuberculosis, leprosy, nerve diseases, kidney diseases and
appendicitis.
Lieutenant David Underhill, one of the 7th PSYOP Groups top experts, did not
believe they could. He came up with a plan to work on the medical
deficiencies of the enemy troops in the bush. He wrote (edited for brevity):
The following approach will be followed.
Leaflets depicting Government of Vietnam medical and health care programs
should be prepared with low-key text telling of the Government of Vietnam’s
concern for its people. For example, it might show a medical doctor or
corpsman giving inoculations to children or adults and the text could point
out that whole villages or hamlets or the nation could be safely mass
inoculated.
Rural and urban “drug stores” could be depicted telling of the readily
available high-quality medicines. A druggist could be shown with a modern
refrigerator and the text could explain the requirement for modern
refrigeration to prevent spoiling or contamination of medicines in the
tropical heat. This approach should tend to present the enemy with facts he
is not aware of. The deaths of friends and known deaths of individuals while
undergoing treatment might be attributed to inferior medical service when
compared to the information presented on the leaflets.
Treatment of South Vietnamese troops along with prisoners of war should be
shown to lessen enemy fears concerning rallying. This approach is better
than attacking the enemy’s medical service. Some Viet Cong may have received
good treatment or believe that their medical services are excellent thought
they have never used them. They might think attacks on their services is
incorrect and if so, we lose credibility. If he reads our leaflets, he may
wonder if his medical services are as good as they should be, or that ours
might be better. It could cause him to hold the Government of Vietnam and
allies in higher regard for the interest they have in the welfare of all the
people.
Leaflet CC-121-70
This tactical leaflet is also aimed at NVA units and expresses great worry
about their safety. The image depicts NVA soldiers caught in a mine field
and being killed and injured. The text on the front is:
To members of the NVA C-19 Engineer Company and 18B Regiment,
Will you be next?
The text on the back mentions the many members of the units that have been
killed by mines and bobby traps. The area is covered with mines and
explosives and is unsafe. If they immediately surrender through the Chieu
Hoi program, they will safely leave the area and be resettled in the south.
Leaflet CC-417-70
The artwork on this leaflet is exceptional. It depicts two young fighters
surrendering, one holds a leaflet, the other holds a piece of white cloth. I
suspect the artist was Vietnamese because the picture is done with such
sensitivity. The text on the front is:
Return to the
Government of The Republic of Vietnam.
The text on the back is:
You can use this leaflet as a pass to return to the Government of The
Republic of Vietnam. Even without the leaflet, you'll be received with
hospitality. You may report to any ARVN or Allied unit or post. You will be
duly awarded for any weapon turned in. You will be well treated and may
later join your family.
Leaflet CC-822D-70
The CC leaflet is a bit different because many of the leaflets are all text,
and others have drawings. This one has a photograph of a Viet Cong member in
the bush finding a propaganda leaflet. The text on the front is:
The Government of Vietnam always keeps the pledges it makes.
Since 1969, 68,500 Communist cadre have rallied and enjoyed all the benefits
on the back side[of
this leaflet].
The back of the leaflet is all text and mentions eight benefits:
The Hoi Chanh will be warmly received.
A subsistence allowance of $50 a day for each family member including the
wife and children.
Clothing values at $1000VN.
Pocket money of 300VN a month.
Medical care free of charge for him and his family.
Receive vocation training at the Chieu Hoi Center,
Resettlement allowance of $1200VN,
Rewards for weapons.
The “P” Series
The code “P,” was originally for “People’s Army of Viet Nam,” (PAVN), later
called the North Vietnam Army (now NVA), and targeted members of the NVA
inside South Vietnam.
Leaflet P-04
The front depicts four photographs of happy citizens of the Republic of
Vietnam. The text is:
ASPECTS OF THE PEOPLE’S LIFE IN VIETNAM
Happy family reunion – Busy city scene – Ample rice supply – Modern factory
The back is all text:
As you can see, the people of South Vietnam are progressing in many ways. We
do not need the Communist Party liberation to be happy.
The Communist Party aggression is sure to be defeated. Do not die in a
hopeless cause. Use the National Safe Conduct Pass to join the just cause
and enjoy a good and happy life. When the war is over you can continue to
enjoy your new life in the South or return to your home in the North.
Leaflet P-05
Chieu Hoi leaflet P-05 depicts happy Communist North Vietnam Army defectors
enjoying a meal in a South Vietnamese Chieu Hoi Center. This leaflet is
found in both a horizontal and a vertical format, though the text has not
been changed. The text on the front says:
Sergeant Vu Tuan Anh. 33rd Regiment, 320th North Vietnamese Division, enjoys
a meal at the Pleiku Chieu Hoi Center.
The back is all text and says:
THESE MEN USED THE SAFE CONDUCT PASS
These men are enjoying life in one of South Vietnam's “Open Arms” centers.
They have stopped killing the innocent people of the South. The Government
of South Vietnam offers a warm welcome to those who will voluntarily leave
the ranks of the aggressors and join the cause. More than 30,000 Viet Cong
and North Vietnamese soldiers and cadre have left the ranks of the
Liberation Army.
You can do so too. Use the National Safe Conduct Pass to join the Just
Cause. You will be warmly welcomed.
Leaflet P-08
I have seen at least ten of the “P” leaflets. Examples are: P-01 (Where are
your comrades?); P-02 (Life in South Vietnam); P-04 (Aspects of people’s life in
South Vietnam); and P-010 (Where is the liberated territory?). The image on P-08 above
depicts an American helping a Vietnamese with construction. Some of the text is:
IS THIS IMPERIALISM?
The United States is the richest and most powerful country in the world. What does
it need from Vietnam? NOTHING. In fact, it is now giving free Vietnam 40,000,000,000
piasters in food and economic assistance a year. Is this the new form of
“imperialism” as propagandized and distorted by the North Vietnamese Communists?
We mention “Catalog” several times in this article. I have a number of such
catalogs and their use is explained the 1969 document Employment of U.S. Army
Psychological Operation Units in Vietnam:
Each PSYOP battalion published a catalog listing 600 to 800 available leaflets. The
catalog was numerically indexed and gave data on leaflet number, theme, target, size and
color of the leaflet, together with the leaflet and English translation. Catalogs were
inventoried and screened periodically to maintain current leaflets. Catalogs were
distributed to tactical units and PSYOP customers to facilitate ordering specific leaflets
for the target audience. Action was taken by the 4th PSYOP Group to cross-index leaflet
catalogs according to PSYOP themes. It was noted that several units initiated or completed
indexing of catalogs by target audiences as well.
I think sometimes we forget how
dedicated these young troops coming down from the North to "liberate" the
South were. A Vietnam veteran I showed these leaflets to told me:
We found some of those leaflets in the Iron Triangle in 1968,
partially burned in a bunker complex. We had a couple of North Vietnamese Army prisoners and we asked them
what the leaflets said. One POW spoke some English. Our Lieutenant tried to
hand one to him. He would not take it but told us it was for traitors, and
they would kill anyone that touched them.
PSYOP troops are always studying the
effectiveness of these leaflets, and I am sure they never thought they were
so despised that the NVA troops did not even want to dirty their hands by
touching them.
The Effectiveness of U.S. PSYOPS Leaflets
Speaking of effectiveness of leaflets, I should
mention that they were always being assessed and studied. After two major
world wars and dozens of smaller wars you would assume there was agreement
on all the phases of PSYOP. You would be wrong. I attended a Worldwide PSYOP
Conference several years ago and the entire meeting seemed to be about the
way to determine the effectiveness of leaflets. Some attendees believed that
effectiveness could not always be proven, while others believed that using
mathematical formulae, anything and everything could be determined. Above is
one of many booklets on the subject and after decades of leafleting it
starts off with, “A method is needed to objectively pretest PSYOP leaflets
directed at the variety of target audiences…” They are not even sure how
they should go about pretesting leaflets before they are dropped. After the
drop is another question entirely. So, the reader should keep in mind that
leafleting and PSYOP is as much an art as it is a science, and nobody has
completely figured it out yet.
The "SPC" Leaflets
We don’t know much about the SPC leaflets. My files show that they
seem to have started out targeting the North
Vietnamese in Cambodia, then added Laos, then added those troops coming down
the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and finally added the North Vietnamese troops already
settled in the south that might be getting homesick. Some examples are
depicted below.
Leaflet T-6-SPC
This first leaflet targets the North Vietnam troops and mentions Cambodia.
It depicts an unhappy NVA soldier thinking about how bad the war has gone.
The text on the front is:
THE QUESTION OF
SURVIVAL.
At present, your northern comrades are being attacked by the
combined military strength of the South Vietnamese army and our American
allies in Cambodia. Many of your comrades are asking themselves what are the
chances of survival? The question of survival has confronted them because of
our determination to destroy their Cambodian refuge, once and for all. Many
of your comrades, however, did not take the opportunity to evaluate their
chances for survival. They recklessly believe in the north Vietnam Communist
party's propaganda of “glorious victories” in the South. Now they are dead
in this tragic Cambodian battlefield.
Leaflet T-7-SPC
This May 1970 leaflet targeted North Vietnamese troops coming down the Ho
Chi Minh Trail to create and/or exploit nostalgia. The leaflet was designed
by the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam and sent off-shore (probably to
the 7th Group on Okinawa) for printing and delivery according to established
procedures. The poem was titled "My Sister,"
and
contains 10 verses. I have translated the first five:
I have a little sister,
as beautiful as a poem.
Her name sounds like "Dream."
Her husband was drafted away.
For two years, she hoped
to see her man home.
From the far away battlefield
where the men go,
but no news from them come back.
She usually wept when alone,
and moaned, reproached, and resented
those who instigated this war.
And caused wives to be parted
from the husband they beloved.
Women usually wanted
their men back.
My sister missed her
husband,
and used to be afraid
and nervous,
each time news spread
over,
that more and more
youths
had been drafted by
Uncle Ho’s order.
She sat late at
night.
Each time she saw the
troops,
moving to the distant
Battlefield “B.”
But none of them
return,
while more and more
went away.
Leaflet T-8-SPC
This leaflet features two North Vietnam soldiers in Laos talking to
a farmer. They might be about to buy some food, or perhaps steal some food.
The leaflet suggests they can talk to the farmer about defecting. The text
on the front is:
The most essential thing to do is to save your life and return to
the North. If you need food, trade your equipment with the Laotian people.
The back is all text:
SAVE YOUR LIFE.
As you infiltrate South and find yourselves in this mountainous
area, you may feel abandoned and may consider your future dim.
The further you travel the further the distance seems to be. You
must cross over many dangerous mountains and you must constantly hide and
try to avoid detection. Soon you’ll begin to realize your dilemma. Death and
hardships may be your constant companions. If you don’t find a way to escape
from this now, you may never be able to return to your family and your
native land. Your family needs you now and is waiting for you. You must not
die senselessly.
The "X" Leaflets
Leaflet X-6
The “X” leaflets are very strange. They seem to fit no pattern and
come with the comment:
To be disseminated without regard to dissemination characteristics
with normal leaflet requirements.
In other words, even though mathematical formulas were used for most
leaflets according to their size and paper weight to assure that they would
drop on their targets, these “X” leaflets were just added to the pile and
were allowed to fall wherever they landed. It would appear the cost of
leaflet paper sheets was expensive and there was no desire to waste any
space. So, when eight or ten leaflets were printed on a sheet and there was
a small space in some corner where the paper was blank, they would print a
leaflet on some general subject, just to utilize the paper more efficiently.
Many of the “X” leaflets that I have seen are regarding the Paris Peace talks. The text on leaflet X-6 is:
PEACE
The Party and the Government of the North will be found guilty by history if they
don’t end this senseless war.
Other leaflets in this category are small, about 2 x 4-inches in size. They
usually have an all-text message on the front and back. For instance, X-4 is
like the leaflet above but with a different text:
When accepting negotiations for peace in Paris, capital of France, the
leaders of the Communist Party and the Government of the North have no right
to ask the soldiers to sacrifice more.
The message on X-4 is:
WHERE IS THE TRUTH?
So far you, the compatriots in the North, have been listening with the ears
of the Party, and seeing through the eyes of the Party. Thus, how can you
learn what you want to know? To learn the objective truth, the news
pertaining to the Vietnam War and the world, be they good or bad, please
listen to
THE VOICE OF FREEDOM
Leaflet X-5
Leaflet X-5 depicts a dove on the front. The text on the back is:
People in the North and the South demand that the Communist Party and
Government of the North end this senseless war the sooner the better and
return to the people an eternal peace.
Leaflet X-6 has a flowery design and the text:
The Communist Party and the Government of the North will be guilty toward
history if it does not want to end this senseless war.
An I Corps Tactical Zone Leaflet?
Leaflet 166-67
We mention the
“I” Corps leaflets where we mention codes. They were early leaflets, mostly
in 1966 but some were made in 1967. The front has a satirical cartoon of
Chairman Mao easting a sumptuous meal while a Viet Cong sits at his feet
eating the scrapes. The meaning of the picture is clear. The text is:
Beijing.
The back is
all text:
Dear
compatriots,
The Viet
Cong’s Chinese masters have announced that the Vietnamese people should
increase their support for the Viet Cong’s illegal war in South Vietnam.
At the same
time, Viet Cong soldiers remain hungry, thirsty, lacking food and medicine,
and do not receive any payment which could help support their family, their
parents, wife, and children.
Try to think
about where all the rice and money that the Viet Cong robbed you of went.
Stand up
against the Viet Cong. Do not let them tax you and take your rice so they
can send it to their masters in China.
The "R" Leaflets
Leaflet R-2
The “R” leaflets
were used exactly like the “X” leaflets above.
Leaflets coded "R" were scrap leaflets, printed to use up all the paper on a
printing sheet and save Uncle Sam money.
One difference was that they were a bit larger,
measuring about 4.5 x3-inches. The PSYOP specialists hated dead space that could
be utilized on a big sheet of paper. The R leaflets had a general message so that they
could be added to any leaflet bomb regardless of the theme of the leaflet-mix in that
bomb. This one has a nice patriotic image on the front depicting an American soldier, a
South Vietnamese soldier and a Vietnamese civilian all working to protect the nation. The
text on the front is:
WE FIGHT THE COMMUNISTS TOGETHER
THE PEOPLE AND ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND THEIR AMERICAN
FRIENDS ALL ARE FIGHTING FOR A FREE VIETNAM
The back is all text:
Why are American troops in Vietnam?
The international communists want the whole world to become communist.
The Vietnamese communists want South Vietnam to become communist.
The Vietnamese and the American people are determined to fight against
this communist plot in order to: Live in true freedom, happiness, and
peace.
As friends, we are fighting alongside you because communism is a threat to all free
peoples.
I have not seen many other “R” scrap leaflets. The 7th PSYOP Group was also
secretly printing Korean-language leaflets to be dropped on North Korea. On
many of their Vietnam leaflet sheets, the scrap leaflet was for the North
Korean program.
The “A” Leaflets
Leaflets printed by the Vietnamese Armed Forces or ARVN usually
start with a “DV,” or the letter “A.” Other Vietnamese leaflets start
with D.S.V.
A15/V4
This leaflet shows the difference in treatment between the
Government of Vietnam and the leaders of the Viet Cong. We first see some
fighters that need drugs standing before two VC leaders with empty hands.
The text is:
The only thing the Viet Cong does is to make promises they don’t keep.
The back of the leaflet depicts another three fighters that have
perhaps gone Hoi Chanh being given needed medicines by the ARVN or
government representatives. The text is:
The government dispense medicines
Support the government
The "DV" Leaflets
The Vietnamese coded their leaflets with the letters "DV" and a long series
of numbers afterwards. The "DV" indicated Quan-Doi Viet Nam Cong Hoa (Army of
the Republic of Vietnam).
DV156AH30115
This Vietnamese Army 7 x 4-inch leaflet depicts captured enemy soldiers
together with troops of the Republic of Vietnam. The theme is “good
treatment.” The text is exceedingly long so I will just translate a small
part of it:
This is a picture of soldiers from the 66th and 101st Regiment taken
together with Republic of Vietnamese Officers at Headquarters, II Corps.
Seeing this picture, you will know clearly how the Armed Forces of the
Republic of Vietnam behave with prisoners-of-war and ralliers. Here is what
they wrote to their comrades:
“When the unit moved, we were sick and not able to follow the unit and were
left behind. We were then captured by the Vietnamese and U.S. helicopter
troops. It was awful. We thought we would die immediately, because our
leaders had always stated that in capturing us the American and Vietnamese
soldiers would savagely torture us, feed us rice mixed with line, then send
us to Saigon to be shot.” But how strange! In surrendering, we were never
beaten, we were given food, drink and medical care…”
Leaflet DV15AH2268
Vietnamese PSYOP leaflet DV15AH2268 depicts President Nguyen Van Thieu and clarifies
his attitude towards the National Liberation Front. The text is:
THE PRESIDENT OF REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM HAS DECLARED:
There will be never a Joint Government in South Vietnam.
The back is all text:
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IS AGAINST A JOINT
GOVERNMENT
President Nguyen Van Thieu has declared his willingness to talk to anyone in the
South Vietnamese Liberation Front, but the government of the Republic of Vietnam will
never recognize that Front as an independent organization.
Lately, with continuous failures in the battlefield, the Communists have spread
rumors that there will be a Joint Government in the South. Their sole purpose is to create
confusion among the public. However, the people of the South understand that the rumors of
a Joint Government are just a propaganda tactic of the Communists. Its sole purpose is to
cover their military and political failures.
There will be no Joint Government in the South.
At the same time, JUSPAO was dropping similar leaflets over the jungles of South Vietnam. These were generally coded with the letters "SP" (Special Project) and a number in the early years of the war. Since it was always the American desire that all PSYOP should appear to come from the government of Vietnam, the letters "SP" caused a problem. That was a sure sign that the leaflet was an American product. In later leaflets, the letters were removed, and the codes were only numbers.
The D.S.V. Leaflets
This early Vietnamese leaflet depicts a friendly conversation between a farmer and a soldier. This leaflet uses some words that would be recognized as the Communists blending into the population like fish into the ocean. It then shows that the Army can also blend into the population as the farmer invites the soldier to a cup of tea. The text is:
Soldiers – Civilians - Fish – Water
Oh, Soldier of the Republic
I invite you to have a cup of tea while you rest.
We believe that the code D.S.V./63/14 stands for “Civil Affairs,” and this might be the 14th leaflet of 1963.
Leaflet CP-09
The leaflets coded “CP” are extremely rare and were highly classified. They
were used in Cambodia by American troops that were not supposed to be there. The CP stood
for the classified operation name “Camel Path.” These leaflets were not to be
mixed with other leaflets and were only to be dropped over Cambodia. And of course, the
words “Camel Path” were not to be spoken. The leaflet is text at the top with an
arrow pointing to the official 7-flag safe conduct pass used in Vietnam. The text on the
front is:
You can avoid this hopeless fate. Use the pass to cross the front line and come back
to live under the protection of the Government of Vietnam. The pass bears this symbol.
The back of the leaflet depicts a dead North Vietnamese soldier and the text:
Why did this young man from North Vietnam come to die here, outside the mud wall of
a lonely outpost in Ba Long? His place should have been at his home, in his farm, where
his labor is needed to help feed his compatriots in the north. Instead, he has been sent
to the South and assigned the hopeless job of storming into an outpost defended by the
people of the South. What did he hope to achieve by his suicidal attempt? To
"liberate" the people of the South as he had been told by his Communist masters?
But why do the people that he is supposed to liberate build mud walls and plant bamboo
spikes to keep the liberators out? Perhaps, at the last minute he saw the truth. But, it
was too late. The Labor Party has already spent him like an expendable item in its bid to
take over South Vietnam.
Did the Pentagon Lie about the Number of
the Enemy?
I think everyone knows by now that the American public was not told the
whole truth about the war. The military worried that if the South Vietnamese
found out they might lose the will to fight, and if the American people
found out they might decide the war was unwinnable and demand that the U.S.
pull out of Vietnam. So, the numbers of enemy were kept small, and the
public was told that allied tactics were winning the war. Perhaps if the
Pentagon had been more forthright the war would have ended sooner and with
far less bloodshed. Still, their priority was saving South Vietnam, so
perhaps some shortcuts were considered worth taking to keep fighting the
Viet Cong and North Vietnam and eventually tiring them to where they would
lose faith and quit. One thing seems clear, for the purposes of morale the
Army wanted to keep the count at about 300,000. Other organizations with
less to worry about from a public relations disaster came in with much
higher numbers. This meant that the United States was fighting a war against
ghosts, with the enemy being as much as twice the number the Army thought it
was fighting against.
Graham A. Cosmas said about the counting of the enemy forces in Vietnam
in MACV, The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation, 1962–1967
(edited for brevity):
The president
and his advisers were particularly concerned about the impact of enemy
strength figures on American public opinion. The Joint Chiefs once
transmitted both the revised irregular total and an increase in political
cadre strength from the previous estimate of about 40,000 to 88,000. Between
them, the new figures would raise the Military Assistance Command’s total
enemy strength holdings from about 300,000 to nearly 420,000.
It became
clear during this period that Westmoreland, for both substantive and public
relations reasons, wanted to find some way to avoid reporting a 100,000-man
increase in enemy strength. As a result, Westmoreland adopted a strategy of
removing the self-defense forces and political cadre from the military order
of battle. By this means, MACV could keep total Communist strength around
300,000. CIA analysts were estimating the enemy’s irregular strength by late
1966 at more than 300,000 and the entire Communist order of battle at
perhaps 600,000. [Author’s note]: If these numbers were
true, U.S, forces were outnumbered by the enemy in Vietnam.
On 23 June
1967, the first interagency meeting to review the CIA draft of the special
estimate ended in deadlock. The new document estimated total enemy strength
at around 500,000 personnel of all categories. However, spokesmen for the
Defense Intelligence Agency, representing MACV at the meeting, rejected the
CIA’s totals for the other categories and insisted on using MACV’s old
figures, which would keep overall enemy strength around 300,000.
In the view of
many of the young intelligence officers, who usually were on their first
tours in their specialty, this amounted to a demand that they lie. The
Combined Intelligence
Center’s Order
of Battle Branch, which published MACV’s monthly estimates of enemy forces,
reduced subordinates’ estimates of guerrilla, self-defense, and political
cadre strength. "I had a distinct understanding that these figures were
going to have to go down."
The military
delegations refused to count the self-defense categories and maneuvered to
keep the total number of enemies in the estimate below what all believed was
an arbitrary, command-established ceiling of 300,000. General Westmoreland
denied then and later ever setting such a ceiling, and no documentation has
been found of a direct order from him to do so. Nevertheless, his
intelligence officers clearly believed that their commander wanted to keep
enemy strength estimates within the set maximum.
Leaflet NT4/TD/2 – Continuous Evaluation
Some readers might believe that after an
initial evaluation and check of language, spelling, grammar, and assurance
that the leaflet follows the political policies, it is “Good to go.” Not
true. Leaflets were continuously evaluated, brought before boards, friendly
prisoners of War and Hoi Chanhs, to determine the continued value. I
selected this leaflet to show you such a case. Here is a 7th PSYOP Group
leaflet that was looked at a second time in September 1971 before reuse of
the leaflet was approved. It was found to be lacking. The original leaflet
depicted an injured Viet Cong being treated by South Vietnamese medics. It
was meant to show the good treatment they would receive from their brothers
from the south. I will mention some of the text below and the criticism by
the evaluation board. I will underline the words that were problems.
Your wives and children are waiting for you impatiently. Nothing
remains but for you to make yourself POWs, and you will be
well-treated by the Republic of Vietnam government. You will reunite with
your families in North Vietnam or build a new life in South Vietnam if
you rally courageously.
Peace will be restored sooner or later. Even though there will be peace, the Communists will not let you
reunite with your families but send you to other battlefields for you know
well that the life in South Vietnam is freer and more prosperous than in
North Vietnam. This would harm the deceiving propaganda in North Vietnam.
There were two major flaws indicated by
the evaluation board. The first was that the first paragraph first told them
to become prisoners of war and later told them to rally which would have
made them Chieu Hoi candidates. The two choices are quite different and
could confuse the reader and be counterproductive. The second problem was
that in the first paragraph the enemy soldier was told he could return home,
and in the second he is told that he would never be allowed to return home.
The board asked:
How can you promise a man he will return home and then tell him in
the same leaflet that he won’t be allowed to return home even if peace is
restored?
I said above in the code section that we
did not know much about the NT series. I have seen close to a dozen of them,
but there does not seem to be any connection that might point to who
requested them. Some I have seen are: NT3/A/TD-1 (To Cadres and Combatants
beyond the Front Lines), NT3/A/TD-2 (To Communist Cadres and Soldiers),
NT3/A/TD-3 (Rice seeds are distributed to farmers), NT3/A/TD-4 (RVN
Pacification Program), NT3/A/TD-9 (RVN’s Goodwill), NT4-TD-1 (RVN
Pacification Program), NT4-TD-2 (NFL Cadres and Soldiers), NT4-TD-3 (To the
Cadres and Soldiers), NT4-TD-4 (Secret base of Hardship)
Leaflet 1389A
This leaflet was part of a mix that we mention just below this entry. It depicts the
back of the 7-flag safe conduct pass usually signed by Thieu or Ky on the front. The back
is all text. Although it does not bear the “CP” code, we know it was dropped on
North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia. The text on the front is:
To friends on the other side of the front line
You will be treated deservedly once you leave the Communist ranks to return to the
Country and the Nation. You will live in peace under the protection and help of the
government of the Republic of Vietnam.
You will be greeted as loved ones by your compatriots. You will be provided all
articles for everyday use until you will have had a new life. Should you bring in a
weapon, you will be rewarded a monetary amount adequate to the value of the weapon.
The extent of the Allied propaganda effort in Vietnam is told by James William Gibson
in The Perfect War- Technowar in Vietnam, The Atlantic Monthly Press, NY, 1986:
From 1965 through 1972 over fifty billion leaflets were distributed in South and
North Vietnam and along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos and Cambodia; this vast sum was the
equivalent of more than 1,500 leaflets per person in both the north and the south. In 1969
the military and civilian propaganda apparatuses produced over 10.5 billion leaflets, 4
million pamphlets, 60,000 newspaper articles, over 24.5 million posters, and nearly
12 million magazines.
Press sheet
The uncut sheet depicted above consists of a mixture of propaganda leaflets in the
Vietnamese language and represents a sample press sheet from the small format, high speed
Hancho web presses. Two of them were used to print leaflets during the 1966-1967 periods.
Another press was added in 1968.
Declassified SOG documents show the extent of the leaflet operation in Vietnam. 31
million leaflets were dropped in 1964, 67 million in 1965, 142 million in 1966 and 271
million in 1968. MACV could produce 200,000 3x6-inch leaflets per eight-hour shift on its
Harris high-speed press. The PSYWAR Directorate had a Webendorf Press that that SOG was
authorized to use from 1600-2400. It could produce 500,000 leaflets per shift. In
addition, the deception mail operation produced 200 fake letters per month of various
types to be mailed into North Vietnam.
The black letter program was constantly being fine-tuned. A MACVSOG comment on the
subject states:
We plan to use notional leftist organizations abroad as originators of the letters,
but are beginning with a true leftist Japanese fishing organization. In line with this, we
are soon going to use a Paris-based Vietnamese, pro-Hanoi student organization’s
magazine to infiltrate subtle anti-Communist propaganda into North Vietnam by making
slight changes in some of the articles…
We will experiment in the printed media field, for example; calendars, fishing
hints, and tide tables are presently being obtained. Varying paper stocks are now being
used.
As the war progressed the black letter output went from 3,993 in 1965 to 6,000 in 1966
and 7,550 in 1967. The letters were mailed from Singapore, Paris, Hong Kong, Bangkok and Tokyo,
allegedly from North Vietnamese living outside the country. There were nine general themes
for the letters: Weakness in Communist ideology; Revision in North Vietnam; Chinese
imperialism; North Vietnamese mismanagement; Peace; Free Enterprise; Free society;
Resistance movements and the Chieu Hoi program. The letters were coded according to type:
Special: High level hard sell propaganda (400 letters per month).
Vulcan: High and medium level with a revisionist point of view. (50-60 letters per
week).
Thor: A personal letter with soft sell and human interest. (15 letters a week)
Mars: To next-of-kin of battlefield casualties. (10 letters per week)
Luna: Exploitation of captured Viet Cong letters. (as available)
I should mention here that we discuss black SOG operations in greater depth in our
article on the Sacred Sword of the Patriots League. Readers
interested in black operations are encouraged to read that article for more information on
the “dirty tricks” of the Vietnam War.
In Volume I of the Department of Defense contracted the Final Report Psychological
Operations Studies – Vietnam, Human Sciences Research Inc, 1971, Drs. Ernest F.
and Edith M. Bairdain mention the value of leaflets:
In regard to the best means for disseminating the Allied message among the Viet
Cong, members who rallied to the government stated that 99% saw propaganda leaflets, 100%
heard airborne loudspeakers, 98% saw radio sets, 34% saw newspapers, 13% saw magazines, 9%
heard ground loudspeakers, 7% read posters, 4% saw television sets and just 1% saw PSYOP
novelty items. Of the enemy who saw the leaflets, 81% of the VC and 97% of the NVA
actually read them. Of the enemy who heard the airborne loudspeakers, 89% of the VC and
98% of the NVA actually listened to the message. The authors point out that this
demonstrates that leaflets, airborne loudspeakers, and radio are the best methods to reach
Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army personnel.
Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces PSYOP
Although Americans like to believe that they invented PSYOP and are the masters of the
art, the Vietnamese were practicing PSYOP early in their war against the Communists. On 1
July 1953 the Vietnamese Army had two PSYOP companies to conduct propaganda in the 1st and
2nd Military Regions (Later Corps Tactical Zones). On 1 January 1958 the unit was renamed
the Mobile Cultural Battalion. On 1 November 1959 it was renamed a PSYWAR Battalion. On 1
March 1963 a decision was made to form 3 PSYWAR Battalions and the original unit became
the 1st PSYWAR Battalion headquartered in Saigon. The 2nd and 3rd PSYWAR battalions would
be assigned to the 2nd and 3rd CTZs headquartered in Pleiku and Da Nang with a 4th
battalion planned to be activated in the 1964-1965 time frame for the 4th CTZ.
A Vietnamese Army Loudspeaker Truck
Not exactly up to U.S. Standards, but apparently it did the job
As an ARVN tactical unit the mission of the battalion was local civic action to promote
confidence in the government, to win the people from the influence of the enemy and to
encourage the people to stand up against the communists; troop morale operations among
ARVN forces to promote a fighting spirit and a strong determination to win, to promote
discipline and a willingness to sacrifice one’s life for the nation and the people;
and PSYOP campaigns against the enemy to break their fighting will and to cause them to
surrender. The original single battalion consisted of 602 men, but under the new
organization, each battalion was authorized 367 men. The battalions have the ability to
produce white, grey and black propaganda using leaflets, loudspeakers, printed material,
photographs and documents. Each battalion supports a corps, the companies support
divisions, the groups support regiments and the PSYWAR teams support battalions.
After the 1963 reorganization the ARVN PSYWAR battalion consisted of a Headquarters and
Headquarters Company, a Technical Company, and three PSYWAR Companies. The Technical
Company was comprised of a Special Operations Platoon, a Cultural Platoon, a Radio
Augmentation Platoon and a Press Platoon. Each of the PSYWAR Companies was made up of six
PSYWAR Teams.
Vietnamese PSYOP structure
The Vietnamese PSYOP structure was designed after that of the Republic of China on Taiwan.
Curiously, the structure was first called the Russian Political Commissar System. In
the Communist system, the military commander was subordinate to the political Commissar.
The system was then adopted by the Communist Chinese. Again, the Political Commissar
insured that the military stay subordinate to the Party. When the Nationalists were driven
to Taiwan, they took this system with them but changed it so that the military commander
was in charge. That same system was adopted by the Vietnamese. The military commander is
superior in authority to the Political officer so there is a unity of command. In 1960,
Vietnamese President Diem visited Taiwan and while there was introduced to this system of
PSYOP. By 1964 Taiwan and the United States had worked together to establish a Political
Warfare system for Vietnam. More of the background of Vietnamese POLWAR can be found in The
Political Warfare Guide for Advisors printed by MACV.
Vietnamese Political Warfare Insignia
The six arrows represent the “six great warfares” first espoused by
Nationalist Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek: Ideological warfare, Stratagem warfare, Mass
warfare, Intelligence warfare, Organizational warfare and Psychological warfare.
Their General Political Warfare Department was made up of a Psychological Warfare
Department, a Political Indoctrination Department, a Social Services Department, Chaplain
Services, a Military Security Service, Information Services and the Political Warfare College.
U.S. forces were advised that because of the peculiar Vietnamese system, a POLWAR
Battalion was not to be considered the equivalent of a PSYOP Battalion.
Major Michael G. Barger compares the US and Vietnamese (ARVN) battalions in Psychological
Operations Supporting Counterinsurgency: 4th PSYOP Group in Vietnam:
| US PSYOP Battalion |
ARVN POLWAR Battalion |
| 200 personnel |
175 personnel |
| 6 printing presses |
1 printing press |
| 8 field teams |
3 field teams |
| No Cultural drama teams |
Cultural drama teams |
| Sociologists & psychologists |
None |
| Journalists, script writers, etc. |
Usually none |
| Propaganda Development Center |
None |
The Vietnamese General Political Warfare
Directorate
First Lieutenant William J. Pollock
During the Vietnam War, United States Army First Lieutenant William J. Pollock was
assigned to the Psywar Department of the General Political Warfare Directorate (GPWD) in
Saigon as a printing and publication advisor from 1969 to 1970. He had obtained a
master’s Degree and taught graphic arts and was a member of the U.S. Army Reserve's
351 PSYOP Company in the Bronx, New York City.
A Patriotic Image – Smiling ARVN with White Dove of Peace
The government of South Vietnam established the General Political Warfare Directorate
but there were problems from the start of the war. This was mainly due to differing
priorities between South Vietnam and the U.S. Between 1964 and 1971, there were 12
different Vietnamese Ministers of Information and that created considerable problems with
maintaining stability within the organization. The Directorate was tasked with producing
patriotic war songs, and anti-Communist plays and literature which depicted the heroic
fighting spirit of the Vietnamese people.
The United States assigned about 18 advisors from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. There
were also a number of Nationalist Chinese and Republic of Korea officers; but no enlisted
personnel. The advisors lived off the local economy; first in small houses, and later when
credible security threats were received, they were billeted in small “bachelor
officer quarters” all over Saigon. They were expected to “blend in."
Production of the Newspaper Tien Tuyen (the Frontline Daily).
This Vietnamese printer hand-set type each day and then hand-fed the paper into old
French era letter presses. The newspapers were then put together for distribution and the
type was cleaned and the repeated. The unit had reporters and editors in Saigon and in the
field. One of Pollock’s duties was going out in the field armed only with his
military issue .45 caliber pistol and paying the staff from a bag of cash. He was warned
to be cautious; the Viet Cong had placed a bounty on his head.
Pollock’s mission was to provide technical and logistical support to the
Vietnamese. The GPWD printed several daily newspapers, a magazine, numerous flyers, aerial
leaflets, pamphlets and the large publicity banners strung up for various events.
GPWD Painters Prepare Large Propaganda Banners
The banners were made for various patriotic celebrations and ceremonies, and many were
prepared when President Nixon made an unscheduled five-and-a-half hour visit to South
Vietnam on 30 July 1969.
Their compound contained a TV studio and 16mm movie processing lab, editing and dubbing
rooms and a radio studio. The Vietnamese did black (secret), white (acknowledged) and gray
(no markings but obvious as to the source) propaganda and the Americans supplied
technological support and liaison. Viet Cong prisoners-of-war were interrogated for
information and encouraged to defect to the government through the Chieu hoi (Open Arms)
program.
GPWD artisans take part in Temple Building
In the United States, politics and religion are kept far apart and it would be unheard
of for a U.S. Army unit to make a statue of the Virgin Mary for a Catholic Church. In
Vietnam, the monks, priests, churches and temples were part of the mission of the GPWD.
The Government of South Vietnam had no restrictions of aiding religion. Here a military
artisan carves a statue to go into a Buddhist temple.
Pollock receives the Vietnamese Technical Service Medal
Pollock was awarded the Bronze Star and the Vietnamese Technical Service Medal awarded
for outstanding initiative and devotion by individuals assigned staff duty. He said that
the Vietnamese gave him a wonderful ceremony and reception along with the award.
The Vietnamese 10th Political Warfare (POLWAR) Battalion worked in I Corps with the U.S.
7th Psychological Operations Battalion. They shared the same compound in Da Nang and their
printing facilities were integrated. The 10th POLWAR consisted of four PSYWAR Companies, a
technical and administrative company, and a cultural drama platoon. Each PSYWAR Company
contained five Civic Action teams, one intelligence team, and one indoctrination team. The
first priority of the POLWAR Battalion was command information; informing and
indoctrinating friendly military forces. The second priority was winning over the civilian
population, and the third was PSYOP efforts aimed at the enemy. The POLWAR Battalion
worked under ARVN Corps Control, Often at division level, and with U.S. advisors available
as needed.
The POLWAR Reproduction Office has the ability to print the following products monthly:
Leaflets: 30,000,000
Posters: 800,000
Booklets: 600,000
Banners: 100
Tien Tuyen newspaper: 600,000
Misc. documents: 100,000
Newspapers prepared by the POLWAR Press and Information Office are:
1. Vanguard (Tien Phong): News for the Officer’s Corps. 20,000 copies.
2. The Republic Fighter (Chien Si Cong Hoa): News for the NCO Corps. 247,000
copies, twice a month.
3. The Fighter (Chien Si Tim Hieu): News for the Enlisted men. 300,000 copies,
twice a month.
4. Frontline (Tien Tuyen): 22,000 copies daily, free to all military personnel.
Credibilis, the 4th PSYOP Group monthly Journal said about the Vietnamese POLWAR
units:
Vietnamese members of the 30th POLWAR Battalion on a hamlet sweep
There is one POLWAR Battalion assigned to each of the Corps Tactical Zones. The 10th
Battalion is in I Corps at Danang. The 20th Battalion is in II Corps at Pleiku, the 30th
Battalion in in III Corps at Bien Hoa, the 40th Battalion in in IV Corps at Can Tho and
the 50th Battalion is in Saigon.
In a Vietnamese-language article entitled “Coastal Raiders” translated by
Donald C. Brewster, Tran Do Cam talks about Vietnamese psychological operations. He
mentions several operations:
Leaflet drops usually took place in the highly populated areas south of the 18th
Parallel.
Large quantities of leaflets were placed in the shell of an 81mm mortar that was
fired into the coastal villages and communities from the fast patrol boats when they were
1,500 to 2,000 meters offshore. The shell would explode overhead like a flare and the
leaflets would flutter down from the sky.
Sometimes the fast patrol boats also distributed radios wrapped in waterproof
plastic in the villages along the coast so that the population could listen to South
Vietnamese radio stations such as the Voice of Freedom (Tiéng Nói Tu Do), Mother of
Vietnam (Me Viêt Nam) or the Sacred Sword of Patriotism (Gýõm Thiên Ái Quôc).
A former agent informs me that Brewster is incorrect with his comment about Mother
Vietnam Radio. He stated that Mother Vietnam radio came into existence after MACV-SOG had
phased out such boat operations.
The Special Operations Research Office of the American University (SORO) published the
classified A Short Guide to Psychological Operations in the Republic of Vietnam in
1965. Authors Jeanne Mintz, Herbert Silverberg and James Trinnaman say about radio
operations:
In 1965 there were 11 radio stations in Vietnam broadcasting 120 hours a day. (This
does not include the “Voice of Freedom” PSYOP broadcasts). The stations were
located in Saigon, Hue, Quang Nhai, Qui Nhon, Banmethuot, Nha Trang, Dalat, Ba Xuyen, Hoi
An, Tuy Hoa and Tan An. The Hue station was used by the ARVN for propaganda broadcasts. Of
course, the Voice of American also broadcast on a great number of frequencies to Vietnam.
The Voice of Freedom (VOF) was a major player in the “black” radio operation.
Declassified documents show that it produced 76 different programs weekly with
commentaries in Vietnamese, English and French. Some of the program titles are; Vietnamese
Traditional Music, Sounds of Poetry, Returnees Songs, the Roman Catholic program, the
Buddhist program, Activities Abroad and at Home, the Daily Battle Scene, News Analysis,
Propaganda and Truth, the Open Arms program and Liberation Deeds.
A knowledgeable source says that the SORO description of the Voice of Freedom as a
"black"station is wrong. At most it was "gray."
Other black Allied radio stations included the SOG fake Radio Hanoi clone broadcast
from Number 7 Hong Tap Street in Saigon; Radio Red Flag, the voice of an alleged breakaway
North Vietnamese Communist Party faction; and the CIA station Red Star Radio, allegedly a
dissident Communist group in South Vietnam. The small fixed-station radios disseminated to
the North Vietnamese by the Allies were codenamed “peanuts.”
By the end of the war the December 1973 Survey
of Psychological Operations in Vietnam says about the radio output:
There are five CAS-operated radio stations, three broadcasting in Vietnamese and two
in Khmer. Mother Vietnam Station, with a Tokyo Rose approach, broadcasts a daily basic
three hour program on five transmitters. The Sacred Sword of the Patriotic League radio
station, a black operation pointed toward Hanoi, broadcasts five hours a day. The Voice of
Nam-Bo Liberation, a black operation directed at communists within South Vietnam
broadcasts to the Mekong delta and Central Vietnam. The Voice of Khmer programs are much
the same as Mother Vietnam, and a black station, the Voice of the Popular Front of
Indochina appears to come from Hanoi but injects divisiveness between Vietnamese
communists and their Khmer allies.
The Voice of America reaches Hanoi from two medium wave transmitters. Big Squirt at Hue
and a million-watt transmitter in the Philippines.
Radio broadcasting by the Government of Vietnam consists of the Voice of Freedom and
two VTVN national radio stations. Channel A broadcasts 18 hours a day and can be heard by
North Vietnamese troops in the Vietnam-Cambodia border area. Channel B is the Political
Warfare station and broadcasts 18 hours a day to the Vietnamese armed forces and their
dependents.
The comment about "five CAS-operated radio stations" means that they were
"controlled American source" stations and the term was used in government
documents as a euphemism for CIA.
What did the Viet Cong think of these radio stations? A 23 May 1967 classified
confidential report translates a captured Viet Cong document. In it, the Party complains
that many leaders, cadre and soldiers are listening to enemy broadcasts and reading enemy
leaflets. They blame this political error on lack of ideological consciousness and lax
discipline. It lists those who are allowed to listen to the broadcasts, such as members of
their own propaganda teams who need to know what the enemy is thinking and other political
cadre, and then goes on to say in part:
Aside from the above mentioned comrades, no cadre are authorized to listen to enemy
broadcasts and to read or keep enemy documents.
The document recommends a private counseling for a first infraction, a public
counseling for a second infraction, and a reprimand for a third infraction.
Mother Vietnam Radio’s seductive voice, identified over the air as
“Mai Lan.”
A sophisticated beauty who had studied broadcasting in the USA, and who became an instant
hit.
Mother Vietnam Radio was run by South Vietnamese Army psychological warfare staff with
American aid during the War. The station had broadcast from 7 Hong Thap Tu Street and was
code-designated “House No. 7.” The station was born in 1971 when Henry Kissinger
called for a psywar radio offensive by the CIA to pressure the Northern communists and
Viet Cong into complying with the terms of the ceasefire agreement recently signed in Paris. The
station effectively featured a seductive female voice, nostalgic music, and plenty of soft
news meant to bury its political message deep in the sentimental appeal that the common
Motherland of all Vietnamese at last deserved peace and the end of bloodshed. It was a
“grey” radio station and moderate in comparison to other propaganda efforts. The
station encouraged North Vietnamese soldiers to defect to the South and sought to break
their morale.
The PSYOP/POLWAR Newsletter of September 1968
says she an earlier asset:
Miss Mai Lan greets American Forces Vietnam Network viewers with “Chao Cac
Anh.” Hello everybody. The statement signals the beginning of another
program in the “Let’s Speak Vietnamese” series on the American network. It
is designed to increase spoken communication between Americans and their
Vietnamese allies, by giving the Americans an opportunity to learn the
basics of their host country’s language. Mai Lan was known to American
troops through her performance as an English-speaking disk jockey on RVNAF
radio. She attended a French High School in Saigon. She learned to speak
English in an American High School in Bangkok, Thailand where her family
lived for two years.
Viet Cong Colonel Tam Ha
Another member of the radio station staff was a former Viet Cong political commissar, a
colonel whom was still addressed by his old Viet Cong name, Tam Ha. Just before the
Viet Cong launched the May 1968 second phase of their Tet Offensive, Tam Ha came over to
the Government side bearing the complete tactical plan for the second VC attempt to
“liberate” Saigon. Thanks to him, the U.S. and Vietnamese troops deployed to
meet the Viet Cong and successfully beat off their attacks.
On 20 April 1975, as South Vietnam was about to fall, the CIA sent all 144 staff
members and their families, totaling about 1000 people and equipment to Phu Quoc Island
off the coast of South Vietnam. The refugees were then picked up by the cargo ship
“Pioneer Challenger” and moved to Guam, from where they were eventually
resettled in the United States. Throughout the program's nearly five years it was continuously headed by the late Jim
Welch. He came to Saigon because "Nixon went to China," so Jim had to close down
his long-running Chinese broadcasts from Taiwan.
I
have talked sparingly about the CIA in Vietnam. This article is about
military propaganda and the CIA is a civilian governmental organization.
The CIA had one officer whose duties included PSYOP, who was assigned as
liaison officer with Military Assistance Command – Vietnam Special Operation
Group Headquarters. I
could say that they had their hands in just about every aspect of the
Vietnam War, and used both their own trained agents and others who were not
actually in the CIA but aligned themselves with it because they believed in
the virtues of the anti-Communist fight. Many of these individuals were
military, civilians, merchant marines, scholars, teachers, and others who
had intimate contact with the Vietnamese and could speak to them informally.
They would simply travel around and report what they saw. One of the perks
for helping the CIA was a passport and an American Express credit card
which allowed them to freely travel in and out of Viet Nam. They often used
Air America and their passports were stamped by Vietnamese immigration
officers as they entered and left. One PSYOP soldier that was also a trained interrogator told me about using a
CIA aircraft on occasion.
Once, when leaving a far north field in II Corps [Dak To, or Pleiku], I flew
to Nha Trang on an Air America blue and white Beech C-45 [Twin Beech in
current civilian terminology]. I was the only one in uniform. A half-dozen
passengers in civilian clothes, including a couple of young and attractive
women. My status in the PSYOP
field and knowledge of the CIA / Air America connection allowed me to be a
passenger. I do not recall how the flight was arranged, or by whom, merely
that I was an allowed passenger, and they were going to where I needed to
be.
Air America operated several C-45s that were extensively modified C-45s with
tricycle landing gear replacing the C-45's tail-dragger landing gear system,
and powerful turboprop engines replacing the C-45's reciprocating engines.
The CIA also operated several U-10 Helio Couriers in Laos, and possibly
Vietnam.
The CIA must have kept a stock of B-52 leaflets. I was told:
All B52 missions, Arc Light in South VN, Linebacker in North VN, other names
for the Trail missions in different countries had to be followed up with
B-52 and Chieu Hoi leaflets. If
we learned late of a planned mission and did not have the leaflets, the CIA
would supply them. At Phan
Thiet, when a short notice B-52 mission was planned for the next morning, I
got a call. The leaflets would
arrive on a blue and white Air America Huey helicopter downtown. I was given the address of the CIA house. We went after dark in our jeep (normally not allowed out of the
compound after dark) and picked up the leaflets from the CIA staff. The next morning, I threw leaflets from a USAF 0-1 Bird Dog, not the
USAF U10 Helio-Courier loudspeaker/leaflet plane.
Over the years I have been amazed at the number of people that now
acknowledge an informal arrangement with the CIA. One tends to think they
were all officers, but many of the agents were mid-level Non-Commissioned
Officers with the ranks of Staff Sergeant and Sergeant First Class.
There is also a record of a PSYWAR Bureau. A mention of this organization is found in Monthly
Historical Summary, April 1966 (Declassified) Appendix II, from the Commander, U. S.
Naval Forces Vietnam. There is a long list of operations that were Civic Action or PSYOP.
We can’t tell in most cases which were Vietnamese and which was American, but in some
specific instances the Vietnamese are identified:
The PSYWAR Bureau issued 22,900 magazines, 52,400 posters, and 91,500 leaflets to
Vietnamese and U.S. units for further distribution. In a special project in conjunction
with JUSPAO, the Vietnamese PSYWAR Bureau produced 10,000 special posters depicting the
new Rung Sat Special Zone and Long Tau River security regulations. These were distributed
to the Rung Sat Special Zone and the four surrounding provinces for posting.
The Manila Conference
In response to an invitation from the President of the Republic of
the Philippines, after consultations with the President of the Republic of
Korea and the Prime Ministers of Thailand and the Republic of Vietnam, the
leaders of seven nations in the Asian and Pacific region held a summit
conference in Manila on October 24 and 25, 1966, to consider the conflict in
South Vietnam and to review their wider purposes in Asia and the Pacific.
The participants were Prime Minister Harold Holt of Australia, President
Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea, Prime Minister Keith Holyoake of
New Zealand, President Ferdinand E. Marcos of the Philippines, Prime
Minister Thanom Kittikachorn of Thailand, President Lyndon B. Johnson of the
United States of America, and Chairman Nguyen Van Thieu and Prime Minister
Nguyen Cao Ky of the Republic of Vietnam.
Leaflet 1526
At the
seven-nation Manila Conference just ended, The Republic of Vietnam listed
six simple requirements for peace in Vietnam. There requirements were all
fully endorsed by the other six allied combatants.
I mention this because an entire series of leaflets were prepared
by the 7th PSYOP Group to tell the people on North and South Vietnam of the
conference and what was decided. 3,000,000 copies of SP-1525 were printed
explaining the six requirements for peace in Vietnam. 10,000,000 copies of
SP-1526 with the same basic message. 13,000,000 copies of
SP-1527 were printed, 10,000,000 for South Vietnam, 3,000,000 for North
Vietnam. The image on this leaflet depicted Vietnamese fisherman pulling in
their nets and the message was once again the six requirements for peace.
The same breakdown on 13,000,000 leaflets was used on SP-1528. The leaflet
depicted President Lyndon B. Johnson with the theme “Manila Conference
Exploitation.”
Leaflet 1528
Speaking to U.S. troops at Cam Ranh Bay, Republic of Vietnam. on 26
October 1966, President Lyndon B. Johnson affirmed:
I GIVE YOU MY
PLEDGE. I SHALL NEVER LET YOU DOWN, NOR YOUR FIGHTING COMRADES, NOR THE 15
MILLION PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM, NOT THE HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF ASIANS WHO
ARE COUNTING ON US TO SHOW NOW IN VIETNAM THAT AGGRESSION DOES NOT PAY.
13,000,000
copies of SP-1529 were printed, 10,000,000 for South Vietnam, 3,000,000 for
North Vietnam. The leaflet depicted the 7 Allied leaders at the conference
and once again explained the results of the conference and conclude with:
The Allied
Forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months
after the above conditions have been fulfilled. Manila 25 October 1966.
Military Black Propaganda
MACV-SOG
Military activities were officially described as providing assistance to
the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). Within the Military Assistance Command
Vietnam, the Studies and Observation Group (MACV-SOG) was charged with conducting
unconventional warfare, including black propaganda.
According to author John Plaster, SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in
Vietnam, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1997:
The Studies and Observations Group did not answer to MACV or its commander, General
William Westmoreland; it answered directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon.
Officially, SOG answered solely to the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and
Special Activities, a two-star general whose small staff responded only to the Joint
Chiefs' operations officer (J-3), with unprecedented direct access to the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs. Any money SOG needed would be buried in the Navy's annual budget.
Allen B. Clark adds in Valor in Vietnam: Chronicles of Honor, Courage, and
Sacrifice: 1963-1977, Casemate, 2013:
The acronym SOG, standing for Studies and Observation Group, was a euphemism for a
semiautonomous element of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, which in fact
answered directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington (in the person of the Special
Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities). The SOG mission was conduct of
clandestine operations throughout Southeast Asia by U.S. members of the various services
and by indigenous personnel. Agent insertions, ambushes and raids, rescue missions, deep
reconnaissance, and interdiction were among the typical SOG cross-border missions. SOG was
established with a chain of command outside MACV channels. SOG would answer directly to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon via a special liaison, the special assistant for
counter-insurgency and special activities (SACSA). In Saigon only General Westmoreland and
four non-SOG officers were even briefed on SOG.
Another explanation of SOG and its duties is found here:
The Studies and Observations Group was a joint unconventional warfare task force
created on 24 January 1964 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a subsidiary command of the
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). The unit would eventually consist primarily
of personnel from the United States Army Special Forces, the United States Navy SEALs, the
United States Air Force, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and elements of the United
States Marine Corps Force Reconnaissance units.
The Special Operations Group (as the unit was initially titled) was in fact controlled
by the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA) and his
staff at the Pentagon. This arrangement was necessary since SOG needed some listing in the
MACV table of organization and the fact that MACV's commander, General William
Westmoreland, had no authority to conduct operations outside territorial South Vietnam.
This command arrangement through SACSA also allowed tight control (up to the presidential
level) of the scope and scale of the organization's operations.
The mission of the organization was to execute an intensified program of harassment,
diversion, political pressure, capture of prisoners, physical destruction, acquisition of
intelligence, generation of propaganda, and diversion of resources, against the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam.
I have mentioned the official explanations for what SOG did, but I think
some personal recollections from friends would give a more rounded look at
their operations. Some comments from old comrades:
All SOG and those “Special Operations” types working in Viet Nam, Laos,
Cambodia, and way up country Thailand, stayed in the Opera Hotel in Bangkok.
We took it over and only we could stay in it.
If a room was not being rented out to one of us, the agency paid for the empty room so no one else stayed in it.I do miss those days.
There was a safe in SOG from which was used to pay “locals” who did special
tasks for us. The safe had gold,
silver, platinum, US currency, Swiss Francs, etc. About anything they
wanted. A majority went to those
who volunteered to be “walking” in a Viet Cong area and get captured.The VC would usually “reeducate” them for about six weeks to several
months.They were trained to
observe where they were kept and the cadre. When they came out, we paid them for the information they could give
us which was usually about $10,000. We would wait several months and then raid the camp with the hope the
cadre captured would know about any American POWs or MIAs. The information was usually slim, but every little bit counted. We used to raid camps with Americans believed to be in them, but the
Viet Cong would escape with the US prisoners or shoot them when it looked
like they were going to lose them. We stopped raiding those camps. At the end of the war, the safe’s
contents were audited, and it came out to the exact amount that should be in
it. We had good men in SOG!
These operations (OPLAN 34-Alpha -
also known as Operation Switchback) were conducted in an effort to convince North Vietnam
to cease its sponsorship of the communist insurgency in South Vietnam. Similar operations
had originally been under the purview of the CIA, which had carried out the emplacement of
agent teams in North Vietnam using air drops and over-the-beach insertions.
Graham A.
Cosmas says about OPLAN 34A in MACV The Joint Command in the Years of
Escalation, 1962–1967, Center of Military History, United States Army,
Washington, D.C., 2006:
The Military
Assistance Command planned and conducted a program of covert South
Vietnamese airborne and amphibious raids into North Vietnam. The Pacific
Command had developed the concept for these operations in mid-1963.
At a Honolulu
conference shortly after Diem’s overthrow, Secretary McNamara reviewed
CINCPAC’s concept and directed MACV and the CIA jointly to prepare a
detailed twelve-month plan for implementing it. The two agencies completed
their Operation Plan (OPLAN) 34A in mid-December. They proposed a total of
over 2,000 activities, in three ascending categories of scale and severity,
to include reconnaissance, psychological warfare, and sabotage operations as
well as small-scale military attacks. All were to be conducted by South
Vietnamese air, ground, and naval units supplemented by Asian, mostly
Chinese Nationalist, mercenaries. MACV and the CIA would furnish equipment,
advisers, and base facilities within South Vietnam; but no Americans were to
enter North Vietnam.
After an
interdepartmental committee in Washington reviewed the plan and refined the
proposed list of actions, President Johnson on 16 January 1964 authorized
commencement of the first, most limited, phase of OPLAN 34A on 1 February.
Ambassador Lodge and General Harkins then secured South Vietnamese approval
of the plan, an essential step since the Saigon government would furnish
most of the forces involved. Aside from a jurisdictional dispute over
responsibility for certain agency-run activities along the North
Vietnam–Laos border, the Military Assistance Command and the Central
Intelligence Agency cooperated with little difficulty in carrying out OPLAN
34A.
To conduct the
commando operations, General Harkins in March established the Special
Operations Group, later retitled the Studies and Observations Group, within
MACV headquarters. Headed by an Army colonel with a CIA deputy and with an
initial strength of 99 military people and 31 civilians, the group commanded
the American personnel engaged in 34A and other special operations and
advised, assisted, and supported the South Vietnamese armed forces in
planning and carrying out the missions. Although the MACV commander had
operational control of SOG, final implementing authority for its activities
rested elsewhere. Based on monthly lists of activities recommended by MACV,
the Defense Department, in consultation with the White House and State
Department, made the final selections of operations to be conducted and
retained a veto over the launching of every raid.
MACV-SOG's efforts were organized around six sections that were assigned
responsibility for clandestine operations (OP). OP-33 was the PSYOP Branch, patterned
after the World War II Morale Operations Branch of the OSS; 1n 1968 it was re-designated
OP-39, the Psychological Studies Group.
MACV-SOG branches:
