SGM Herbert A. Friedman (Ret.)
There are dozens of books and probably millions of words written on the Viet Cong attempted uprising in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) in 1968. I am not going to discuss the uprising in any depth except to give some background. I have already written an article on the Tet holiday in general, and any reader can find that using this link
As most historians know, the Viet Cong decided to attempt a general uprising in 1968, hoping that the Vietnamese people in the South would rise up and join them. That did not happen. The people wanted no part of the insurrection and the Viet Cong were beaten so badly that they never became a major fighting force again. However, this did not help Vietnam and the United States in any way, since North Vietnam was then forced to send trained professional troops down the Ho Chi Minh Trail in greater force.
These In-country cartoons by Fehrenbacher also seem to catch the truth of Vietnam. Here he shows a soldier, probably
a 71L Clerk, who usually works with a typewriter being tossed an M-16 during the Surprise Viet Cong Tet offensive.Tet seems to have been a complete surprise to American forces. The Communists had offered a cease fire and the Americans and South Vietnamese believed them. They accepted. Staff Sergeant Don Fieler told me a story that he finds funny now, but not in 1968:
On 31 January 1968, at about 2200, I was on the latrine sitting on the opening next to the Sergeant in charge of intelligence. I asked him how it looked for the TET cease fire and he said that everyone believed that all was going well, and it would be peaceful during the TET holidays. Three hours later that latrine took a direct mortar hit as the TET offensive started. Since then I have had little faith in intelligence.
On the other hand, friends of mine who were high in the ranks of Intelligence knew something was up and warned their headquarters, but apparently, nobody was listening. One analyst who shall go unnamed told me that he was putting pins in the maps from recon units and soon had all the major cities surrounded by pins. He had no doubt something big was about to occur but nobody cared to listen. I wrote this about 20 years ago. I never went into detail on this in the past but now it seems that some of the stories are getting out so perhaps I should tell more with a lot of OPSEC and editing.
I was a section chief at MACV. I was not the only one predicting Tet 1968. Everyone from Lieutenants and captains to senior NCOs were forecasting it but the higher ups did not want to believe it or were told not to believe it. We had a VERY difficult time getting them to believe the VC strength numbers and they would not allow the intelligence analysts to add many NVA units because enemy strength levels could not be increased for political reasons. My very sensitive intelligence files were fully detailed about enemy military and civilian personnel, to include their families (if they had them) and their addresses and their names. I also had additional details available from the RVN National Police files. Unfortunately, the Generals believed that the Viet Cong could be trusted to uphold the holiday ceasefire.
There were more details available to us within the RVN National Police files! By the way, I believe the National Police were the least infiltrated RVN government group in-country! We could and did combine our files with the Vietnamese and had very detailed information about many of the southern communists so we could have air or ground dropped leaflets and/or fake documents that sent them home to check on their families. Then we could have the police and/or our special operations people go get them. And very few of the very sensitive intelligence reports went more than one or two hands from me. The Australians and New Zealanders worked very closely with us from collateral to very sensitive intelligence operations and the gathering of the intelligence too. It was a pleasure to work with them, and to supply them with reports from my MACV and Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam files.
Viet Le, a researcher and author told me about other reports that were ignored by the U.S. Government (from an unpublished manuscript of Viet Le – I have edited this for brevity).
On 21 November 1967, the CIA Saigon Station sent a remarkable memorandum. It was written by a team of analysts named Joseph Hovey, Bobby Layton, and James Ogle, who had just completed it on Thanksgiving Day, Saigon time. In early December 1967 came two more warning reports from the CIA in Saigon. The work was the product of a direct request from National Security Adviser Walt Rostow.
It reached President Lyndon Johnson’s table in mid-December, six weeks before the offensive. The memorandum stated that the NLF was planning a political and military offensive utilizing all assets. Other key phrases were "all-out offensive", "January to March 1968", and "urban centers".
George Carver, the head of Office of the Director (CIA) where the memo was reviewed before being sent to the White House, had already put a note over the memo strongly implying the authors were crying wolf. The memo was eventually overlooked at the White House. The offensive took place and led to a dramatic change of public opinion in the US. The American war effort started winding down from that point. The President came under immense pressure and chose to stand down for the coming election.
Joseph Hovey was one of the authors of the report. He and the other two colleagues were part of the Collation Branch of CIA Saigon Station. The Saigon branch was part of the Deputy Directorate of Intelligence (DDI), the CIA research and analysis division.
A friend of Hovey recalled that he started talking about impending enemy plans for massive countrywide attacks in the fall of 1967. In July or early August 1967, Hovey started seeing for the first time the terms "general offensive" and "general uprising" in enemy documents. He was struck since the terms had not been used since the 1945 – 1946 revolutionary period. It signified something big.
Another CIA analyst named Sam Adams sought to correct the order of enemy battle figures. The first source Adams met was Leon Goure, head of RAND’s enemy morale and motivation project. The project was in fact dated back to at least 1964 to a former RAND colleague named Zasloff. Sam Adams consulted the RAND specialists and started digging in captured documents and interrogation reports. He soon came to the profound finding that the enemy strength, their "order of battle", was underestimated. He found that the actual number of NLF combat strength was about double what the military estimated.
Richard H. Dick James was a staff sergeant in 1968 assigned to an A-Team in the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) as its Intelligence Sergeant. He said about the Tet offensive:
None of the allied forces should have been surprised. In August of 1967 an agent turned in the plans for the 1968 Tet Offensive. The Special Forces officer commanding Project Oak, in Detachment B-57, personally delivered the report to the MACV J2 (Intelligence) commander, a general, who instructed the SF officer to turn it over to the Collections Officer, a colonel who hated SF. He told the officer to get the report out of his office, saying that General Westmoreland didn’t believe the enemy capable of conducting such an offensive. The SF officer reminded him that they had been reporting large VC gatherings for months, appearing to be assembling for just such an attack.
The SF officer then appealed to the MACV J2 general, who reiterated what the colonel had said about General Westmoreland’s belief. The SF officer proceeded to give the report to the 5th Special Forces Group S-2 (Intelligence), telling him about what had happened at MACV headquarters. The 5th Group S-2 disseminated the information to all Special Forces units.
Martin J. Manning and Clarence R. Wyatt edited the 2-volume set titled Encyclopedia of Media and Propaganda in Wartime America. They wrote about the various wars that the United States was involved in and I have added a brief part of what was written about the Tet Offensive of 1968 in the Vietnam War in this article (edited for brevity):
The war had not been going well for the Viet Cong and People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), who were unable to compete with U.S. military firepower and mobility. DRV Defense Minister General Vo Nguyen Giap favored trying to end the war in one master stroke. Giap’s plan borrowed from Chinese Communist doctrine’s concept of the "General Offensive," to which the Vietnamese added the idea of "General Uprising, " a one-two punch during which the people of South Vietnam would rally to the Communist cause and overthrow the Saigon government. The success of Giap’s plan depended on three key assumptions: The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) would collapse under the impact of the General Offensive, the people of South Vietnam would follow through with the General Uprising, and American will to continue would crack in the face of the overwhelming shock.
At 1:30 in the morning on 31 January, the Presidential Palace in Saigon was attacked. By 3:40 a.m., the city of Hue was under attack and the Tet Offensive was in full swing. Before the day was over, five of six autonomous cities, 36 of 44 provincial capitals, and 64 of 245 district capitals were under attack. Except for Khe Sanh, the old capital of Hue, and the area around Saigon, the fighting was over in a few days. Hue was retaken on February 25 after urban warfare reminiscent of Europe in World War II. The Cho Lon area of Saigon was cleared on 7 March, and by March 20, PAVN units around Khe Sanh began to melt away in the face of U.S. firepower. The Tet Offensive was a tactical disaster for the Communists. More than 58,000 VC and PAVN troops died in the offensive, with the United States suffering 3,895 dead and the ARVN losing 4,954. Non-U.S. Allies lost 214. More than 14,300 South Vietnamese civilians also died. Giap also had been wrong in two of his three key assumptions. The people of South Vietnam did not rally to the Communist cause, and the General Uprising never took place, even in Hue, where Communist forces held the city for the longest time. Nor did the ARVN fold.
John Morello, Ph.D. says in Open Arms, Closed Minds and Eyes: Chieu Hoi, PSYOP, and the Intelligence Failures in the TET Offensive about the signs of the coming offensive missed:
There were also material indications that something was in the wind. Fighting may have tapered off in the latter half of 1967, but the number of trucks coming down the Ho Chi Minh Trail had increased. On any given month that year the average truck traffic coming out of North Vietnam was around 480. But in October more than 1,100 trucks were seen making their way south. In November, the number climbed to 3,823, and in December the figure was over 6,300. The trucks carried troops, medical supplies, food and weapons. Some of those weapons were stashed in locations near South Vietnam’s major metropolitan areas. In October, allied units operating east of Saigon unearthed one of those caches after routing a VC unit assigned to protect it. Howitzers, recoilless rifles, mortars, machine guns plus ammunition and medical supplies were recovered.
Let me end this part of the story with comments found in The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff Official History. Although they appeared to be caught with their pants down, in their final report they seem to indicate that they knew all about it. If they did, it is surprising that more action was not taken. For instance, call back all the US and ARVN troops on leave:
The Viet Cong Liberation Radio announced that its forces would respect a ceasefire for a seven-day period for Tet (27 January to 3 February) 1968, beginning at 0100 Saigon time. the United States and the Allied governments agreed that the ceasefire would be limited to 36 hours. Before it took effect, however, General Westmoreland concluded that the situation in the I Combat Tactical Zone where enemy forces were known to be concentrating, was so threatening that this region should be excluded from the ceasefire. The administration agreed with General Westmoreland’s views.
The U.S. command was fully aware that the enemy could attack at any time and that he probably intended to do so soon. The Military Assistance Command Vietnam in an appraisal of communist intentions that proved to be highly accurate, had forecast that the enemy seeing that the trend of events was running against them would undertake an intensified country wide effort, perhaps a maximum effort, over a relatively short period. The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet Headquarters, in summing up the course of the war during 1967 and outlining plans for the coming year noted on 1 January 1968 that the tempo of enemy bombardments was rising and the enemy forces were showing increased willingness to engage in some sustained combat. Enemy strength on the eve of the Tet Offensive, according to estimates accepted by United States Army Pacific, total 114,866, of which 55,349 were North Vietnamese regulars and 59,517 were members of the VC main and local force units.
On 1 February, General Westmoreland was able to report that the attack and passed its peak and that the enemy was losing the initiative. The attackers had only local success, and they had not succeeded in capturing a single city in entirety, although they still held parts of Saigon six other cities. At its height, the Tet Offensive had involved and estimated 67,305 enemy troops, of which 44,990, or almost exactly 2/3s, were Viet Cong forces. Evidently the enemy strategy had been to launch the attack with Viet Cong forces and hold back the major North Vietnamese Army units to exploit any later openings that might be gained.
The enemy dead were estimated at 33,875. US losses were 670 dead. The enemy offensive was largely a failure. He had achieved none of his major political or military objectives. The government in Saigon and its administrative structures throughout the country were shaken but intact. No cities have passed under enemy control. There was no evidence of large-scale rallying to the National Liberation Front. Vietnamese forces did not defect or dessert in large numbers. US advisors rated their performance as up to, or beyond, expectations, even in those units that were seriously understrength because of leave granted for the holiday.
The U.S. and Vietnamese Tet 1968 PSYOP Campaign
The 1968 Tet PSYOP Campaign Policy
Since this article is about leaflets, I think it is fair to start by showing the leaflets that American PSYOP units prepared for the Tet 1968 campaign.
Because the Tet PSYOP campaign of 1967 had been so successful, with double the usual number of Viet Cong going Chieu Hoi, Tet 68 was planned to be even bigger and better. Unfortunately, people were not able to read the many leaflets. The JUSPAO guidance for the Tet campaign is quite long so I will just quote a few small parts of it. The documents probably number 100 pages:
The media used will be: leaflets, both air-dropped and hand distributed by civilians, military, RF/PF, police, RD Teams, and Armed Propaganda Teams; Saigon and affiliated radio stations; VOA and VOF; all TV media; stationary and mobile loudspeakers (ground, water and air borne); provincial newspapers; district and other news bulletins~ other suitable printed media; face-to-face contacts; hoi chanh letters; drama teams; films; and where feasible, public meetings and gatherings. Maximum use will be made of National Safe Conduct passes in all leaflet mixes and separate leaflet drops.
Printed media in support will be developed by Field Development Division Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office and Military Assistance Command Psychological Operations Directorate. JUSPAO will print 500,000 copies of each of 17 leaflets for direct shipment to and dissemination by the CORDS Province Representatives PSYOP. Bulk printing will be by the 7th PSYOP Group in Okinawa, which will produce 20,000,000 copies each of 13 leaflets addressed to the Viet Cong, and 15,000,000 copies each of four leaflets addressed to North Vietnam Army personnel in South Vietnam. Leaflets printed by 7th PSYOP Group will be shipped to the 244th PSYOP Company at Danang, the 245th PSYOP Company at Nha Trang, the 245th PSYOP Detachment at Pleiku, the 246th PSYOP Company at Bien Hoa, and the 19th PSYOP Company at Can Tho. CORDS Assistant Province Representatives for PSYOP may draw on these supplies of leaflets or, through the Deputies for PSYOP in the Combat Tactical Zones, designate preferred targets for airdrop.
JUSPAO will produce the following tapes: A series of five tapes intended for use with mobile and stationary ground loudspeakers operated-by the Vietnamese Information Service and other agencies, for placement by CORDS Province Representatives for PSYOP. A tape recording of the 1968 TET Chieu Hoi song, for placement with radio stations and mobile and stationary ground loudspeaker systems. Tapes with a recording of the TET Song (a girl’s voice with guitar accompaniment) will be shipped to all provinces. All tapes will be produced by the Field Development Division with the assistance of the Information Division. Loudspeaker tapes will be: Tet poetry 99 copies, Tet Chieu Hoi Song 78 copies, 8 Tet messages 848 copies, 3 special entertainment tapes 252 copies for a total of 1,277.
The newspaper Free South will emphasize TET themes beginning with Issue No. 10 of Volume II, which should be in the field around 4 January 1968, and continuing through Issues 11 and 12, which should reach the field around 18 January and 1 February, respectively.
The Information Division will produce special TET radio programs for broadcast over the facilities of the Voice of America. National television will be utilized to broadcast programs specifically related to the TET season and TET, Chieu Hoi, Dai Doan Ket themes.
The Chieu Hoi Tote Bag, of which 50,000 are being produced, is intended exclusively for distribution by hand to families known to have Viet Cong connections. The bags and contents will be shipped separately to the Combat Tactical Zone Deputies for PSYOP for allocation to provinces. The following materials should be placed in each bag: A Chieu Hoi Cartoon Book, a TET Chess Game, a 1968 Astrological Forecast, a 1968 Calendar, a TET Photo Insert, a TET postcard, and a School Ruler. Small bars of soap with a TET/Chieu Hoi message on the cover and matches with a message on the box will also be made available in quantities sufficient for placement in each bag.
The 4th PSYOP Group, in coordination with Commanders and Senior Advisors, will produce Chieu Hoi exploitation leaflets and loudspeaker appeals to follow up the standard Tet leaflets and tapes and take advantage of combat operations and local intelligence.
The Vietnamese POLWAR units were also involved in the Tet propaganda campaign.
The Vietnamese General Political Warfare Directorate plan called for the printing of 40,000,000 leaflets: 20,000,000 of six kinds of GPWD, 1,000,000 each by the four Combat Tactical Zones (4,000,000) and 15 million of four types by MACPD. -These 40,000,000 leaflets will be distributed as follows: 5 million to each of the IV CTZ, 1.5 million to the 10th Infantry Division, and 5 million to the 5th Polwar Battalion.
The plan provides for printing of 8,000,000 slogans, or 2,000,000 for each CTZ. MACPD has been asked to print these. They will be distributed to hamlets which are under heavy Viet Cong pressure.
The plan provides for printing of 4,000 banners, or 1,000 for each CTZ. These will be produced in the CTZ. Instructions will be issued to Sectors and Sub-Sectors to paste up the banners in hamlets which are under heavy VC pressure.
Finally, the plan provides for printing of 10,000,000 copies of a message to servicemen from the Chief of the RVNAF Joint Chiefs of Staff. These will be distributed at the rate of 1 million each to the four CTZ, 5 million to the 10th Infantry Division, and 1 million to the 5th POLWAR Battalion. These letters will urge servicemen at all levels to give a warm welcome to the Viet Cong ralliers.
The subjects and topics for propaganda are Spring is the Togetherness Season for Every Family, The Great Union Policy Raised by the Government of RVN is a Honorary Outlet for VC Cadres, Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) and Other National Objectives, The Difficulties Engaged by the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, The Present Grief of Viet Cong Cadres, and Reasons for Viet Cong Cadres to Return to the Government on tile Occasion of TET.
Some of the Tet leaflets are SP-2244 - Return and enjoy Tet, 2245 - Water Pump, 2246 - We miss you, 2247 – Your family needs you, 2248 – Your family awaits you, 2249 – the Tet fortune teller, 2251- New Year, New Hope, 2252 – New Year Greeting number 1, 2253 – New Year greeting number 2, 2262 – NVA Poem to mother, 2226- Good treatment to prisoners, and several more, just about everyone in the 2200 series and all printed from October 1967 to November 1967. The Vietnamese POLWAR unit also printed leaflets with their codes like 8-434 (1) and 8-423 (3). I depict some samples of the American leaflets below. Unfortunately. Most Viet Cong and NVA were too busy fighting to do much reading.
Leaflet 2244
200,400 leaflets were printed. I choose to print the more colorful side so let me mention the text on that side:
Your family will be very sad if you are not home for the Tet Season. We urge you to return and enjoy Tet and a Happy New Year with your family. The newly elected Government will welcome you through its Chieu Hoi Program.
The back of the leaflet shows some happy Hoi Chanhs having a Tet meal. The text is:
CHIEU HOI
The Hoi Chanh shown above are enjoying a Tet meal at a Chieu Hoi Center. As Tet is coming everybody wants to eat good food, to be Reunited with family and friends and live a happy life in a secure area of the Government of Vietnam. Your family needs you and sincerely hopes that you will return to your parents and wife and children. Tet will lack meaning and your family will be sad if you are not home.
Leaflet 2249
200,400 copies of this leaflet called “The Fortune Teller” were printed in October 1967. Fortune telling leaflets were very popular in WWII when both the British and the Germans prepared leaflets using Nostradamus, or astrologists to tell the enemy that they were going to lose. In Vietnam, the U.S. prepared many leaflets giving predictions of Viet Cong defeat or offers of good treatment for those that went Chieu Hoi. This one of them. The text on the front is:
THE TET FORTUNE TELLER
You might be unlucky soon. We suggest you consult the Tet Fortune-Teller.
The "Fortune-Teller Card" has nine items that are important to you. Mark X to the right of the items that are true, or you believe to be true. If you have the right number of marks, you might have good luck for Tet.
1. I want to enjoy Tet with my family.
2. I would like to have better food.
3. The Viet Cong will be defeated.
4. I am sorry that I joined the Viet Cong.
5. Chieu Hoi is a way to be reunited with one's family.
6. I would like to have better medical treatment.
7. ARVN and Allied Forces have better weapons than the Viet Cong.
8. I would like to be free from air and artillery attacks.
9. The people of Vietnam have selected a new government.If you have more than 4 X's you are urged to turn the leaflet over.
The text on the back is:If you have more than 4 (X) you will have good luck on Tet.
The Government of Vietnam guarantees every Hoi Chanh:1. Good treatment.
2. Full citizenship in the Republic of Vietnam.
3. Medical treatment in the Chieu Hoi Center.
4. Permanent reunion with his family.
5. VN $30 daily for food for each returnee, his wife, and older children, VN $15 daily for younger children.
6. VN $200 monthly pocket money, VN $100 monthly for each member of family in Center.
7. Rewards for weapons brought in (From $500 to $75,000).
8. Two suits of new clothing or VN $1,000.
9. VN $1,000 per family for resettlement.
10. Help in finding a job.
11. Those who settle in Chieu Hoi hamlets will receive VN $10,000 to build a bouse, plus free cement and roofing, VN $2,000 to buy furniture, and six months rice subsistence.
Leaflet 2253 – New Year’s Greeting Number 2
This leaflet appears to show a happy grandfather with his two grandchildren, The text on the front is:
HAPPY NEW YEAR
The back is all text:
On the New Year the Government of Vietnam wishes you happiness and peace so you can return to your family and freedom. We wish that you enjoy a happy Tet with your family through the Chieu Hoi Program of the Government of Vietnam. The Chieu Hoi benefits are waiting for you. Your loved ones are waiting to enjoy a reunion Tet with you in a secure area of the Government of Vietnam.
Leaflet 2255
I chose to depict this leaflet because of the lovely color. The girl is very attractive, and I am sure that many a lonely Viet Cong or North Vietnamese soldier looked at her with great longing. The text on the front is:
NEW SPRING WISHES
[HAPPY NEW YEAR]The back is all text:
On a new year, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam wishes you a peaceful year so you could promptly join your family.
We wish you could find your own escape path so you could benefit from the Chieu Hoi policy of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, enjoy the spring, and reunite with your family.
Your loved ones are awaiting you for a reuniting Tet on the free side of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam.
Leaflet 2266
This leaflet features six photographs of happy Viet Cong prisoners of war on the front. The text is:
Rather be free than a war prisoner.
Better to be a prisoner than dead
The back is all text:
A few activities of North Vietnamese prisoners in South Vietnam. Perhaps you will not be very happy to become a war prisoner, but you should understand this truth:
1. You will receive good treatment. The prisoner’s camp is under a self-government system. You and your comrades will be elected to the management of the camp.
2. You will. have good food. According to international law, prisoners of war are entitled to the same ration as a soldier of the Government of Vietnam. The cooking will be done by you and your comrades.
3. You will enjoy sports and learning. In your free time you can participate in various sports or professional courses held at the camp.
BUT THE MOST IMPORTANT IS THAT YOU ARE SURE WHEN THE WAR IS ENDED YOU CAN RETURN TO YOUR HOME.
An Interesting Viet Cong Tet Leaflet
This leaflet was disseminated by the Viet Cong in 1967 and demanded that the Americans and South Vietnamese respect the Tet truce. I add it only because of the irony that one year later the Viet Cong ignored their own 1968 Tet Truce and attacked all the major cities in South Vietnam. The idea was good, and they even got into the American embassy, but the South Vietnamese people did not rise up in support of the Viet Cong and the result was that the Viet Cong for a brief time was wiped out and no longer a military force. This led directly to greater numbers of North Vietnamese troops being sent south to take up the slack.
General Cao Van Vien and Lieutenant General Dong Van Khuyen mention their Vietnamese view of Tet 1968 in an Indochina Monograph published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History, titled Reflections on the Vietnam War. The book was translated by Phillip Tran.
When the Tet General Offensive finally materialized, it came as a big surprise for the Government of Vietnam. We were surprised not because of the absence of telltale indications which our intelligence had picked up but primarily because of our subjectivity and complacency which totally misled our estimates as to the enemy's intention and calculated boldness. It was indeed a risky venture for the enemy, but he had accepted the inevitable heavy losses. It was a daring move because our enemy completely disregarded the traditional sanctity of the Tet and overly relied on theoretical popular uprising.
The Tet offensive did not help the enemy attain his strategic objectives. He temporarily regained some initiative but eventually lost it again and found himself in a military posture much worse than before. The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces did not disintegrate; they became stronger and more aggressive. Popular uprisings, a key to quick victory, never materialized. U.S. forces did not bog down as expected, and finally the enemy's ploy of installing a coalition government was completely shattered. The enemy's subjectivity also brought him a big surprise. He had preconceived ideas about the weakness of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces and the people's hostile attitude toward the United States and the Government of Vietnam. But the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces had fought gallantly and with confidence; they had fully demonstrated their combat capabilities and aggressiveness. Despite their criticisms of the Government of Vietnam and noncommittal attitude, the South Vietnamese people had resolutely refused to cooperate with the Communists. They were not deceived by such disguised stratagems of Communist domination as "coalition," "neutrality," and "peace."
South Vietnamese Colonel Hoang Ngoc Lung wrote a monograph entitled Intelligence for the U.S. Army Center of Military History in 1976. He mentioned the fact that the signal to start the general uprising was a "Happy Tet" poem by Ho Chi Minh broadcast from Radio Hanoi:
When North Vietnam was preparing to launch its General Offensive against cities in South Vietnam during the Tet holidays of 1968, it gave the order for preparation and attack under the form of a "Happy Tet" poem by Ho Chi Minh. This poem was broadcast by Radio Hanoi, intended for Communist troops in the South:
This Spring will be much different from previous springs
Because every household will enjoy news of victory
North and South will now forever reunite
Forward! Total victory will be ours.
The "Happy Tet" poem by Ho Chi Minh that Radio Hanoi repeatedly broadcast for some time before Tet was also a significant indicator that failed to draw the attention of our intelligence experts. For one thing, it had become a habit of the North Vietnam leader to address Happy Tet wishes to the North Vietnamese population every year. For another, words of exhortation to victory were nothing new in Communist propaganda jargon. What our intelligence experts failed to detect was the meaning that something new would happen this coming Tet and that it was going to be entirely different from previous years. The significance of Ho's short poem as a signal for preparations and attack was later confirmed by several enemy prisoners and returnees.
The first phase of the 1968 General Offensive also helped the Republic of Vietnam intelligence establishment to learn more about the enemy. Unprecedented numbers of prisoners, returnees, and important captured documents contributed toward deepening our knowledge on the enemy's strategy and policies. As a result, we knew well in advance every detail about the follow-up phase of his offensive, even the exact time of the first attack, which began on 5 May 1968. This was due to our agent sources within enemy ranks. In addition to information on the enemy campaign, these sources also divulged the difficulties that the Central Office for South Vietnam was facing, particularly the deteriorating morale of Communist units. At the same time, high ranking returnees contributed much invaluable information on the enemy's internal situation.
From a morale standpoint, the uprising was a major blow to the United States. They had been hearing rosy news for years of constant American victories and enormous body counts of dead Viet Cong and had no idea that the guerrilla movement could plan and wage such an enormous attack. For the first time, many Americans, including TV reporter Walter Cronkite, began to wonder if the war was winnable.
The Viet Cong Tet Offensive – 1968
What motivated me to write this short report on the PSYOP of Tet 1968 was an illustrated book titled The Viet Cong Tet Offensive - 1968, part of a “Series of Combat History” that was written by a number of Republic of Vietnam Army officers and printed by their Printing and Publications Center. It was later translated into English by a group of Americans officers assigned to a Joint Staff Civil Affairs Translation Board. It is about 490 pages in length and tells the entire story of Tet 1968 in five detailed chapters. The last section of the last chapter is titled “Propaganda.” I saw that last chapter and thought that I had some Viet Cong leaflets and some Allied leaflets that mention Tet 1968 and perhaps I might do a short report using the Vietnamese book.
Even as the Viet Cong forces were being destroyed, they kept telling their own people that they were victorious everywhere. The report says in part:
The formation of the so-called "Alliance of National, Democratic and Peaceful Forces in the South" was announced. It was the NLF who acted as spokesman for the Alliance, calling for united action to restore independence, democracy, and peace to the South in view of later national reunification.
Although the general offensive failed the very day it was launched, the Communist radios kept claiming victories for more than a week, trying to boost the red soldiers morale...A communique issued by the Communist command in Saigon reported that offensive troops had occupied within ten days the ARVN General Staff headquarters, the American Embassy, the Tan Son Nhut air base, the Go Vap rear area, and had control on most of Saigon's 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th precincts while expanding their thrust into the other precincts.
It said that 10, 000 allied troops including 3,000 Americans had been killed, while tens of thousands of others had defected, and that the whole government machinery in Saigon had collapsed. The communique also claimed that 200 planes, over 600 military vehicles including 200 armored cars had been destroyed, and people from all walks of life in the liberated cities and villages had joined popular Self-Defense units with weapons captured from the enemy. It said tens of thousands of ARVN officers, soldiers, policemen and officials had joined the people's ranks; and all conditions were favorable for a final victory.
Another communique issued by the Command of the western area said:
From 3l January to 7 April 1968, simultaneous attacks were launched against the cities and towns of Can Tho, Soc Trang, Vinh Long, Bac Lieu, Ca Mau, and Rach Gia. The command headquarters of the IV Corps suffered heavy losses; the command headquarters of the 14th, 16th and 32nd Regiments were destroyed. 6,200 enemy soldiers were captured. 25,000 enemy soldiers and cadres were put out of combat.
All other enemy war communiques were of the same line. All claimed big victories, with particular emphasis on a final victory described as within reach to boost the red soldier's morale.
Leaflets were also prepared.
These groups started distributing Leaflets while speaking to the people through loudspeakers. Most leaflets were supposed to have been originated from the so-called Alliance of National Democratic and Peace Forces. Police reported later that a total of twelve different leaflets were distributed in Saigon.
I will not talk about the attacks in any detail; just add some of my Viet Cong leaflets and some of my American-South Vietnamese leaflets that specifically mention Tet 1968 to illustrate the story. I hope to hold this report to about 4,000 words, but my history is that the articles somehow all grow to a minimum of 10,000 words.
About a decade ago I wrote in an article about the casualties of the Vietnam War:
Young men in North Vietnam had a slogan: “Born in the North to die in the South.” They saw their friends marching off, never to return, and knew that if sent South, the odds were very good that they were going to die. During their great “victory” of Tet 1968, 32,000 Guerrillas were killed and another 5,800 captured. The Viet Cong was virtually put out of business in a single prolonged battle. During the course of the War, General Giap said that a total of 500,000 of his troops were killed in the fighting. In April 1995, Hanoi admitted that the actual number was 1.1 million men killed. The United States lost 58,209 men in the war. It would seem to be an American victory, except that South Vietnam did eventually fall so we must say that through patience, propaganda, subterfuge and the support of Russia, China and the Soviet Bloc, North Vietnam was the winner of the war.
Speaking of North Vietnamese General Giap, Colonel Harry Summers, the U.S. author and historian, once decided to provoke General Giap. He said “The North Vietnamese troops had never defeated the Americans on the battlefield.” Many American veterans of the Vietnam War will tell you “We were winning when I left.” General Giap replied: “That is true but it is also irrelevant.” In other words, it was never about the fighting; it was always about the will of the American and North Vietnamese people and governments to fight to the bitter end and win.
Viet Cong woman with Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG)
The number of actual Viet Cong who died during Tet is still open to question. It started about 30,000 and a few years later rose to 40,000. The New York Times of 31 January 1988 said:
The number of enemy dead had climbed to more than 58,000. More than 14,000 South Vietnamese men, women and children also had died. Of all the battles that together are known as the Tet offensive, the longest, bloodiest and most destructive was fought over Hue, in central Vietnam.
The Second Indochina War Symposium was held at Airlie, Virginia on 7-9 November 1984, hosted by the Center of Military History of the United States Army. In regard to the Tet Offensive, historian Douglas Pike said:
In the Tet offensive of 1968 thirty-two of South Vietnam's major population centers were attacked simultaneously by 70,000 of General Giap's best forces. While the Tet offensive had enormous psychological impact abroad, particularly in the United States where it was a major factor in President Lyndon Johnson's decision not to seek reelection, it was a disaster for General Giap. He had begun his winter-spring campaign with 195,000 men. At its conclusion he had lost (killed or permanently disabled) 85,000 of his best troops with virtually nothing militarily to show for it.
The Viet Cong Tet Offensive introduces us to the uprising. I will edit and paraphrase some comments for brevity:
What did the Communists have to say through their propaganda machinery and both the Hanoi and National Liberation Front (NLF) radios during the Tet general offensive? First, they claimed a formation of so-called “Alliance of National, Democratic and Peaceful forces” in the South. The NLF claimed to be the spokesman of this Alliance, calling for united action to restore Independence, democracy and peace” to the south.
Curiously, the South was at peace already, but terrorized by Guerrilla bands that murdered people that did not follow their political beliefs. This would continue during the uprising when the “peaceful democratic forces” would kill thousands of innocent civilians.
American military police kneel behind a wall as they fight for control
of the U.S. Embassy compound.
In the foreground are two American soldiers who were killed in earlier fighting.
In spite of the dramatic attack on the U.S. Embassy, the Tet Offensive was a tactical
defeat for the Viet Cong.
The Vietnam War Almanac
Although the general offensive failed the very first day it was launched, the Communist radios kept claiming victories for more than a week, trying to boost their soldier’s morale. A communique issued by the Communist Command in Saigon reported that their troops within 10 days had occupied the ARVN General Staff Headquarters, The American Embassy, the Tan Son Nhut Airbase, and control of four of Saigon’s districts…10,000 Allied troops including 3,000 Americans had been killed. Tens of thousands had defected. The Saigon Government machinery had collapsed. 200 planes, 600 military vehicles including 200 armored cars had been destroyed. And people were joining the popular self-defense units with weapons captured from the enemy. Tens of thousands of ARVN officers, soldiers and police had joined the people’s ranks. Final victory was in sight.
Vietnam Document and Research notes, Number 22, March 1968, discusses Tet 1968 in depth. Some of the comments are:
When the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army unleashed their attack against the cities of South Vietnam on 31 January their military offensive was accompanied by a propaganda offensive against the Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. At the most public and diffuse level, this "political struggle" took the form of radio broadcasts transmitted by Hanoi and the broadcasting station of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front. These broadcasts asserted that the Government of South Vietnam was being overthrown, that its authority in many localities bad been superseded by that of revolutionary organizations, and that the people should seize power and accomplish total defeat of the Government and its allies.
At the bottom level, amongst their forces on the ground, the Viet Cong propaganda took the fora of leaflets distributed directly to people on the streets or to families in their homes in those sections of cities penetrated or temporarily controlled by the Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Army military units.
So, why did the Tet offensive of 1968 occur? Mervyn Roberts mentions Tet in Propaganda and Influence: Russian and Chinese Targeting of America
Northern propaganda had some initial success in agitating rural southerners against perceived grievances. However, by 1967, the Northern program had lost trust of most southern people. Most National Liberation Front fighters by 1967 were northern invaders, not local guerillas, so a cultural split intensified the bad relationships. Villagers increasingly saw the NLF as bomb magnets who stole their resources and brought nothing in return. They did not necessarily love Americans, but polls, captured documents, and studies indicated they blamed the violence on the Vietcong and saw benefits with the Allies. Given that people were in a life and death struggle, they reacted critically to Northern propaganda. This collapsing situation was part of the motivation in the summer of 1967 for the Northern decision to gamble with the Tet Offensive in 1968. The DRV leadership knew they were losing, and that they needed to take risks to avoid loss.
The Time Opportunity
This leaflet depicts an advancing crowd of Vietnamese and Montagnard country people. The message on the leaflet states:
The time-opportunity has arrived! The entire people unite in a single mind to fight the Americans, overthrow the puppets, and seize the government for the people.
Note: There were certain terms used in many of the leaflets prepared for Tet 1968. Three of the most popular were: Time Opportunity (Now or never), General Offensive, and General Uprising.
Smash Control
The above leaflet, distributed in Quang Ngai Province, contains the statements:
The Liberation Armed Forces will attack repeatedly and continuously the military targets of the Americans and puppets, the government office of the puppet regime, the communication arteries, the pacification teams, the cruel gangs...Compatriots should take this opportunity to rise simultaneously to smash the machinery of control, to liberate yourselves and be masters of your own fate.
PROCLAMATION
PROCLAMATION OF THE REVOLUTIONALY ARMY COMMAND
Compatriot Citizen:
The general offensive against the Thieu-Ky clique which we are looking for has materialized. The Revolutionary Army, responding to the will and the anger of the entire people, has opened fire at the enemy with whom we cannot live under the same sky.
We wish to report to the compatriots that we are determined to overthrow the Thieu-Ky traitors' regime, destroy those who have been oppressing and beating the compatriots so far. Our struggle's objective is to win independence for the people, peace for the country, democracy, and happiness for the people.
We will build a power regime entirely of our own, a regime for the Fatherland and the people. To enable the Army to fulfill its sacred but very heavy responsibility, we demand that the compatriots:
1 - Give us a hand in attacking and pursuing the American and puppet forces.
2 - Help us arrest all the cruel henchmen of the Americans and puppets.Being the children of the people, the Revolutionary Army pledges to do its utmost to win Victory for the Fatherland and the people.
January 31, 1968
The Revolutionary Army Command
Long An Province
A Viet Cong Tet-themed leaflet
The Communists regularly lied and bragged about major victories and thousands of battles won and U.S. aircraft shot down. This is rather typical of their exaggeration and talks about Tet 1968. This Quang Nam Province National Front for Liberation leaflet claims that the Viet Cong:
Annihilated 62,000 enemy troops…24 battalions, 95 companies of US and puppet troops…1000 military vehicles…Tens of hundreds of aircraft…100 vessels…
The leaflet was found by former Sergeant First Class Don Peterson who was in Vietnam during the years 1968-1969. He told me:
I picked this up somewhere between LZ Baldy and LZ Ross. I don't recall the Road number or Highway between the two Landing Zones, but they called it Que Son Valley.
A second communique, issued by the Central Area Command said in part:
From 30 January to 4 April 1968, our forces smashed key military and administrative organs of the enemy in 21 cities. Six sub-area command headquarters and 4 operational commands were destroyed. 16,000 soldiers including 1000 American soldiers were killed, seven battalions including one American battalion was annihilated, 14 vessels and 155 military vehicles were destroyed and 13 planes shot down…400 enemy soldiers surrendered to our side. 6 Key highways were under constant pressure. We destroyed the Rach Mien Bridge and took over the My Thuan ferry.
A Second Viet Cong Tet-themed leaflet
Whereas the first leaflet targeted the enlisted American troops, this leaflet targets both the officers and enlisted. Once again it is from the Quang Nam Province National Front for Liberation. Notice the exaggerated total has climbed over 100%. In the first leaflet they killed 62,000 enemy troops. That number is now 150,000 troops.
45 DAYS AND NIGHTS
This small 3 x 4-inch 5-page booklet is the alleged story of the Viet Cong victory over the Americans and the South Vietnamese during the Tet offensive of 1968. The title and text are:
45
DAYS AND NIGHTS
HEAVEN AND EARTH
From 30 January 1968 to 15 March 1968 - 45 days
- [Viet Cong] Soldiers and people of the South:
- killed, injured, and captured over 150.000 enemies including 45.000 Americans and vassals, many of enemy units were decimated or severely mauled, including 3 regiments, 1 puppet airborne brigade, over 60 battalions, over 200 companies.
- Disintegrated 200,000 enemies.
- Shot down, destroyed about 2200 airplanes.
- Blew to smithereens 3500 combat vehicles, 1750 armored vehicles.
- Destroyed 300 heavy guns.
- Sank and damaged 253 combat vessels.
- Leveled 823 garrisons, posts, and towers.
- Destroyed 300 depots of different kinds.
- 1,000,000 people have secured control in 100 wards, 600 hamlets have just been liberated.All this in only 45 days of ground shaking that reached even The White House and The Pentagon.
More than 1/10 of the total number of American puppet and vassal troops were Destroyed. As the enemy deserted, 40% of the total number of puppet forces were eliminated from the battle. The puppet forces lost 50% of their troops or more, in which the reserve forces including paratroopers, infantry commanders, and rangers that they consider elite units have had up to 20 battalions (out of a total of 35 battalions) destroyed with heavy losses. Combat vehicles and enemy forces suffered very heavy losses, nearly 40% of the total number of aircraft of all types, 1/3 of the total number of armored vehicles were destroyed. The logistics reserve force suffered half of the damage.
Facing these true facts, who can still doubt the Americans will come to a complete defeat?
Retired U.S. Army Colonel Brooks A. Mick, M.D. was a Surgeon in Vietnam during the Tet uprising. He told me a bit about his actions at the time:
Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Leaflet
A Huey, taking off from the airstrip at Kontum during Tet, was shot down and crashed with two of my medics from the 1/22nd Infantry on board, but both were uninjured. They were under fire and sheltering under the wreck until the enemy fire was suppressed and they could bug out.
I found the leaflet just after Tet, sometime in mid or late January, 1968, and I was with either the 1/22nd Infantry or 1/14th Infantry (I was moved around to fill in trouble spots) and we were operating mostly out of Fire Base Mary Lou or up at Dak To. I do recall this was near the Cambodian border, which was within sight across a small valley.I was on an overnight patrol and happened to spot this lying along the trail. I had a new Asahi Pentax 35 mm camera and so I just stopped, leaned over, and photographed this in somewhat poor light. I had no flash at the time, probably wouldn't have used it anyway. I did not pick it up.
[Author's Note]: I do not recognize that particular leaflet but of course, millions were dropped during the Vietnam War. For more information on the Chieu Hoi program, click here.
Treating a wounded North Vietnamese Soldier
I was a Battalion Surgeon, and aside from the two infantry battalions, I served with 5/16th Artillery, and in 4th Medical Battalion's C and D companies.
The Bunker-A Safe Place
The bunker was by highway A14 at the south end of the bridge to Kontum
As I said, I was moved around a lot, sort of a trouble-shooter. I recall all my medics fondly. Some of us were dropped off at the bridge south of Kontum on highway A14. We started a bunker there, but took mortar and small arms fire during the first night, so I moved south a kilometer to a Special Forces C camp, and we set up there. Here are some further photos.
Determined to Fight…
