The Military Assistance Command Vietnam, the Studies and
Observation Group (MACV-SOG) was charged with conducting unconventional warfare, including
black propaganda. MACV-SOG's efforts were organized around sections that were assigned
responsibility for clandestine operations (OP). OP-33 was the PSYOP Branch, patterned
after the World War II Morale Operations Branch of the OSS; 1n 1968 it was re-designated
OP-39, the Psychological Studies Group.
The Operations Staff Directorate was divided into numbered divisions: OP31 through
OP35. This was Navy nomenclature because MACV was originally organized and supported by
CINCPAC, a Navy dominated unified command.
OP-33: PSYOP Studies Branch. Code-named -"Humidor". Comprised
four sections: (a) Research and development; (b) Radio; (c) Special Projects; and (d)
Printed media, forgeries and black mail. Within section (d), the military was in charge of
printed media, and the CIA oversaw forgeries and black mail. PSYOP operations conducted by
(d) included the Sacred Sword of Patriots League (SSPL); the contamination of enemy
ammunition; the mailing from three countries of leaflets, gifts and fake letters; and the
preparation (for Laos) of forged currency and booby traps. Redesignated OP-39,
Psychological Studies Group, in 1968. Lieutenant Colonel
Tom Bowen commanded OP-33 from 22 August 1967 to 17 April 1968, retired as a
Brigadier General. Major
James H. Spear ran MACV-SOG OP-33 operations from 67 to 69 under Tom Bowen
and for a while under General John K. Singlaub. General Singlaub later said
about the black radio stations of the SSPL:
We would spend
our time feeding the Vietnamese fishermen well, fattening them up, so to
speak; we cured any medical problems they had, whether it was rashes or
whatever. This indicated that things were better in the resistance area
than they were in their own village. We collected information from them
and provided them with information about the Hanoi government on
corruption, etc. So, when they went back, they were healthier and
certainly had more pounds. We'd give them very high-calorie foods. But we
spent a lot of time discussing the fallacies of communism, and they would
tell us about acts of corruption and dishonesty among officials. We would
then be able to broadcast very specific cases to create disruption inside
North Vietnam. OP-33 and OP-31 worked closely because of the Paradise
Island operation.
Our goal, as I
was briefed originally, was to create a resistance movement in the North
and you don't do that overnight. The black psywar, the grey psywar was
building up the psychological acceptance of this. The fact that I got that
extra squadron of C-130s gave me the capability to resupply units. Now, we
were doing PSYOP drops in the North including radios with preset channels,
and some leaflets, and gift packages to certain areas. We had the
capability of supplying an area as soon as we got some indication that we
had a resistance going. And the North, after they would wrap up a team,
tried to get us to drop the supplies they wanted, especially watches and
things like that. In terms of these agent teams, after I conducted a
study, it was my conclusion that all the agent teams had been doubled.
That was when I decided that we would use it as a conduit for
disinformation and deception and maybe keep the guys alive. If we just
turned it off, I'm as convinced they would have killed them. Alive they
meant something to the intelligence service, and they would want to keep
them alive.
The senior CIA
guy was there as an advisor to chief SOG. He was our liaison. There were,
I think, eight or nine CIA people in SOG. As I recall, a couple of them
were linguists and so they were working with the people producing the
programs. After I had the idea for the Eldest Son project, which was the
sabotaged ammunition, I wanted to exploit that, and they helped. The OP 33
people who had the responsibility for this were working very closely with
the agency people who were scattered throughout doing other operations.
That's one of the benefits we had of being closely tied to the agency.
The Official SOG History explains in greater detail:
The psychological operations directed by MACSOG from January 1964 to mid-1969 were
referred to simply as “Psychological Operations’ until the code name
“HUMIDOR” was assigned in 1967 to those activities of the Psychological Group
directed against North Vietnam (NVN). Included under HUMIDOR were black and white (gray)
radio operations, leaflet and gift kit operations, black letter operations, and Paradise
Island (ostensibly the headquarters of the Sacred Sword Patriots’ League (SSPL))
operations.
The 1968 MACSOG Mission Statement says, “The mission of MACSOG Psychological
Operations Group (POG) is to conduct black psychological operations directed against NVN
... identified by the code word HUMIDOR. The primary target of HUMIDOR operations is the
civilian population of NVN. These operations are conducted to: establish attitudes
within NVN contrary to present policies of the Lao Dong Party (LDP), create a feeling of
distrust for the leadership of the DRV, promote war weariness and engender an attitude
which indicates that continuation of the war is contrary to DRV national welfare.”
The MACSOG Documentation Study, Annex A,
Psychological Operations, 10 July 1970, was originally classified “Top-Secret
Sensitive,” later downgraded to “Secret.” It is now declassified. It says
that the first facilities of the Sacred Sword of the Patriotic League were built in 1964
on Paradise Island (code-named DODO). The Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed in 1965 that some
sort of resistance movement in North Vietnam be formed and supported. The United States
government was unwilling to support a resistance movement and the recommendation was
disapproved. In 1966 COMUSMACV recommended the establishment of a front organization to
worry North Vietnam. In 1966 the mission of the American Psychological Operations Group
was to work with the Vietnamese Strategic Technical Service (STS) in halting northern
support for guerrilla activities in the south. The two headquarters occupied the same
building at Number 7, Hong Thap Tu, Saigon. The location housed propaganda production
studios, a print shop, a library and a storage vault. Tactical leaflets were marked with a
“sword,” strategic leaflets bore a “freedom arrow.” Declassified SOG
documents show the extent of the leaflet operation in Vietnam. 31 million leaflets were
dropped in 1964, 67 million in 1965, 142 million in 1966 and 271 million in 1968. MACV could produce 200,000 3x6-inch leaflets per
eight-hour shift on its Harris high-speed press. The PSYWAR Directorate had a Webendorf
Press that that SOG was authorized to use from 1600-2400. It could produce 500,000
leaflets per shift. A black SSPL radio was set up first in Hue, later in Thu Duc. The
Navy also broadcast SSPL programs as part of Operation Jenny from EC-121 aircraft. In 1967
SOG’s mission emphasized the increasing the credibility of the SSPL as a resistance
movement in North Vietnam.
The Viet Cong knew that the black radio station Guom Thieng Ai Quoc (Sacred
Sword and Patriotism) was an American station. Proof of this appears in a declassified 2
May 1967 149th Military Intelligence group document entitled “Viet Cong
Propaganda.” The document states that four VC gave a propaganda speech to assembled
forest workers on 12 April 1967 where they told the audience that the station was an
American propaganda tool. The “Black” radio station claimed to broadcast from Ha
Tinh Province (Le Loi's home province), but actually transmitted from American bases in South
Vietnam
OPS-34: Airborne Studies Branch. Responsible for northern infiltration by air.
This operation became the Ground Studies Branch, which was then assigned to
OPS-35; OPS-34 became a staff section, and OP-36 became the Airborne Studies Group.
Infiltration operations were code-named "Timberwork," and later
"Forae." Since it was part of the infiltration campaign there were also
black radio stations that pretended to be in the North and would broadcast
instructions to different groups that were imaginary. Occasionally it would
go off the air with stories of having been attacked and pursued and then
come back later. This was often done by the British black radio to Germany
in WWII.
OPS-35: Ground Studies Branch. Responsible for cross-border operations. It was
comprised of three elements.
Special Operations Augmentation Command and Control Central (SOACCC) was formed in
November 1967 and departed Vietnam in March 1971. It was stationed in Kontum, with
responsibility for classified unconventional warfare operations throughout the tri-border
regions of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. It had around 30 Spike Reconnaissance Teams (RT).
Hatchet Forces, and four Search Location and Annihilation Mission Companies (SLAM
Companies A, B, C and D). Originally named after states (Arizona, New Mexico, etc.), RTs
later adopted names of Asian poisonous snakes and assorted designations once all state
names had been exhausted.
Special Operations Augmentation Command and Control North (SOACCN) was formed in
November 1967 and departed Vietnam in March 1971. It was assigned conduct of classified
special unconventional warfare missions into Laos and North Vietnam. It was composed of
Spike reconnaissance teams, Hatchet forces and lettered SLAM companies. Missions into
North Vietnam were initiated as early as I February 1964 under Operation Plan 34A.
Operations into Laos commenced in September 1965 as part of Operation SHINING BRASS,
renamed PRAIRIE FIRE in 1968. In 1971 the Laotian operations were given the code name PHU
DUNG.
Special Operations Augmentation Command and Control South (SOACCS) was formed in
November 1967 and departed Vietnam in March 1971. It was located in Ban Me Thuot and
created when permission was granted to conduct cross-border missions into Cambodia. It was
engaged in classified special unconventional warfare missions inside VC-dominated South
Vietnam and throughout Cambodia. It contained Spike reconnaissance teams, Hatchet forces,
and four SLAM companies. Cross-border operations had been conducted into northeastern
Cambodia since May 1967 under Project DANIEL BOONE, later known as SALEM HOUSE. In 1971
the name was changed to THOT NOT.
It should be noted that prior to 1968, OP-35’s CCN, CCC & CCS were called FOBs
(Forward Operating Bases). There were 4 FOBs. FOB1 later became the CCN. FOB 2 & 3
combined to form the CCC. FOB4, became the CCS.
Boots Porter, 1SG, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) during Vietnam adds:
In 1968 I was at FOB-1 (Phu Bai), FOB-2 (Kontum) and FOB-4 (Danang). After the
change FOB-4 became CCN, FOB-2 became CCC and FOB-5 (Ban Me Thut) Became CCS. You can take
it to the bank. I was there at each of them.
OP-37: Maritime Studies Group. The Maritime Studies Group was the action arm
of OP-31: the Maritime Studies Branch, and was responsible for covert maritime operations
conducted by the Vietnamese Coastal Security Service (CSS). Its cover name was the Naval
Advisory Detachment. The capability to carry out missions against North Vietnam was
maintained through extensive training at Da Nang and by conducting operational missions
against selected targets in South Vietnam.
SOG comprised about 400 soldiers at a given time. About 100 soldiers were doing
actual combat duty, with each of the three Command and Control units of OP-35 having about
36 Americans.
The "Sacred Sword" refers to a Viet hero named Le Loi who expelled China from
Vietnam in the 15th Century with a magical sword.
Robert W. Chandler mentions the historic Vietnamese opposition to China in War
of Ideas: the U.S. Propaganda campaign in Vietnam, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981.
He says:
No less than fifteen times during the last 900 years the people (of
Vietnam) responded to the call to arms, frustrating invasion attempts by superior Chinese
and Mongol forces. Each time a trespasser presented himself at their doorstep, the
peasants threw themselves into the conflict, routing the invaders and preserving
independence.
The resistance most remembered by the Vietnamese was the successful
overthrow of the fifty-year Chinese interregnum in 1428. Le Loi, an aristocratic landowner
called the "Prince of Pacification," encouraged and led the people in a decade
of incessant guerrilla warfare that evicted the intruders. His leadership became legendary
over the following centuries; repeated by word-of-mouth from one generation to the next.
JUSPAO Leaflet 1668A – Le Loi
JUSPAO prepared a series of leaflets, handouts and posters that depicted Le
Loi. They are all numbered 1668, and the variations have alpha characters attached.
The standard handout numbered 1668 is in full color and depicts Le Loi in armor
at the head of a Vietnamese peasant army. It is 7 x 10 inches in size. The text in
Vietnamese is, "Follow the example of Hero Le Loi. Promote the unyielding spirit of
the Vietnam people in the destruction of the Communists and the salvation of the
country." There is also an identical poster numbered 1668, but the size is 20 x 28
inches.
Other variations are 1668A (a postcard sized leaflet printed four to a 8 x 10
1/2 sheet), 1668B (A standard leaflet printed nine to a 10 1/2 x 16 sheet), and a
Cambodian-language leaflet numbered 1668C (a postcard sized leaflet printed four to a 8 x
10 1/2 sheet).
The story of the sacred sword is famous in Vietnamese folklore. The story dates
back to the time of the Ming dynasty. The Chinese domination weighed heavily on Vietnam.
Overburdened with taxes, the peasants of Thanh Hoa province, Lam Son district, rebelled
but were easily defeated by the Chinese.
Long Quan, the spiritual Emperor of Water intervened. He sent a gift to a Thanh
Hoa fisherman called Le Than. One night as he lifted his net, Than found that it was much
heavier than usual. He thought it contained an iron bar so he threw in back into the
water. A little later he netted the same iron bar. After the third occurrence he looked
more closely and found that the bar was in fact, a sword.
Le Loi and some soldiers visited Than. In a corner shone the sword. Astonished,
Le Loi took up the sword and studied it. On the sword were the words, "By the will of
Heaven!"
Later, after a military defeat, Le Loi and his lieutenants saw a strange light
on top of a banyan tree. Climbing up the tree he found that it came from a sword hilt
inlaid with jade. He then remembered the sword he had seen at Than's house. The next day,
he informed Than of his discovery. The hilt fit the sword perfectly.
Than said, "My prince, it's Heaven who sent it to you! We pledge to follow
you and sacrifice our lives for the independence of the Homeland!"
The sacred sword in Le Loi's hands made him invincible, and so motivated his
troops that soon the whole country was liberated.
One year after the Ming had been driven out, Le Loi, who had become King, went
boating on the Ta Vong Lake, in the heart of the capital. A gold tortoise approached the
boat. "Please be so kind as to return to my master Long Quan, the Emperor of the
Kingdom of Waters, the sacred sword that he has entrusted you." Le Loi threw the
sword into the water where the gold tortoise swallowed it and dived. Since that day that
the Ta Vong Lake has been called "Sword Lake" or more exactly "Lake of the
Restored Sword."
Note the similarity between this Vietnamese legend and the story of King
Arthur, Excalibur, and the Lady of the lake.
Every child in North Vietnam knew the story of Le Loi, and he was second only
to Ho Chi Minh in their list of national heroes. He was a perfect symbol for the West to
use as a fighter against imperialism and oppression, and the CIA quickly decided that his
story would work well in an anti-Communist PSYOP campaign.
Kenneth Conboy and Dale Andrade mention the concept of the new Sacred Sword in Spies
and Commandos - How America Lost the Secret War in North Vietnam, University Press of
Kansas, 2000. Some of their comments are:
Five hundred years later the sacred sword returned to Vietnam, although the
twentieth century version was the brainchild of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. From
its origins in the dying days of the First Indochina War, America's spy organization
launched a cover operation against Hanoi that would have far reaching effects on U.S. cold
war policy, not just in Southeast Asia but throughout the world.
The new sacred sword was wielded by psychological warriors, men who fought with
ideas instead of weapons, propaganda instead of bullets. Summoning the specter of China -
Vietnam's timeless foe - was not lost on CIA planners. Updating the legend, they hoped to
use it to convince the North Vietnamese people that their government was a lackey of China
and the Soviet Union. The same disinformation also criticized the South Vietnamese
reliance on the United States, a tactic designed to mask Washington's hand in the scheme
and capitalize of Vietnam's historical distrust of any foreign intervention. The point of
the sacred sword was to rid Vietnam of all foreigners just as Le Loi had done
centuries before.
The Sacred Sword of Patriotism symbol
The background of the PSYOP campaign to form and support a fake anti-Communist
movement within North Vietnam is told in several books. Most agree that Herb Weisshart of
the CIA was named deputy chief of the North Vietnam Operations Branch in Saigon. About
that same time Washington was in the process of switching the PSYOP operations to MACVSOG
under "Operation Switchback." The CIA and military worked very closely from that
time forward.
Weisshart was appointed Deputy Head of MACVSOG, specializing in psychological
operations from its inception in January 1964 to Mid-1965. He recalls some of his
activities:
From 1961-1963 activities included leaflet and gift kit airdrops, gray and black radio
broadcasts (VOF and VOSSPL), the initial development of the notional resistance movement
and a very few special air operations (intelligence gathering). We also ran maritime
operations using small boats for psywar, intelligence, and paramilitary actions against
coastal targets. I would characterize these operations as very modest. It was a small
program.
When I went out there and started the SSPL, increased the leaflet drops, accelerated
the radio programs, it was only for one reason. That was to see what we could do to force
North Vietnam to take some of their assets and divert them to worrying about what we
were doing in their backyard. You couldn't expect much more. We had an awful situation in
the South to propose as an alternative for what the people in the North were experiencing.
It was not a great psywar comparison that we could capitalize on. We just had to hope that
there were reasons why some people up north would be dissatisfied, and that we could
capitalize on it early in the game. Nevertheless, at the time I believed there were
several reasons why they wouldn't want to be dissatisfied. It was a tough situation at
that time.
The SSPL was planned and implemented beginning in April 1963. It was based on a similar
notional resistance movement program developed elsewhere in 1952 and still in effect in
1963. Soon after my arrival in South Vietnam we sought a legend and an easily recognized
symbol upon which to base a notional resistance movement in NVN. Several of my staff had
previous experience in leaflets, radios, propaganda, over flight and notional internal
resistance operations. We casually interviewed several Vietnamese and learned of the
Sacred Sword legend. The sword was said to rest at the bottom of a NVN lake (known as
Sword Lake). It was said to have been placed there to be used only by those individuals or
groups that would rally the people against despotic rulers and outside invaders.
Allegedly, it was used in a former dynastic period and returned to the lake.
Weisshart is mentioned by Thomas L. Ahern, Jr. in the 2005 declassified
“Center for the Study of Intelligence” secret publication: The Way We Do Things:
Black Entry Operations Into North Vietnam, 1961-1964. The author mentions the SSPL just in
passing as a minor part of the duties of the CIA sabotage teams introduced into North
Vietnam.
In May 1963, CIA Headquarters sent Herbert Weisshart, a covert political action
specialist, to Saigon to set up a notional resistance movement. Invoking Vietnamese
mythology, it was to be called the Sacred Sword Patriots' League (SSPL). It would provide
an ostensible sponsor for real teams on the ground and, if all went well, would provoke
paranoia in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam hierarchy. The first team trained for this
multiple mission included ethnic Hmong and Thai. Team EASY parachuted into the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam near the Laotian border, on 11 August 1963, and soon came up on the air.
Team SWAN had the same training and a similar multiple mission to spread SSPL
leaflets while collecting intelligence and hitting sabotage targets. But it had much less
luck. Jumping on 4 September into the area of Cao Bang, in the northern reaches of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, it was promptly seized by security elements. All the
station knew, for the moment, was that it failed to come up on the air.
Mervyn Roberts also mentions Weisshart in his 2016 report: United States
psychological operations in support of counterinsurgency: Vietnam, 1960 to 1965:
Herbert Weisshart, a covert political action specialist, arrived in Saigon in March
1963 to organize a notional resistance movement for the CIA. Weisshart had experience
providing PSYOP support to notional teams in China and later helped to draft OPLAN 34A
that transferred the covert operations in Vietnam to the military. Appealing to Vietnamese
mythology, Weisshart created the Secret Sword of the Patriots League (SSPL). In 1428, this
mythological sword had been delivered to the tale's hero by a turtle swimming in a Hanoi
lake. With this sword, the Vietnamese were able to defeat the invading Chinese. Weisshart
hoped to create dissension between the Vietnamese and Chinese by utilizing this image. He
recalled that it would provide an ostensible sponsor for real teams on the ground and,
if all went well, would provoke paranoia in the DRV hierarchy. To support this program
Weisshart developed operations like Operation Loki, where captured North Vietnamese
fishermen were indoctrinated into believing they were in an area controlled by the
notional resistance movement SSPL.
Under Operation Loki, North Vietnamese fisherman were kidnapped and brought to Cu
Lao Cham Island, or Paradise Island, off Da Nang. They were indoctrinated at an SSPL
resistance camp notionally located in North Vietnam. The men were held several days and
then sent home with PSYOP-themed gift baskets. Reportedly, some fishermen sought to be
kidnapped to receive the medical treatment provided and, according to later SOG commander
John K. Singlaub, a chance to gain an average of over 20 pounds during their ordeal. Some
of the fisherman knew exactly where they were, having visited the island during the course
of their lives. Eventually, SOG had to limit the number of times a man could be kidnapped.
In light of this, it is unlikely the overt purpose for the camp succeeded. However, it may
have provided other intangible benefits later in the war when the program was used to
disseminate faulty intelligence.
Richard H. Shultz Jr. Says in The Secret War Against Hanoi, New York, NY: Harper
Collins Publishers, 1999:
The psywar that SOG carried out against North Vietnam included the following
operations: the creation of a notional or fabricated resistance movement, known as the
Sacred Sword of the Patriotic League (SSPL), whose purpose was to foster the impression
that a well-organized resistance movement was active in North Vietnam; and the
indoctrination of North Vietnamese detainees at Paradise Island. Started in 1965, the
latter operation sought to convince kidnapped North Vietnamese fishermen that the SSPL was
real and that they had been taken to a liberated part of North Vietnam.
The official cover story for the operation is told in the SOG history:
The Sacred Sword Patriots League (Guom Thieng Ai Quoc) is a notional organization,
utilized as a cover for US/GVN Maritime and Psychological Operations against North
Vietnam. Supposedly, The Sacred Sword Patriots League is a group of dissident,
nationalistic Vietnamese striving to free their beleaguered country from the grip of all
who oppress her. The present membership if approximately 10,000 people, both active and
passive, and includes almost 1,600 regular militia. The membership is located mostly in
North Vietnam and is organized into activity zones. At present, the major actions of the
SSPL have taken place in areas of the North Vietnamese ‘Panhandle’, close to
the League’s safe zones located below the 19th parallel. Its present actions consist
of radio broadcasts (VOSSPL) from a station in one of these safe zones, maritime
operations conducted by CSS/NAD, detention of fishermen at PARADISE, and psychological
operations involving leaflets and letters.
Evolution of the SSPL.
The roots of the SSPL can be traced back to the anti-French, nationalistic movement
of the 1930’s and ‘40’s. Many present members of the SSPL were formerly
with the Viet Minh, the Vietnam Quoc Dan Dong (VNQDD), and the Dai Viet nationalist
parties. Towards the late 1940’s the power of the Communists began to grow in the
nationalistic movement, and, by the early 1950’s, their strength became all too
obvious.
In February 1953, a terror wave, designed to eliminate all the non-communist resistance
leaders, forced many of the true nationalists to flee for their lives. Le Quoc Hung and
many others sought sanctuary in the remote highlands of Nghe An and Ha Tinh provinces.
Here, on 17 April 1953, in one of these hidden areas, seven nationalistic leaders met and
formed the Sacred Sword Patriots League. This historic meeting later became known as
‘The Soldier’s Conference’.
Following Dien Bien Phu in late May, l954, Le Quoc Hung and his followers attempted to
raise support for their nationalistic movement. The horror of the Land Rent Reduction and
Land Reform Campaigns rallied many people to their side. A revolt was staged in Nghe An
Province, but was ruthlessly squashed by the Lao Dong Party’s troops. The battered
new organization was forced underground. Secret cells were formed in many villages and
hamlets and secret training areas were set up. These later became the League’s safe
zones.
In December 1961, the League held its first National Congress at which Le Quoc Hung
was named President and under the hand of Hoang Chinh Nghia, the SSPL Manifesto was
drafted. In July 1962, the League’s militia was unified under Nguyen Thanh Le and in
early 1964; the League’s first printing plant became operational. At the second
National Congress, Le Quoc Hung retired in favor of Hoang Chinh Nghia. The membership of
the SSPL in 1965 had risen to 7,000. In April 1965, the Voice of the SSPL began
broadcasting words of hope and freedom from its secure location in Ha Tinh Province and
Indoctrination of selected people throughout NVN in the precepts of the SSPL was begun at
PARADISE.
The Third National Congress in December 1967 re-elected Hoang Chinh Nghia as President.
The SSPL militia had grown to 1,600 with a total membership in the SSPL of 10,000.
Support of the SSPL. The SSPL is supported by patriots from many different
countries, and is, in fact, anti-US. The League has friends in the Vietnamese communities
in Bangkok, Hong Kong, Taiwan, France, and many other locations. The SSPL is willing to
accept help from anyone who is against the type of exploitation of free people that the
United States, Red China, and the Soviet Union are currently perpetrating in Vietnam.
Policies and Goals of the SSPL. In the eyes of the SSPL, the Vietnamese War has turned
into a struggle between the Communist world powers (The Lao Dong Party) and the Capitalist
world powers (the Thieu/Ky regime). The Vietnamese people are caught in the middle. It
is the purpose of the League to work for the people, and against those who bring harm to
Vietnam. The SSPL supports two ‘Pillars for Peace,’ Removal and Reparation. They
seek a halt in the US bombing of the Vietnamese people, a removal of all the NVN forces
from South Vietnam, and of all foreign troops from Vietnam. In addition, they seek payment
from the major powers to rebuild their war torn country. The SSPL blames the Lao Dong
Party for the continuing Vietnamese hardships and the unfavorable status of the Vietnamese
nation. These conditions are a direct result of the LDP’s close ties with Peking and
the war policies being demanded by Peking in return for support of the LDP. In general,
its views are nationalistic, in favor of unification, against the fratricidal fighting,
and against any attempts at exploiting the Vietnamese people.
Before we leave this part of the history, I should point out that
other Top-Secret – Sensitive documents from SOG show that there were
considerable problems and debates between Washington, the Chiefs or Staff,
the Navy, and SOG about what should be done and how it should be done. Some
officials thought the U.S. Navy should run the program while others thought
the Vietnamese should run it since the organization was supposed to be a
patriotic Vietnamese group. American sailors might be seen or even captured
and that would not help the program. There were arguments about how many
prisoners (or “guests” if you prefer) should be taken and how many the
island could host at any given time. I am going to add some of the comments
from this document below, they are in no order and just give an idea of how
complicated the mission was. These comments are random but show that things
did not always run as smoothly as we might suppose. This is a peak behind
the curtain where we see what was really going on.
The first discretionary authority was granted to CINCPAC in January 1965.
CINCPAC was authorized to approve separate LOKI (junk capture) missions to
meet Intelligence requirements. Further extension of these authorities was
granted in November 1965. CINCPAC was authorized to employ the PTPs in
shipping interdiction missions and to deliver psychological leaflets by 81mm
mortar rounds at his discretion.
One hundred and seventy missions sortied over a period of 356 possible
operational days during 1965. MAROPS missions effected the capture of 126
prisoners, the destruction of more than 50 enemy Junks and damage to 19
enemy vessels, including three patrol craft. Forty-nine bombardment and 25
psychological harassment (PSYHAR) missions were considered successful. 13
deliveries of gift kits, radios and psychological warfare materials were
fulfilled. One thousand radios were delivered, 28,752 gift kits dispensed,
and 1,124,600 leaflets dispensed by 81 MM mortar. MINT/LOKI operations were
approximately 50 percent successful.
In compliance with the concept of non-attributability to US sponsorship of
actions in NVN territory, US assigned personnel were not permitted to
accompany nor participate in actions north of the 17th parallel line of
demarcation. Planning and operational control were retained by the United
States Government. Operations included but were not limited to interdiction
and harassment accomplished by interception, capture, interrogation, and
destruction, as appropriate, of North Vietnamese logistic craft and armed
junks; bombardment of coastal targets and cross-beach operations Involving
"sea-commando" teams; and delivery of psychological warfare material
including propaganda leaflet, radios, and gift kits.
OPERATIONS – In 1966 maritime operations accounted for 2,000,600
psychological harassment (PSYHAR) Leaflets Distributed by 81mm Mortar,
60,000 PSYHAR Gift Kits Delivered, and 2,600 PSYHAR Radios Delivered.
The NASTP-Class PTF was an 80-foot, 80-ton diesel-powered, mahogany hulled
craft capable of speeds up 7 to 40 knots, with cruising range of 860 to
1,050 miles depending on speed.
[The most potent of SOG's Maritime resources were the PTFs, the so called
"Nasty" Class motor gunboats built by Batservice Verft A/S in Mandal,
Norway.] It was believed that this type craft could be operated as
non-attributable to the United States and would greatly improve the
capability to conduct covert marine operations.
In 1967, a total of 101 missions were conducted for the purpose of
capturing prisoners. A total of 328 prisoners were captured on 56 missions.
Thus, an average of approximately 6 prisoners were captured per mission and
approximately 56% of the missions were successful. Therefore, to furnish 100
prisoners per month to paradise Island, which is the number expected to be
processed each month, a total of 16 successful missions per month should be
conducted (16 x 6 = 96 prisoners per month). Only 56% of the missions can be
expected to be successful. To arrive at the total number of missions which
should be scheduled: 16 successful 12. missions = .56 (total missions to be
scheduled) or 28 missions per month.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff imposed restraint on the employment of
detainees for intelligence and defection operations. To obtain JCS approval
for such employment in cases where large scale defection operations are not
involved, unrealistic and limits the effectiveness of PLOWMAN. Operations
have been limited by this JCS imposed restraint. A JCS decision can be
acquired in sufficient time to plan the return of detainees for intelligence
or defector operations. Once these personnel are earmarked for this type of
operation, additional training Is required. Decisions from JCS should be
expected in less time than it takes to provide this required training.
PLOWMAN PSYOP in support of the SSPL program have been successful
in that they have provided the only personnel for personal Indoctrination
and have distributed, on a personal basis, SSPL gifts and literature.
Intelligence derived, while generally low-level, has included some
significance and represented the only human intelligence (HUMINT) from the
coastal provinces of NVN.
Most prisoners captured, both for SSPL and intelligence purposes,
have been from a small area, 93% of all captured during 1967 were from two
of the six PLOWMAN operation areas. The success of the PLOWMAN operations is
dependent on the training of the Vietnamese personnel. However, training of
PTF crews in operational tactics is insufficient to insure the most optimum
results from each mission. Although PLOWMAN operations are covert, launching
a mission is easily visible to anyone and tracks to the Operational areas
are not always outside radar range of the NVN coast.
PLOWMAN psychological operations have achieved a significant impact
in NVN by providing the coastal fishing population with evidence of an
alternative to communist suppression, exacerbating strains between the
population and the government and party structure, and varying degrees and
modes of concern at the several levels of NVN leadership at the existence of
dissident elements in the NVN population.
PLOWMAN operations appropriate to the original mission occur in
coastal waters south of 20 degrees 30 minutes North Latitude. CADO missions
of destruction [Sabotage], if related to SSPL, could be counterproductive
unless the NVN populace has been told that SSPL is going to destroy a
specific objective in the interest of furthering the SSPL. To destroy
targets which do not enhance SSPL could produce a fear of the SSPL In the
minds of the populace.
The JCS authorized CINCPAC to approve and execute the following
missions. DRIFT. Distribution of gift kits and transistor radio ashore and
offshore. (b) CADO. Psychological deception operations executed by agents
infiltrated and exfiltrated by rubber boats launched from PTFs, on isolated
stretches of the NVN coast. SWALLOW missions are team captures ashore. LOKI
and SWALLOW (Junk and shore kidnap) operations were considered the most
lucrative from the viewpoint of accomplishment. The operations were
recognized as a "primary source of information on activities within the DRV
and additionally were considered effective beyond actual damage created, in
causing constant alert of NVN shore defenses and burdensome concern that an
attack was imminent at any place along the coast south of the 20th parallel.
PSYWAR - The psychological warfare
program was introduced including leaflet bombardment and delivery of gift
kits, supported by related 'radio propaganda and news broadcasts, and
thorough indoctrination of NVN prisoners to be later returned NVN.
Emphasis was shifted from traffic interdiction to support of psychological
warfare operations in early 1968, as additional restrictions were introduced
prohibiting destruction of Junks less than 10 meters in length, unless they
were determined to be carrying military supplies or an uncommon amount of
foodstuff or cargo. Smaller junks obviously employed in fishing were spared.
Detention of NVN fishermen was discontinued 3 April by JCS order and 81mm
leaflet distribution confined to south of 20°N. On 6 April leaflet bombs
were further limited to 19°N by CINCPAC. Gift distributions were similarly
restricted on 10 April. The 16 April message also curtailed MAROPS to permit
only coastal 12 reconnaissance south of 19°N and detainee return missions,
N0 MORE than 20 to 23 detainees at one time were authorized at the Paradise
Island Camp with length of detention period reduced. Rules of engagement
were eased on 1 June to permit destruction 19 of waterborne logistic craft
below 19°N and collection of 20 detainees was again authorized In July. The
last detainee was returned to North Vietnam 22 October 1968.
Location of Cu Lao Cham Island
Cu Lao Cham Island
Paradise Island was actually Cu Lao Cham located south of the 17th
Parallel, well inside the waters of the Republic of South Vietnam.
John L. Plaster also mentions the operation in SOG: The Secret Wars of
America’s Commandos in Vietnam, Simon and Schuster, 1997. He tells of North
Vietnamese fisherman being kidnapped at sea and taken to a remote village:
In a small cove stood an ordinary looking North Vietnamese fishing village,
except a bamboo stockade encircled it, as in the old anti-French liberation war days, and
over it flew not the North Vietnam Communist flag, but the large blue and white banner of
what they had been told was the Sacred Sword of the Patriotic League.
"This is liberated territory," their guide boasted as they
pulled up to the dock. "You are welcome here brothers."
Camp Dodo, Paradise Island
(Photos courtesy of MSG Kenneth Mancil)
SOG documents expand on the description:
Located off the coast southeast of Da Nang, operations commenced in May 1964, as a
detention center for captured fishermen to indoctrinate them in the precepts of the SSPL
and then return them to NVN. The code name for the US complex constructed in 1965 on
Paradise Island was DODO. It included the US and Vietnamese Command Posts, Nung Security
Force Camp, and medical, supply and administration facilities.
Headquarters of the notional organization, SSPL, was located on an Island purportedly
in North Vietnam. Actually an island off the coast of South Vietnam, near Danang, was used
by SOG PSYOP (operation terminated 2 Dec 1968). The island, called Paradise, consists of
three camps. A small camp called DODO was the base for the US personnel (three officers
and four enlisted men). The camp was well separated from the other camps and was
principally a support base where the US Advisors could communicate with and assist the
Vietnamese camp commander. The second camp, PHOENIX, was the delivery point for prisoners
captured through marine operations. Its capacity was 90 to 150. It was operated by 3
Vietnamese who represent the SSPL and who both interrogated the POW’s for
intelligence for SOG intelligence and indoctrinated them with the program of the SSPL. The
third camp, separated by heavy foliage and several kilometers, was D36 where more
thorough indoctrination was conducted. The camp, with a capacity of 50, was reserved for
those selected prisoners who had shown a desire to join the SSPL and were to be tasked to
perform an intelligence or PSYOP function upon return to NVN. In addition to being
interrogated and indoctrinated, the prisoners were also employed in making chopsticks
along with other small items such as thread, needles, and twine, were used in gift parcels
containing propaganda material that were handed to the boats detained by marine
operations, and also given to prisoners when they were returned to their homes. All
POW’s were returned to NVN with the exception of those who requested assistance in
defecting to South Vietnam. With the exception of the small advisory staff, on the island,
all operations were conducted by members of the STD who were specially trained Vietnamese
intelligence and psychological operations. The primary objective of capturing prisoners
and leading them to believe that they were captives or the SSPL was to establish
credibility for the organization.
A report of operations on Paradise Island from 1964 through 1968 was prepared by
MACSOG in early 1969:
General History. Operations were initiated on PARADISE in May 1964 under control of the
Vietnamese Coastal Security Service (CSS). After capture, detainees were landed at
PHOENIX, where they were detained and interrogated for military intelligence and low level
political, social, and economic information. The detainees were led to believe that they
had been captured by a group of NVN patriots (SSPL) dissatisfied with the policies of the
Lao Dong Party. Following interrogation, they were indoctrinated in the precepts of the
SSPL. In May 1965, a US advisory team from OP-33 was installed at DODO to assist Strategic
Technical Service (STS) Psywar personnel in processing detainee information and improving
interrogation and indoctrination procedures. During 1965, temporary structures were built
at DODO to house US/Vietnamese operations and fiftyfive man Nung force hired to provide
security for operations. Three subgroups, consisting of three or four bamboo huts each
resembling types found in the hills of NVN, were constructed high in the hills behind
PHOENIX and DODO.
The purpose of these new locations was to separate detainees during the indoctrination
stage and lend credibility to the guise that the SSPL secret zone was located in the
highlands of NVN. In 1966 and 1967, DODO facilities were expanded and three additional
subgroups were added. Also, a Base Camp was constructed between DODO and the subgroups
to alleviate supply and administration problems and to provide an operational area for use
of the interrogators and indoctrinators in preparation of reports. There were no major
changes in operational methods until 1 July 1968, when Joint Chiefs of Staff direction
limited the number of detainees captured in one week to ten and the detention period to
fourteen days. At this time, the PHOENIX site was abandoned as a detention site and
detainees were landed at an isolated beach, Bai Xep, and taken directly to the subgroups
where interrogation and indoctrination were accomplished. From August 1968 until
termination of activities in October 1968, additional facilities were constructed at
PARADISE to include a new command post, dispensary, supply building, defensive structures,
and a new Subgroup. On 21 October 1968, the last detainee was returned to North Vietnam
as directed by CINCPAC. On 10 December 1968, all US personnel were removed from PARADISE
by direction of Chief, SOG. PARADISE was placed in a caretaker status under control of the
senior Vietnamese representative from the Strategic Technical Directorate (formerly STS)
Psywar Branch.
Operations. From the beginning of operations in 1964 until l July 1968, all detainees
were landed at Phoenix and detained for a period of time in bamboo huts located 50-200
meters from the ocean. Detainees were blindfolded, and moved to the detention area where
extensive interrogations were conducted. An indoctrination phase followed in which the
detainees were taught the history goals and activities of the SSPL.
Detainees indicating a desire to assist or join the SSPL were given low level missions
in NVN in support of SSPL activities or to collect intelligence. The period of detention
varied but was generally a matter of a few months. As many as 120 fishermen were in the
camp in 1966 and 1967. Additional subgroups were constructed in the mountains starting in
1965, and the indoctrination phase was moved there. Between 1 July 1968 and 21 October
1968 (when all operations ceased) detainees were moved directly to the subgroup areas
bypassing the Phoenix site. During this period the number of detainees captured per week
was limited by Washington directive to ten and the detention period to fourteen days.
Indoctrination of detainees was divided into three phases: group indoctrination,
individual indoctrination, and group discussion. In the indoctrination phase the detainee
group was lectured thoroughly on the history, organization and precepts of the SSPL. Both
the Lao Dong party (NVN) and the Chinese Communist party were heavily criticized. A firm
stand was taken against the US role in South Vietnam coupled with the proposal that all
Vietnam be united without outside influence. Current policies of both sides in the war
were reviewed and contrasted to a platform of peace, unity, and prosperity for the
Vietnamese people. The second phase, individual indoctrination, was a continuation of the
above process with the individual detainees though brought out in the discussions. The
final phase, group discussions, resembled the Communist cell technique of using members of
the group to criticize NVN policies.
In a Vietnamese-language article entitled “Coastal Raiders” translated by
Donald C. Brewster, Tran Do Cam talks about Vietnamese psychological operations. In regard
to the Sacred Sword of the Patriotic League he says:
Missions to capture fishermen for the purpose of indoctrination began on May 27,
1964. In this operation a fast patrol boat and a Swift captured a fishing junk in the
waters off Dong Hoi. Six fishermen along with their junk were brought to a
place called Cu Lao Cham Island which was located off the coast of Da Nang. In an effort
to win their support, the fishermen were treated very kindly and were well fed. On June
2nd, the fishermen and their junk were returned to where they were captured and they
brought along with them the various gifts of cloth, food and plastic utensils, etc., that
they had been given during their stay.
During 1967 we undertook a special psychological warfare program. For a period of
almost three months we captured more than 300 fishermen in the area from Dong Hoi to Thanh
Hoa. We took two individuals from every village. After delivering them to Cu Lao ChĂ m we
made sure that they were well fed. Each person ate a half chicken every day, and after
three months was plump and had a healthy complexion. We took them back, each to his
hometown, to see what the reaction would be both locally and by the regime in North
Vietnam. It came as no surprise to us during the next six months that when we tried to
capture the same individuals again, they were nowhere to be found. After almost nine
months had passed we finally captured one fellow who sighed: you folks hurt us. When you
released us the local government officials noticed that we were fat so they put us in the
“thought reform” camps and just released us.
Ex-PSYOP Trooper Mervyn Edwin Roberts III, PhD, says in: Let the Dogs Bark: The
Psychological War in Vietnam, 1960-1968, forthcoming from the University Press of
Kansas, 2018:
Under Operation Loki, kidnapped North Vietnamese fishermen were brought to Cu Lao
Cham Island, or Paradise Island, ten miles off Da Nang. They were indoctrinated at an SSPL
resistance camp notionally located in North Vietnam. The men were held several days and
then sent home with PSYOP-themed gift baskets that included information products, soap and
other useful goods. Reportedly, some fishermen sought to be kidnapped to receive the
medical treatment provided, and according to later Studies and Observations Group (SOG)
commander Colonel John K. Singlaub, a chance to gain “an average of over 20
pounds” during their ordeal. Some also knew exactly where they were, having visited
the island during the course of their lives. Eventually, SOG, the successor to the CIA in
these operations, had to limit the number of times a man could be kidnapped? As part of
the increased emphasis on the SSPL program, infiltration teams in the North began to
assume a secondary mission of psychological warfare. The first dual mission team, code
named Easy, parachuted into the North on 11 August 1963. While collecting intelligence,
the team spread SSPL leaflets. Other teams carried special single-use leaflet mortars to
disseminate product after their sabotage mission was complete.
Shultz tells how the SSPL was said to have gone into the mountains to fight on
for freedom. He adds, "The names of the fictitious leaders of the Sacred Sword
organization included individuals who has Le as either a family name or a given name. For
example, the founder of the SSPL was Le Quoc Hung."
MACVSOG also produced a marching song
for
the mythical organization:
A SSPL marching song was written and produced entitled “Let Us Rise
Up Ardently
and Liberate our Nation.” The song was sung by the island choral group, “the
singing fishermen” (detainees who recorded songs for SSPL radio).
Duy Lap Nguyen adds in: The
Unimagined Community: Imperialism and culture in South Vietnam, Manchester
University Press, 2020:
The Sacred Sword of the Patriots
League (SSPL) radio stations were established in Hue and Thu Duc,
transmitting hours of programming by the "Voice of the Sacred Sword"
broadcast, supposedly from a clandestine base in Ha Tinh. The contents of
the radio programs consisted of phony communications and orders to local
committees, instructions to the general population on techniques for
resisting the government, reports on enemy casualties, and lurid accounts of
corruption and scandal in the Communist party. The station also played
patriotic music, including an ardent marching song, "Let us Rise Up Ardently
and Liberate our Nation," which was composed as part of the PSYOP
Campaign - The programming was periodically interrupted for realistic affect.
Radio operations were shut down temporarily, to allow broadcasters,
supposedly, to evade detection by Communist patrols. To expand the audience
for SSPL propaganda, thousands of fixed-frequency radios, bearing the
insignia of the organization (an image of the sacred sword of Le Loi) were
distributed through covert air operations over North Vietnamese territory.
The MACSOG documentation
study - psychological operations, 10 July 1970, also mentions the
operation. Some pertinent comments are:
This Appendix discusses the
psychological operations directed by MACSOG from January 1964 to mid-1969.
These operations were referred to simply as "Psychological Operations" until
the code name "HUMIDOR" was assigned in 1967 to those activities or
the Psychological Group directed against North Vietnam. Included under
HUMIDOR were black and white (gray) radio operations, leaflet and gift kit
operations, black letter operations, and Paradise Island (ostensibly the
headquarters of the Sacred Sword Patriots League (SSPL)) operations.
Over 31,000,000 leaflets and
33,000 gift kits were introduced into North Vietnam in 1964. Leaflets
were normally delivered by C-123 aircraft. However, during December. 14.5
million Sacred Sword Patriots League leaflets
were dropped along the coastal strip using auto-rotation leaflets designed
to drift from offshore release points from an altitude of 5,000 to 9,000
feet. The Voice of the Sacred Sword Patriots League (Channel B) commenced
operating in April 1965 using the Voice of Freedom short-wave transmitter in
Hue. The radio represented the voice of a dissident nationalistic
organization in North Vietnam. The general themes of the scripts were
anti-Peking, anti-present North Vietnam policies, and pro-negotiations. In
November 1966, the Voice of Sacred Sword
Patriots League broadcasting commenced from the new transmitters at
Thu Duc outside of Saigon.
SSPL Identity Card
Shultz illustrates an SSPL membership card. The text in Vietnamese is:
The SSPL Southern Committee No. 1109/CMT/NB
IDENTITY CARD
The SSPL Southern Committee certifies: The bearer is a
member having the secret number_____ grade hardcore military cadre of the SSPL Southern
Committee entrusted with the mission to make relations, develop and coordinate activities
with diverse secret cells in the whole southern region. The strict assistance on all
aspects from our agencies to him will be warmly welcomed.
Date_______________1971
FOR THE SPPL SOUTHERN
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
MEMBER FOR CURRENT AFFAIRS
The membership card is also depicted and stamped “Secret” in John L.
Plaster’s SOG – a Photo History of the Secret War, Paladin Press,
Boulder, CO, 2000. The author says:
As part of a deception program, SOG published Sons of the Sword Patriot League
membership cards for planting on enemy bodies.
Major General John K. Singlaub
