On October 20, 1965. The 7th Psychological Operations Group was
authorized. In April 1966, it was relieved from attachment to IX Corps and
retained under operational control of United States Army Ryukyu Islands
(USARIS). At the same time, the 14th PSYWAR was redesignated the 14th PSYOP Battalion and
became part of the 7th PSYOP Group.
The History of the 7th Psychological Group
The History of the 7th Psychological Group 19 August 1965 to 31 December 1965
adds:
Thirty broadcast hours were beamed daily by VUNC from Okinawa to Korea by two
transmitters.
On 1 November 1965, Radio Branch began making a seven and one-half (7.5) minute
daily newscast in the Japanese language in support of the High Commissioner,
Ryukyu Islands to be broadcast by the Far East Broadcasting Company (FEBCO).
This newscast was part of the ten-minute block which was filled with a
weathercast by FEBCO. When a full complement of personnel is attained and the
announcers, translators and writers gain experience these newscasts will
increase to thirty (30) minutes per day. At the close of the year, the newscast
had increased to 15 minutes per day.
The "Mission" of the Battalion in the Cold War was to monitor and research
information, and to broadcast and disseminate “the truth” to mainland China,
North Korea, Vietnam, and other Asian countries. The radio station also
"entertained" the troops with local broadcasts consisting of news and music.
7th Psychological Operations Group Unit History 1967
The 7th Psychological Operations Group Unit
History 1967 adds:
While the Detachment's printing presses were humming, so were its radio
transmitters. The Radio Branch produced more than eight thousand hours of radio
broadcasts. Most of these broadcasts were beamed to North Korea in support of
the United Nations Command. In recognition of its dedicated operation of the
Voice of the United Nations Command Radio, the Commander in Chief, United
Nations Command presented the unit with a citation on 17 July I967.
Additionally, 18 members of the Chinese Language Section received certificates
on behalf of General Charles H. Bonesteel, Commander-in-Chief United Nations
Command, for their help in breaching the "bamboo curtain" and bringing truth to
millions of people virtually imprisoned in a Communist society.
The Voice of the United Nations Command (VUNC) radio continues to aim its daily
programs of music, news, and feature programs to the upper-level political
cadre, upper and middle government bureaucrats, and the officer corps in North
Korea. During the year, VUNC assumed a new sound by revamping its program
schedule. New programs developed, such as "Facts on Freedom" and "100,000
Questions," allow the listener to make in-depth analysis of the antipathies in
Communist political, social, and economic life. News broadcasts are now heard
more frequently in 5-minute capsules, complemented by a 10- minute daily news
analysis and two 5-minute news commentaries.
The Korea Detachment is located in Seoul, Korea, and is responsible for the
normal day-to- day functions of supply, mess, and motors; the operation and
maintenance of the three Voice of the United Nations Command (VUNC) transmitter
sites and their associated equipment; and for implementing the United Nations
Command/United States Forces, Korea, PSYOP program. The Korea Detachment was
under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Jack L. Barton, until his rotation to
CONUS in mid-December.
The primary mission of the detachment is to render direct psychological
operations support to the United Nations Command / United Stated Forces, Korea,
through audio and visual media. Audio support consists of origination and
production of radio programs for both North and South Korean audiences, in
addition to those produced by the Okinawa-based Radio Branch. Visual support
includes the origination of leaflets, a monthly 32-page magazine, wall posters,
an annual UNC calendar, and an annual Farmer1s Almanac.
During 1967, major program changes in VUNC programming were effected when on 1
May, all features were reduced to 5 and 10-minute length. In conjunction with
changes in program format, Korea Detachment increased the Base Station
emanations to the South Korean audience by 5 hours, with daily sign-off at 12
noon. Three programs were deleted from the schedule and were replaced by the
thrice weekly, "Tidings from Seoul,"programs.
Again in 1967 as in 1966, a Korea Detachment announcer/writer was dispatched to
Vietnam for on-the-spot coverage of ROK military and civic action. A total of 34
feature tapes were recorded in Vietnam, from which, a 120- program series called
"Vietnam Correspondent" was produced and broadcasted to both North and South
Korea.
Among the special programs produced during 1967, the traditional New Year’s
messages from President Park Chung-Hee and House Speaker Lee Hyo-sang
were featured in a special New Year's Day program to North and South Korea. A
policy statement delivered at the 252nd Military Armistice Commission meeting by
Major General Marvin G. Dernier was incorporated in a special program broadcast
on 28 July to both North and South Korea. On 30 July, UNCURK’s Chairman for
July, R. A. Preachey, spoke to North Korea over VUNC clarifying the unification
of the United Nations on the Korean question.
A Jilli Safe Conduct Pass coded 1984.
This beautiful full color safe conduct pass depicts the flag of the Republic of
Korea and flower branches facing upward at the sides. The text at the top is:
Safe Conduct Pass to be honored by all Republic of Korea Forces and Allied
Troops
This Safe Conduct Pass provides you SALKIL
[Way to Survive]
Based on subject matter contained in Jilli leaflets, a series of seven
announcements were written and produced for the North Korean target audience.
These announcements listed irresponsible acts by North Korea in terms of
infiltration and armed attacks south of the DMZ, and assured the North that the
United Nations Command was fully prepared to take defensive measures against
continuation of armistice agreement violations.
Korea Detachment was active in its visual media support, as well. Additionally,
Korea Detachment increased its inventory of leaflet designs from 68 titles in
1966 to 170 titles in 1967. The usual leaflet requirement notwithstanding, five
special leaflets were designed for the Dok-soo-ri field training exercise; nine
quick-reaction leaflets for North Korean Armistice violations were prepared; and
one photographic leaflet on the defection of Lee Su-kun, former vice-chief of
the North Korean Central News Agency, was prepared. The latter was forwarded to
the Group for printing within 24 hours of Lee's defection through the Panmunjom
Joint Security Area.
Specialist 5 Jim Aguirre
So,
how did this article get written? I received a letter from Jim Aguirre who
had worked for the Voice of the United Nation’s Command, and he had a
question. I found the answer for him and noticed there was hardly anything
written about this unit in the civilian press. They kept a very low profile
and had never been written about in depth. I checked my own military files
and found I had a lot of data and thus asked Jim to send me a brief
description of his time there and set about to write their history. Jim
said:
I
was starting my third year of college when most draft deferments started
getting cancelled. A “heads-up” from my local draft board that my notice was
in the mail convinced me to enlist and get some kind of assignment choice.
Being heavily into photography at the time, I thought I wanted to be an Army
photographer. My recruiter told me that the anticipated life of a combat
photographer on the ground was “approximately 15 minutes” and suggested
that, since my college major was English with a Journalism minor, I would
fit well into a public information slot. I took him up on it!
After basic training at Fort Ord, California, I got orders to attend the
Defense Information School (DINFOS) at Fort Slocum, NY. When I graduated, I
went to Fort Jackson, SC, and became a member of the public information unit
there, working on the post newspaper and writing boring “hometown news
releases.” A few months later, I got orders to attend the Psychological
Operations Course at (then) Fort Bragg’s John F. Kennedy Special Warfare
Center. Upon graduation, I got orders to proceed to Okinawa and the 14th
PSYWAR BN where I served as a news writer, senior news writer and news
editor at VUNC from November 1963 to February 1965. I was promoted to SP5
midway through my VUNC tour.
Voice of the United Nations Command (VUNC)
The
Voice of the United Nations Command (VUNC) was a vestige of the Korean War
and was—ostensibly—operated under the auspices of the United Nations. In
fact, it was pretty much a part of the United States Army in most or all
respects as far as I could tell and operated under the umbrella of the
United States Army Broadcasting and Visual Activity, Pacific (USABVAPAC).
VUNC was established in the early 1950’s with the primary target audience
for conventional psychological warfare content being North Korean and
Chinese military personnel during the Korean War. With the armistice in
mid-1953, the focus shifted to soft propaganda directed at the civilian
populations of North Korea and China and remained that way during my time
there.
In
the mid-1960s, it was a high-power radio station broadcasting on two
short-wave frequencies; 9.840 MHz and 13.832 MHz; 50KW1 on each frequency.
The large rhombic antennas located on the northern end of Okinawa (Deragawa)
were designed to focus the signal on North Korea and China, the primary
target audiences. VUNC was on-the-air approximately 16 hours per day, seven
days a week, providing news and culturally relevant feature programming
designed to foster a positive image of the free world. “Feature” content
included health and wellness, cooking, music, etc.
The 15th PSYOP Detachment’s FEEDBACK
Feedback is
a newssheet prepared by the Leaflet Branch and printed by the Reproduction
Division of the 15th PSYOP Detachment of the 7th PSYOP Group as a training
mission and for the information and use of the Group members. This issue
mentions a lot of material on VUNC.
VUNC’s Transmitter building, Yongsan, Seoul, 1970.
The Battalion Headquarters for the 14th PSYOP Battalion was on Okinawa but there
were detachments in Japan and Korea. In Korea the unit was known as VUNC or The
Voice of The United Nations Command. The Headquarters Company was in Seoul and
two VUNC broadcast sites were located near the DMZ.
Although some shows were taped or broadcast live from Korea, the main VUNC
studios were located on Okinawa. Shows were taped and sent to Korea for
rebroadcasting by means of a 50 KW shortwave transmitter located at Deragawa Okinawa.
The location of the first VUNC studio is unknown but was moved to Machinato in
1961 or 1962.
The 14th consisted of fixed High-Frequency transmitters, fixed and mobile AM
radio broadcasting stations, and printing, loudspeaker, language, and research
detachments.
The United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam Command History, Volume II
1968 said about the station:
7th PSYOP Group – the Korea Detachment, the largest off-island detachment of the
group, had the Voice of the United Nations Command (VUNC) as its major mission.
The mission of the 7th PSYOP Group was to provide PSYOP support throughout the
Pacific Command. One of the major operations of the 7th Group was the VUNC,
which was a strategic radio operation broadcasting over 20 hours daily to
audiences in Noth Korea and Communist China.
Jim Aguirre
continues:
The broadcast
languages during the 1963-65 period were Korean, Mandarin and Cantonese, and
the target audience was working-class and middle-income Koreans and Chinese.
Content was first created in English and then translated into the relevant
languages. Native-speaking radio announcers did the on-air presentation.
Translators and on-air announcers were either contract or Department of the
Army civilian (DAC) personnel.
Our work area
was secured because we had a quantity of classified material (mostly Secret
and Top Secret “backgrounders”) on the premises. Even though this material
was kept in a secure room, access to the building was limited and we had an
armed military guard at the entrance.
At least in
the early 1960s, there were two content creation sections: newsroom and
features, plus technical personnel operating and maintaining the two 20KW
transmitters and providing support to the on-air studio facilities and
teletype equipment in the newsroom. Content creation and facility
operation/maintenance personnel were all active-duty US Army personnel with
two Department of the Army content managers overseeing news and feature
programming. All Army personnel were members of Headquarters & Headquarters
Company, 14th PSYWAR Battalion and reported directly to a Voice of the
United Nation’s Command Officer in Charge—a Captain when I was there—but
took content direction from the Department of the Army civilians.
The newsroom,
where I served as a news writer, senior news writer and news editor during
my tour, operated in much the same way as civilian radio station newsrooms
in larger U.S. cities at the time. It was a seven-day-a-week operation, and,
since there were broadcast deadlines to be met, we went on duty at 0700 and,
for the most part, completed our newscasts by around 1500. Staff rotated
days off, but there was always a working crew in the newsroom each day to
create newscasts, including weekends and holidays. On-air personnel and
technical staff were on the same schedule, but I believe the features staff
had weekends and holidays off because their content material didn’t have the
same daily deadlines as the newscasts.
During my tour
at Voice of the United Nation’s Command, we experienced several major
typhoons but the “show had to go on.” Most of the station personnel lived in
the nearby barracks and it wasn’t too much of a problem for them to get to
the station. I lived off-base “on the economy” in an Okinawan-style house
with my wife (who worked in the Post Exchange administrative offices). She
didn’t have to go in during the storms, but I did and, on more than one
occasion, I spent the night at the VUNC facility because it was too nasty to
drive back to the house. Still, it was a pretty good duty!
In addition to
the news editor, the newsroom usually had 3-5 news writers and a teletype
operator on duty every day. We had wire service feeds from Associated Press,
Reuters and United Press International providing potential news content.
Copy was taken from the ASR-28 teletype machines as it came in, evaluated by
the news editor and individual items were assigned to news writers who
drafted the content.
Draft content
developed by the news writers was reviewed and edited, as needed, by the
news editor and then compiled into a full newscast. As I recall, the final
draft newscast was reviewed and approved (or sent back for further editing
or development as needed) by the Department of the Army civilians in charge
of news content. On weekends when the DACs were not at the station, final
approval of the newscast was made by the news editor, a significant
responsibility.
All news
content was factual, but carefully edited to create the best impression for
the target audience. We avoided controversial issues whenever possible and
any negative references to free-world countries were avoided. Pretty typical
“soft” propaganda material.
One of our
most challenging times was on November 22, 1963, when the teletype alarms
all went off simultaneously—and continuously. The teletype operator on duty
ripped off the first piece of copy he could grab (I don’t remember from
which wire service) and handed it to me. It read “President John F. Kennedy
has been shot. More to follow.”
What followed
was about 48 hours of non-stop updates via teletype and through official
channels, confusion, concern, and a military lockdown of the entire unit. We
had no idea what was going on stateside and whether it might cause a
military response. It was a few hours before we put out the first newscast
containing any information on the President’s death, and we stayed very
low-key with it. We reported only the bare facts in as positive a way as we
could and avoided any and all speculation. We emphasized the orderly
transition of the presidency to Vice President Lyndon Johnson and the
inherent stability of the United States government.
The lockdown
lasted about 48 hours. Once it was determined that the President’s
assassination was a domestic issue (official explanation) rather than an
international attack on the United States (something that continues to be
debated to this day), life returned pretty much to normal. A memorable, yet
sad, time!
7th PSYOP Psychological Group Unit History 1968
The 7th PSYOP Psychological Group Unit History 1968 mentions the Korea
Detachment and VUNC:
During the year, the Korean Section continued producing radio programs for
broadcast over VUNC facilities. This involved translation, writing, adapting,
editing, announcing, and related program preparation functions. Each month, 30
tapes of VUNC programs, prepared by the section, were sent to the Vietnam
Detachment for transfer to the ROK Army to use on their radio stations in
Vietnam. The Korea Section also supplied interpreters for special purposes
during the year and were responsible for several special translations. In
addition, the section assisted in the preparation of a Korean language sound
track to be used with a US Army PSYOP film. A member of the Korea Section went
to Vietnam for three weeks to conduct interviews with ROK troops for use over
VUNC to inform North Korea of the ROK forces' current capabilities and their
successes in civic action programs.
Radio Branch Operations – Broadcasts in three languages.
The mission of Radio Branch, headed by Mr. James E. Braatz, GS-13, included
preparing radio program material for and operating the Voice of the United
Nations Command (VUNC) facilities on Okinawa. The activities of Radio Branch
included planning, writing, translating, recording, and broadcasting radio
propaganda programs in Korean, Japanese, and Mandarin. The Radio Branch acted as
the coordinator for programming VUNC broadcast material by the 24th PSYOP
Detachment (formerly Korea Detachment), 7th PSYOP Group, and maintained liaison
with other information and broadcasting media as required. Close coordination
was maintained with the Propaganda Branch to ensure input of research material
for use by radio script writers.
At the beginning of 1968, the Radio Branch was reorganized. The Feature Section
and News Sections were combined into the new English Language Section, In April,
after the return of the Radio Branch Chief from TDY to the 24th PSYOP
Battalion.
Inside the Broadcasting &Visual Activities facilities in Korea
One
reader was kind enough to tell me that there was a "U.S. Army Psychological
Operations Pacific" 1964 Vietnam War 29-minute PSYOP training film on
YouTube. Here you have a 1964 PACOM PSYOP briefing that gives technical
details, and numbers regarding Broadcasting &Visual Activities missions, and activities for the region,
and time.
Operating
Instructions: PSYOP for North Korea
On 21 November 1968, the 7th PSYOP Group published a 16-page guide
on methods for propagandizing North Korea. The purpose of these instructions
is to provide guidance to and prescribe responsibilities for subordinate
detachments of the 7th PSYOP Group for the conduct of day-to-day PSYOP
directed to North Korea in support of the PSYOP Program.
It states that the mission is the Group, on a continuous basis,
will conduct PSYOP which is directed to the North Korean military forces and
civilian population, and which is designed to fulfill psychological
objectives directed by the United Nations Command and the United States
Forces – Korea.
Under its concept of operation, the Group will continue to rely
upon the Korea Detachment and the 15th PSYOP Detachment to develop PSYOP for
North Korea. Two principal media—radio and visual media—will be employed by
these operational detachments in conducting PSYOP to the North Korean
audience. In developing media output in support of the campaign, to apply
PSYOP actively against North Korea, exploit themes presented below at every
opportunity, provided the situation warrants such exploitation.
There were 15 major and numerous minor themes to be exploited. Some
of them are (edited for brevity):
Explain to the North Korean populace the advantages they will have
if they were to defect to the South. Target potential defectors.
Convince
the targeted group that living in the free society in the South is worth the
risk of defecting.
Target North Korean agents and exploit the
psychological pressure they face when infiltrating the South.
Explain the
illegal nature of North Korean activities along the DMZ.
Demonstrate the
economic achievements of the Republic of Korea to the people of the North.
Convince the North that the Republic of Korea is militarily strong and armed
with modern weapons.
Convince the North that “one man rule” is the reason
for their problems and should be changed.
Convince the North that they
will never reach production goals if they waste money on a needless military
buildup.
Show how young industries in the ROK are thriving and producing
domestic commodities for the people.
The US/ROK Mutual Defense Treaty is
a Joint defense pact to preserve peace in Korea.
The US has exemplified
herself in honoring commitments in Vietnam, Thailand, Europe, and Korea.
The ROK armed forces with allied support constitute a powerful deterrent
force to renewed aggression.
Purges are a constant threat to the security
and wellbeing of all Party members in the North Korean regime.
Political
indoctrination is added to an already long duty day.
Sons and husbands
conscripted into long military service leave wives and mothers, who in their
absence, must take over all the work.
Economic progress cannot be
achieved so long as it is hampered by a large military buildup.
If North
Korean farming methods are so progressive, then why is rice so severely
rationed?
An Example of the PSYOP Intelligence Notes
PSYOP INTELLIGENCE NOTES of the Target Analysis Section, 7th Psychological
Operations Group, No. 123 – North Korea, said about VUNC Propaganda
Effectiveness on 3 July 1969:
Problems in Determining the Effectiveness of VUNC Broadcasts to North Korea
Interviews with defectors and captured or surrendered agents have indicated that
North Koreans, despite strict prohibitions on listening to foreign radio
broadcasts, have listened to the Voice of the United Nations Command (VUNC) and
other Free World broadcasts, and are knowledgeable about developments in the
world including topics not covered by North Korean mass media sources. It has
also been found that information learned from radio broadcasts reinforces the
credibility of information learned from leaflets and vice versa.
The evaluation of the effectiveness of VUNC broadcasts to North Korea presents a
very difficult problem because North Korea is a denied area and the usual
techniques to determine listenership response, such as audience surveys, letters
to the radio station, and so forth, cannot be employed. Instead, the probable
effectiveness of VUNC broadcasts to North Korea can be determined only from the following sources of information:
1. Interviews with defectors and captured and surrendered agents.
2. Analysis of North Korean propaganda to determine reactions to Free World
propaganda.
3. Indirect indicators of effectiveness such as jamming of Free World
broadcasts, imposition of restrictions on listening to foreign radio broadcasts,
and so forth.
The amount of information about effectiveness of VUNC and other Free World
broadcasts to North Korea is of course limited because large numbers of recently
emerged ex-North Koreans are not available, and information about conditions in
North Korea is sparse. North Korea restricts outflow of inf'ormat1on that would
be of significant value to intelligence analysts examining condition there.
Foreign travelers in North Korea are highly restricted in their movement there
and in their contacts with the local population. Many intelligence reports deal
with topics of military, economic, and political significance, rather than with
topics pertaining to North Korean society and with reactions to and
effectiveness of foreign psychological operations, such as radio broadcasts and
leaflets operations.
The 7th PSYOP Group, to obtain more information about the effectiveness of
psychological operations against North Korean audiences, utilizes trained
psychological operations intelligence interrogators who conduct detailed
interrogations of defectors and captured or surrendered agents. These interviews
are based upon psychological operations intelligence essential elements of
information (EEI) and for this reason produce information more suitable for the
needs of psychological operations than those based upon the usual combat or
military intelligence EEI. The product of these interviews is usually published
and given wide dissemination.
VUNC’s Studio, Yongsan, Seoul, 1970.
Propaganda analysts at the 7th PSYOP Group review all available North Korean
propaganda material, including magazines, newspapers, speeches of Kim Il-song,
monitoring reports of North Korean broadcasts produced by the Foreign Broadcast
Information Service (FBIS), translations of North Korean publications produced
by the Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), and other materials. These
are not only subjected to the usual types of propaganda analysis but are also
examined for any explicit reactions to Free World psychological operations and
for any counter-propaganda reactions to psychological operations themes.
PSYOP research analyses employ another method to determine probable
effectiveness of its VUNC radio broadcasts: periodic panel reviews in Seoul of
tape recordings of VUNC broadcasts. The panel sessions include former North
Koreans who are knowledgeable in North Korean affairs, newspaper reporters
assigned to cover Panmunjom, and a cross section of South Koreans. The panels
usually consist of from 10 to 20 people. At a review panel session, the members
listen to taped VUNC broadcasts and answer questionnaires designed to determine
their opinions about the probable effectiveness of the VUNC broadcasts in North
Korea. Although these panel sessions do not produce firsthand information about
the effectiveness of VUNC broadcasts in the target area, they have produced
valuable information about the probable effectiveness of such broadcasts. This
has been of great benefit to VUNC program planners and producers.
It has been determined from interviews with former North Koreans that some of
them have listened to VUNC and other Free World broadcasts. While some tend to
identify VUNC with the Voice of America (VOA), and some spoke of VUNC in terms
of broadcasts from the Republic of Korea generally, others were specific in
their identification of VUNC and stated that they had listened to it. Most
significant of recent evidence that VUNC is listened to in the North came during
the 236th Military Armistice Commission meeting, on 17 March 1969 at Panmunjom,
wherein the senior member of the North Korean delegation, a brigadier
general-Commissar, revealed tor the record that a broadcast of "the United
Nations Command radio" had been monitored in North Korea during its report on a
helicopter crash in the South. This rare revelation served as irrefutable proof
that VUNC has listeners in the North at the top level. Several recently captured
North Korean armed agents said that they had listened to VUNC While training
with their North Korean military unit. One said that when he was on guard duty
at night, he listened mostly to VUNC and Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) after
2100 hours because all other South Korean radio stations had signed off.
A North Korean soldier who defected to the Republic of Korea in November 1968
indicated that he listened to South Korean broadcasts, including VUNC, KBS, CBS,
and commercial broadcasts during 1968.
A North Korean farmer who defected to the Republic of Korea in November 1968
said that he had listened to South Korean radio broadcasts, especially music,
sportscasts, and defector interviews, over VUNC, KBS, CBS, and MBC. He also said
that he had listened to a broadcast which included a relay broadcast of a
Republic of Korea-Japan goodwill soccer game in September 1967, detailed news
about the Pyongyang flood, and an award ceremony in which Republic of Korea
policemen who had been involved in apprehending (or killing) North Korean armed
agents were honored. He had listened to that broadcast while visiting the home
of his wife’s cousin. They had listened to the broadcasts over a Czechoslovakian
high-fidelity radio. The source believed that his wife's cousin and her husband,
a military officer, listened to broadcasts from South Korea because she had
said, "there are many interesting points in South Korean broadcasts."
A North Korean armed agent who was captured in November 1968 said that while he
was undergoing training in a safehouse, before he was sent to the Republic of
Korea, he, and the members of his group of five agent trainees had listened to
broadcasts from VUNC, KBS, MBC, and CBS over a Japanese-made transistor radio.
Usually, listening was done individually in his room, and be and his fellow
trainees were not subjected to any restriction in their radio listening. They,
however, did not discuss what they had heard. Radio listening was usually done
during the afternoon two-hour rest period or during the evening. The agent
trainees preferred 1n listen to broadcasts from South Korea to listening to
North Korean stations so that they would understand the situation in the
Republic of Korea better, and they liked South Korean popular songs. The source
recalled hearing a defector interview with Yi Yong-myong which had been
broadcast over VUNC on 30 September and 5 October 1968. He remembered the
program but not the exact date when he heard it, except that he recalled it was
early October 68. He had heard other defector interview programs but he
remembered only the foregoing.
Other sources indicated that they had listened to broadcasts from South Korea
but they could not recall the call signs or identifications of the stations to
which they listened. However, these people reported that they listened to these
foreign broadcasts for news and information, as well as to hear music and sports
events. The fact that such listenership to broadcasts exists in North Korea
indicates that radio is a live communications medium that helps counter North
Korean control of information.
“A” Site. Kanghwa Island 1971.
A captured agent, formerly a North Korean Social Safety Officer, who left North
Korea in April 1967, said that he had listened to VUNC and KBS while he was in
agent training in Pyongyang. However, he said that the VUNC signal, when he
tried to listen to it in Pyongyang, was weak and not clear enough. He said that
a signal from a Peking radio station interfered sometimes with the VUNC signal
because it was so weak. (Note: Reception of the 50% nighttime sky wave signal
from VUNC on Kanghwa Island starts near the Pyongyang area and becomes stronger
north of Pyongyang. The sources comment that the VUNC signal was weak, and that
another station interfered with it ties in with calculated VUNC A signal
strength for the Pyongyang area.
A surrendered North Korean agent reported that a group of farmers in Upnae-ri,
Baekchon County, South Hwanghae Province in 1959 had organized an underground
movement to struggle against the cooperative farm system. This group had been
influenced by listening secretly to radio broadcasts from the Republic of
Korea.
A North Korean agent apprehended by Republic of Korea authorities in April 1967
provided some insight into the value of music in psychological operations radio
broadcasts. He said that he and his fellow agent trainees used to listen to
VUNC, KBS, and commercial stations in the REPUBLIC OF KOREA. They mainly
listened to music and dramatic programs. The source revealed a considerable
knowledge of popular songs and singers in the Republic of Korea.
North Korean Reaction to Free World Broadcasts
North Korea’s English-language publication, “Korea Today”, No. 9, 1966, in an
item called “The Narcotic Center,” a North Korean phrase for the United States
Information Service (USIS) asserted:
“The US propaganda medium is going on at full blast. Under USIS there are three
radio stations in South Korea, Voice of America, Voice of Freedom, UN Command
Radio, in addition to three telecast stations. And all the other radio stations,
Government-run or otherwise, are operated by US advisors with funds provided by
US aid. ‘Keep lying until the people believe you,’ was Goebbels’ dictum. And
this is the gospel of Washington propagandists.”
This North Korean mention in 1966 of VUNC in “Korea Today” was the first time in
the 10 or more years that North Korea has ever admitted that VUNC existed. It is
understandable that North Koreans would associate the Voice of America and the
Voice of the United Nations Command under the United States Information Service,
since both VOA and VUNC follow US policy guidance.
In the spring of 1968, VUNC broadcast a feature program which discussed economic
development in Far Fast areas using a list of available goods in department
stores in Okinawa as an example. Within about two weeks, a North Korean
broadcast, as reported by the “Foreign Information Service” (FBIS), carried a
similar program listing the various goods on sale in department stores in
Pyongyang.
On the 21st anniversary of the 10 May 1948 general elections in the Republic of
Korea VUNC carried a special commentary dealing with the subject of the value of
free elections. Two days later, on 12 May, the Central News Agency in Pyongyang
came out with an appeal to the Republic of Korea to support the "revolutionary
movement" in the South and denouncing the 19li8 elections as "rigged" by the “US
imperialists.”
“B” Site. Chorwon Valley, 1971
PSYOP Intelligence Notes,
No. 122 North Korea: 9 September 1969 said:
Source tuned in various stations. He does not recall them all, but he does
remember MBC, KBS, and VUNC. Among his favorite programs were pop music, news,
and open panel shows. The following reasons were given for tuning in Republic of
Korea programs: they were more interesting than North Korean programs. Knowing
someday he would be dispatched to the Republic of Korea; he wanted a firsthand
account of existing conditions.
PSYOP Intelligence Notes,
No. 152 North Korea: Public Opinion--Foreign Propaganda - 4 November 1969
added:
Source: Male, a former North Korean Army lieutenant in a civilian administrative
police company serving in and near the DMZ. Source defected to the Republic of
Korea in March 1969. When asked if he had heard VUNC, the source was vague, but
he did indicate that he had listened sometimes to broadcasts at around 1200 KHz
on the radio dial. From late 1967 until March 1968, in the village where he was
living, all the households were instructed to have their radios modified so that
they could only receive North Korean radio stations. One day in January 1969 the
source asked his wife to check to see if the vice-commanding officer for
political affairs radio had been modified. His wife visited his house, and she
turned his radio dial to see if it had been fixed; she found that the dial had
not been soldered to one place on the dial. If a radio was modified, people
could only listen to one radio station, Korean Central Broadcast Number One.
PSYOP Intelligence Notes
,
No. 172 North Korea: PSYOP--Attitudes of the People - North Korean Reaction to
PSYOP: Leaf1ets and Radio Broadcasts - 23 January 1970 gave another report:
From its inception, VUNC was staffed and operated by personnel and facilities
from various units. Although an attempt has been made to trace the history of
VUNC, this paper should not be construed as a unit history because VUNC was
never an organizational entity, per se.
For over 20 years the Bamboo Curtain separating North Korea from the rest of the
world was penetrated by VUNC, "The Voice of the United Nations Command." Given
access to a medium wave radio receiver tuned to 1270 kHz or 1240 kHz, a Korean
listener could hear programs that were rarely, if ever, heard on domestic North
Korean broadcasts: commentaries on political and economic conditions throughout
the Free World as well as in the Communist Bloc countries, past and current
popular music, and reliable news reporting."
Following the cessation of hostilities in Korea, and after control of Japan
reverted to the Japanese government, VUNC stopped using its leased Japanese
facilities for broadcasting to Korea. Japan based operations were moved to
Okinawa in March 1958. The newsroom remained in Tokyo, however, because at that
time Okinawa lacked adequate wire service facilities. VUNC's newsroom was later
moved to Okinawa and on 1 January 1961, all VUNC's Japan-based operations ended.
New studio facilities were completed in Korea in May 1964, and in October 1965,
a building was completed to house a new 10 KW medium wave and two short wave
transmitters. With these transmitters, the range of Korea-based VUNC covered the
entire target area of North Korea.
On 19 August 1965, the 7th Psychological Operations Group was constituted by
General Order No. 306, Headquarters, USARPAC, and activated on 15 October 1965.
The "Korea Detachment, " was later designated 24th PSYOP Detachment on 4
December 1968. Also, the 14th Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Battalion, which
had been reassigned from Hawaii was incorporated into the 7th PSYOP Group as the
14th PSYOP "Battalion.
Less visible but equally significant to the organizational changes were the
modifications in VUNC' s programming as they reflected changing military and
political situations. For example, VUNC introduced programming aimed
specifically at the Republic of Korea audience following the 1960 student
uprisings which overthrew the Rhee Government. (The number of broadcasts to the
Republic of Korea audiences increased in 1967). In 1966 and in 1967 an
announcer-writer from the Korea Detachment was sent to Vietnam for on-the-spot
coverage of Republic of Korea military and civic action programs. These visits
resulted in a 120-program series called "Vietnam Correspondent" which was beamed
to both North Korean and Republic of Korea audiences. Considering the
diminishing influence of Communist China in North Korea, Chinese language
broadcasts were dropped by VUNC in 1967. VUNC's operations always reflected the
military, political, and economic realities of Korea.
To summarize, VUNC's program content emphasized themes which tended to contrast
North Korea's isolation from Asian affairs, which described the benefits of
international regional cooperation, which compared and contrasted life and
conditions in the Republic of Korea with those in North Korea, and, very
important in the light of the mission of the United Nations Command, emphasized
to North Korea's existing and emerging power elite, the dangers of
miscalculating the resolve of the UNC, the ROK military, and the US Forces Korea
to repel any aggression.
Roughly 70 percent of the message -bearing content of VUNC was produced in
Okinawa by the 15th PSYOP Detachment. The remaining 30 percent of the
message-bearing content was written and produced in Korea by the Radio
Propaganda Section of the 24th PSYOP Detachment. In terms of overall content,
including music, commentaries, and news, roughly 50 percent was produced in
Korea, about 40 percent was produced in Okinawa, and the remaining 10 percent
was produced by Voice of America (VOA).
