THE AMERICAN PSYOP
ORGANIZATION DURING
THE KOREAN WAR

SGM HERBERT A. FRIEDMAN (Ret.)

Note: The historian for the 7th Air Force and the 8th Fighter Wing in Korea was granted permission to use text and/or images from this article in historical presentations on the Korean War and later history. Singapore has requested the use of images from our Korean War articles as part of their History O Level examinations, a source-based case study where students are provided with numerous sources on an issue and decide on the source’s reliability. The theme is "Was American intervention in the Korean War necessary?” Leaflets from this article were exhibited at the Strategic Air Command and Aerospace Museum, Ashland, Nebraska; the images were in an interactive display titled “The Air War over Korea.” Leaflet images were in one open binder and text in an adjacent open binder. Visitors flipped between the two binders, selecting an image and the best text to go with it to build their own propaganda leaflet. An author writing the autobiography of Major General Charles A. Willoughby requested the use of reference material from this article. The University of Leicester requested material from this article for their study: Postwar Urban Reconstruction in China 1937 – 1958.

Background

President Truman

Kim Il Sung

Following Japan’s surrender in World War II, Korea was arbitrarily divided into zones of Soviet and American occupation, north and south of the 38th north parallel. By 1948, it was clear that reunification of the two countries was hopeless, in May 1948, the Republic of Korea (ROK) was created in the south, with Dr. Syngman Rhee as president, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was formed in the north. In April of 1948, President Harry S. Truman had stated, "The United States should not become so irrevocably involved in the Korean situation that an action taken by any faction in Korea, or by any other power in Korea could be considered a Casus belli (cause for war) for the United States." Kim Il Sung, the dictator of the DPRK, listened closely. He was finely attuned to the intricacies of political rhetoric, and interpreted the President’s comment to mean that the United States would not become involved in any military action on the Korean peninsula. The U.S. withdrew its occupation forces in June 1949.

Possibly, because of this perceived "green light," 93,000 North Korean troops with approximately 100 Russian-made tanks attacked southward early on Sunday morning, 25 June 1950 in an attempt to force reunification. The forces of South Korea were almost pushed into the sea, and communist forces occupied the capital Seoul and much of South Korea.

Mark R. Jacobson mentions how the United States was taken completely by surprise in his PhD thesis, Minds then Hearts: U.S. Political and Psychological Warfare during the Korean War, 2005, Ohio State University:

The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff had just returned from a series of briefings at Far East Command in Tokyo where there had not been a hint of the possibility of a North Korean attack. By the time the armistice was signed three years later, The Korean War had resulted in major shifts in U.S. Defense policy, including a tripling in the size of the armed forces and a doubling of the Pentagon budget.

Nicolas Eberstadt mentions the secrecy of the plan in The End of North Korea, AEI Press, Washington D.C. 1999:

…In attempting to evaluate North Korean unification policy, the degree to which the plan was predicated on absolute secrecy (what the Soviets used to call “Maskirovka”) is an aspect that deserves special comment. The initial success of the attack hinged largely on the fact that it took Seoul and Washington almost completely by surprise - and it took them by surprise because Pyongyang expertly concealed both its capabilities and its intentions up until the moment of truth. Less than a week before the actual invasion, for example, the DPRK was floating diversionary proposals containing new ideas for possible steps towards peaceful and voluntary unification with the South. North Korea's top leadership also seems to have subjected its own administrative and military apparatuses to a corresponding measure of strategic deception as the invasion plan progressed. John Merrill notes:

“Even secret Central Committee documents that were seized by United Nations forces when they captured Pyongyang made absolutely no mention of the forthcoming invasion.” High ranking North Korean officers had only the barest presentiment of hostilities until the final orders were issued for the attack. So thorough and complete was the regime's devotion to strategic secrecy, in fact, that an accurate and substantive record of the proceedings leading up to the June 1950 offensive may simply not exist – even in Pyongyang.

According to Shen Zhihua, the director of the Shanghai-based Center for Cold War International History Studies:

Kim Il-sung kept asking for Stalin and Mao Zedong's approval to use force to take South Korea. But at first both demurred as the Soviet Union didn't want to aggravate tensions with the U.S., and China was concentrating on its own reunification. But in late January 1950, Stalin suddenly changed his mind and agreed to Kim's plan to undertake military operations against South Korea. He also called Kim to Moscow for secret talks. In the April talks, Stalin gave final approval to Kim's plan to start the war. Stalin agreed to Kim's estimate that the U.S. would decline to or not have enough time to intervene in the war but emphasized that the Soviet Union will not help out in case of the U.S. intervention. Mao said that if the U.S. entered the war China would send its own armies to assist North Korea, and troops could be transferred to the China-Korea border right away.

It is hard to explain how totally the USA was caught by surprise. The American military had been so weakened after WWII that there were no highly trained units ready to take on the North Korean aggressors. The peninsula was held by a thread. The 2000 National Security booklet Signal Intelligence and the Pusan Perimeter says:

The North Koreans launched a massive offensive against South Korea on 25 June 1950. This devastating attack was led by 150 Soviet T-34 tanks, which the South Koreans had no weapon powerful enough to stop. In a matter of days, the Korean People’s Army had captured the South Korean capital, Seoul, and was continuing to push south in an apparent attempt to reunify the Korean peninsula under communist rule…General Douglas MacArthur, United States commander in chief in Asia, transferred units from the American army of occupation in Japan to Korea in early July. The arriving U.S. troops were out of shape, not well-equipped, poorly trained, and totally unfamiliar with the Korean terrain. As a result, the UN forces, consisting mostly of Americans and South Koreans, were terribly torn up by the North Korean attacks. Throughout July, the Korean People’s Army pushed the UN forces south, inflicting dreadful casualties in the process.

The CIA admitted major intelligence errors on their part in declassified reports entitled: Two Strategic Intelligence Mistakes in Korea, 1950. Six days before the invasion the CIA did not think the North had the power to defeat the South:

While North Korea could take control of parts of the South, it probably does not have the capability to destroy the South Korean government without Soviet or Chinese assistance…

The CIA did not believe that China would enter the war:

While full-scale Chinese Communist intervention in Korea must be regarded as a continuing possibility, a consideration of all known factors leads to the conclusion that such action is not probable in 1950.

On 15 October, General Douglas MacArthur told President Harry Truman:

There is little chance of a large-scale Chinese intervention.

On the very next day, 30,000 Chinese troops poured across the Duman River followed by 150,000 more soldiers a few days later.

President Harry S. Truman determined to support the Republic of South Korea militarily and sought United Nations backing. An emergency session of the United Nations Security Council resolved to send troops to Korea. The USSR, having boycotted the session, was unable to veto this resolution. Had they been present, history would be rewritten. North Korean troops pushed the United Nations Forces into a small defensive perimeter at the tip of the Korean peninsula.

The American commander on the ground became General Walton Walker. In one of the finest pep talks ever given to a retreating force he told his American commanders on 29 July in what has become known as the “Stand and Die” order:

We are fighting a battle against time. There will be no more retreating, withdrawal, or readjustment of the lines or any other term you choose. There is no line behind us to which we can retreat. Every unit must counterattack to keep the enemy in a state of confusion. There will be no Dunkirk, there will be no Bataan; a retreat to Pusan would be one of the greatest butcheries in history. We must fight until the end. Capture by these people is worse than death itself. We will fight as a team. If some of us die, we will die fighting together. Any man who gives ground may be personally responsible for the death of thousands of his comrades. I want everybody to understand we are going to hold this line. We are going to win.

U.N. troops, largely from the U.S. and Japan and commanded by General Douglas MacArthur, landed at Inchon on 15 September and launched a counterattack. The operation involved some 75,000 troops and 261 naval vessels, and led to the recapture of the South Korean capital Seoul two weeks later. Initial success brought the U.N. troops to the Chinese border by late November 1950, but on 29 November, China entered the conflict and pushed the U.N. forces southward. Seoul fell again on 4 January 1951. Another U.N. counteroffensive in February and March drove the North Korean and Chinese troops back to the 38th parallel. Despite much bloody fighting, the battle lines remained stable for another two years. As the fighting moved up and down the peninsula, ravaging the land, there were an estimated three million casualties. Armistice talks began in July 1951 but repeatedly failed to reach agreement. A truce was signed on 27 July 1953 establishing a demilitarized zone along the 38th parallel and creating a framework for a permanent settlement of the war. Talks have continued fruitlessly ever since.

The Korean "police action" still confuses scholars today. Various leaders in Washington, the Pentagon, and the front lines were recommending actions as diverse as the simple defense of the South, the total destruction of North Korea, contaminating the Korean-Chinese border with radioactive fallout, and even the invasion of the Peoples Republic of China by the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek.

General Douglas MacArthur refused to concede that the Chinese had entered the war until it was almost too late to halt their advance. It was one of the greatest intelligence lapses in American military history. He was ultimately relieved of duty when President Truman felt that his orders were not being properly and promptly obeyed. The goals of the United Nations were so unclear that Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet answered the question "How will we know when we have won the war?" with the answer, "I don’t know, somebody higher up will have to tell me."

Even worse, early in the war the mention of China or the USSR was forbidden in Allied leaflets because there was a fear that such comments might bring them deeper into the war. Later, they were not mentioned because it was feared that the knowledge that China and the USSR were backing the North Korean armed forces might tend to demoralize South Korean civilians. Eventually they were mentioned in Leaflets, but opportunities had been missed. This problem with producing timely propaganda hampered the Allies all through the war. By the time the leaflets were approved at every level, the news was often old and stale.

Corporal Raymond J. Krumenacker stands by at the drop door of an Air Force C-47 looking for concentrations of Chinese troops while members of the Psychological Warfare Section drop bundles of propaganda leaflets over Communist-held  territory in Korea.

Propaganda was used extensively by both sides during the Korean conflict. Aircraft and artillery delivered United Nations leaflets. B-29 bombers dropped strategic propaganda deep behind the enemy’s rear lines. Front-line tactical propaganda was dropped by light bombers and spotter aircraft, or fired from 105mm howitzers. More than 20 million leaflets a week were prepared and disseminated by United Nations Forces at the height of the conflict. Curiously, there seems to be some evidence that the definition of “Tactical leaflets” during the early Korean War was simply “within 40 miles of the front lines.” If the target was more than 40 miles from the front line the leaflet became “strategic.”

To give an example of the daily leaflet war in Korea we quote the Periodic Intelligence Report of the U.S. X Corps.

Friendly: PSYWAR, G-2, General Headquarters – Far Eastern Air Force Bomber Command dropped 2,680,000 leaflets along the line of contact on 27 November 1950. The type of leaflets and quantities dropped are as follows:

"Safe Conduct Pass" leaflets printed in Chinese. 620,000
"Good Treatment of PW" leaflets printed in Chinese. 720,000
"Safe Conduct Pass" leaflets printed in Korean. 620,000
"Good Treatment of PW" leaflets printed in Korean. 720,000

Enemy: Report of U.S. I Corps, 25 November 1950. Several enemy planes dropped three types of propaganda leaflets on the signal relay station 27 miles north of Pyongyang signed by the General Political Bureau, Korean People's Army. The contents of two of these leaflets written in English are as follows:

Leaflet 1. Officers and men of US armed forces surrender and you will not be killed. Prisoners of war are well treated. Lay down your arms and come over to us.

Leaflet 2. Officers and men US Army why are you going to die a meaningless death on an alien soil 10,000 miles away from your country? Your dear people at home are spending miserable days worrying about your fate. Why are you going to sacrifice your youthful life for an unjust cause leaving your dear people behind you? Lay down your arms immediately and surrender. The Korean People’s Army treats prisoners of war well. The only way for you to get home soon is to surrender. Lose no time and come over to us.

General Van Fleet was named commander of the Eighth United States Army in Korea on 14 April 1951. He replaced General Matthew B. Ridgway who moved up to commander of all United Nations forces. Eight days later, on 22 April, Van Fleet was involved in the greatest battle of the war, the Chinese Fifth Offensive. Twenty-one Chinese and nine North Korean divisions attacked southward in human waves. This clash ultimately led to approximately 70,000 Communist casualties, and the capture of 10,000 troops. The enemy was in disarray after this battle, and their morale was low.

The Military Command Structure  

General McArthur	General Ridgway	General Clark	General Van Fleet

Prior to the Korean conflict, General Douglas MacArthur had been Commander in Chief, Far East Command (CINC FECOM), headquartered in Tokyo. Following UN approval of the intervention, MacArthur assumed the additional role of Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC). On 11 April 1951, General MacArthur was relieved of his Korean command by President Harry Truman, following MacArthur’s unauthorized and inflammatory policy statements. Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway replaced MacArthur as U.N. commander. General Mark W. Clark assumed command from Ridgway on 12 May 1952, when Ridgway was appointed Commander of NATO.

President Truman relieves General MacArthur of his Command.

The brunt of the UN action was borne by the U.S. Eighth Army (EUSAK — Eighth US Army in Korea). Commanding EUSAK at the beginning of the conflict was Lt. Gen. Walton H Walker. Ridgway succeeded him at EUSAK when Walker was killed in an automobile accident just before Christmas 1950. Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet replaced Ridgway when Ridgway became CINCUNC. Lt. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor followed Van Fleet.

We know quite a bit about the Psychological Warfare Division of EUSAK from various 1953 documents. For instance, we know that they had C-47 aircraft that could carry 160 leaflet bundles or 4,000 pounds and B-26 bombers that could carry six leaflet bombs or 1,800 pounds. The leaflets were mostly 5 x 8-inches in size and the newspapers were 8 x 10-inches. EUSAK flew leaflets from Airbase K-16 (Seoul) to the United States I, IX, and X Corps, and to the Republic of Korea I and II Corps. Army Ordnance sent 10,000 leaflet artillery shells to EUSAK monthly. They were divided among the various corps with 500 held in reserve for emergency tactical use. One of the most interesting taboos was that no leaflet was ever to use the term “Communist Guerillas” on leaflets; they were only to use the term “Bandits.”

The State of American PSYOP

I mention several times in this article that the United States was totally unprepared at the start of the Korean War. Long after this article was published, Captain Jeremy S. Mushtare wrote his Naval Postgraduate school thesis entitled “PSYOP in Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations: Preparing for Korean Reunification” in 2005. He very succinctly mentions our unpreparedness and I thought I would partially quote him:

Despite the prevalence of psychological warfare in both World War I and World War II, such units no longer existed in the U.S. Army inventory at the outbreak of the Korean War. The importance of psychological warfare largely fell by the wayside and by the time the Korean War ignited in the summer of 1950, the U.S. Army was forced hastily to re-create and deploy PSYWAR units to fulfill the burgeoning needs in the Far East. Thus, the dismantling of the U.S. PSYWAR apparatuses and deemphasis on PSYWAR principles largely resulted in the delayed employment of untrained soldiers during the Korean War. These forces were mostly innocent of previously ascertained PSYWAR principles due to the depletion of critical institutional knowledge during the interim years of peace that occupied the late 1940s. Soldiers who possessed PSYWAR experience from World War II were not a part of the newly reinstituted units and the rapidity with which these forces were fielded did not allow for adequate training to occur prior to their deployment to East Asia. This greatly impeded PSYWAR progress in attaining a level in capability that was even commensurate with the PSYWAR units of World War II.

By the beginning of the Korean War on 25 June 1950, the Tactical Information Detachment of Aggressor Force at Fort Riley, Kansas was the only PSYWAR unit that remained in the entire United States Army that dealt with PSYWAR. Comprised of approximately twenty personnel, it focused mainly on simulating loudspeaker and leaflet operations against U.S. troops during training exercises.

While war plans that included psychological warfare particulars existed, and some missions were executed only days after the outbreak of the Korean War, PSYWAR forces continually lagged in their contributions to the overall war effort. Various personnel were scrounged within the theater, especially those possessing language capabilities, for bolstering PSYWAR operations. Despite these seemingly insurmountable challenges, remarkably the first leaflets disseminated by U.S. forces during the Korean War came less than twenty-four hours after President Truman authorized military intervention against the north, and the first broadcasts from Radio Japan began less than twenty-four hours after that. Both of these efforts, however, were conducted by the small staff in the Far East Theater and were in no way indicative of an actual capability to sustain a PSYWAR campaign.

By January 1951, the United States forces had disseminated over 160 million leaflets which targeted only four different target audiences. During the first five months, the thematic emphasis was on distributing safe conduct passes and surrender appeals. In December 1950, themes began to shift toward undermining enemy morale. By January 1951, the United States began to analyze the results from over six months of enemy prisoners of war interrogations to determine systemic evidence of the effects of psychological warfare products on the enemy. However, they still had not conducted key research on enemy target audiences and demographics. Thus, their inability to isolate specific target audiences forced message themes to be broad in nature in order to ensure as much applicability as possible.

On a wider and more national scene, Dr. Edward P. Lilly wrote a top secret 95-page report dated 19 December 1951 on the history of U.S. PSYOP from the end of WWII to the start of the Korean War titled: The Development of American Psychological Operations 1945-1951. It would seem to indicate that there was no specific policy and for about 6 years there was a constant fight between the State Department and multiple other agencies about who would be in charge of American psychological warfare. It seems amazing that the Americans were able to get anything done. Some of the report’s comments are:

The Psychological Strategy Board was established by the Presidential directive of 4 April 1951. It studied WWI and found out that by the end of the war there was no attempt to remember the lessons of the war in regard to psychological warfare. The same thing happened after WWII. The OWI and OSS were disbanded quickly and few of their records were studied. By 1946 all trace of American PSYWAR was gone. The most qualified people had returned to their radio and newspaper careers and covert actions were abandoned. The American Congress was hostile to any psychological activities and as a result the Department of State was hampered. The Congress cut funds to all the information programs 50% between 1946 and 1948. As Russian propaganda became aggressively anti-American, the State Department hesitated to counter it with American propaganda lest Congress eliminate the entire information program.

The proposal for a permanent psychological warfare subcommittee to guide, coordinate, and execute the American psychological warfare effort under SNWCC (The State Department, War Department, Navy Department and Coordinating Committee) was approved on 30 April 1947. Although it changed its name to Special Studies and evaluations Committee, which was merely a cover name, this body presented the first postwar document on psychological warfare.

In 1948, Congress gave verbal and legislative support to the psychological effort. Most importantly Congress increased the appropriations for information work and promised more in succeeding years. It enacted the Smith-Mundt Act which for the first time gave a statutory basis for the State Department’s information program.

In early 1949, The National Security Council staff proposed that there be immediately established a small organization in the State Department to plan and make preparations for the coordinated conduct of foreign and domestic information programs and overt psychological operations abroad in the event of war or threat of war as determined by the President. In late 1949 the Voice of America underwent a slow change. A Russian specialist became its director. Programs in Russian increased to around-the-clock. The tone of the broadcasts was becoming more aggressive.

One of the major problems was that the State Department had complete control of all psychological warfare programs regardless of the situation while the military, Joint Chiefs of Staff and CIA believed that in a time of warfare it should be controlled by the latter agencies. In December 1949, a Joint subsidiary plans Division was formally approved. It was under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It would supervise the military services’ logistic planning for PSYWAR. Meanwhile, the Navy had one officer assigned to PSYWAR. The Air Force had a PSYWAR Section in its Planning Division. The Army had an awareness of the need for PSYWAR but did little before Korea. There was a belief that this was a subject that the State Department should be responsible for and the military should only be involved in a time of war. Over the years I have been amazed at the number of people that now acknowledge an informal arrangement with the CIA. One tends to think they were all officers, but many of the agents were mid-level NCOs with the ranks of SSG and SFC.

In late June 1950, North Korea attacked the south. This state of "war" or "Police Action" allowed the military to finally start to take control of PSYWAR as had always been argued but never made policy. We might say that the invasion by North Korea was the basis for all future military psychological operations until the present.

The United States Information Service was operating in South Korea in June 1950. A psychological warfare planning nucleus had existed in the Intelligence Division of the Headquarters of the Far Eastern Command since 1949. The State Department was aware that in case of war, PSYWAR was supposed to come under the Theater Commander. There was an debate about the authority of the State Department over the Theater Commander. The Theater Commander claimed that his Psychological Warfare Division should determine the plans, and State disagreed. In August 1950, the State Department established a National Psychological Strategy Board to develop plans and guidance for America’s information program. The State Department insisted that it should be in charge of the planning. Meanwhile, the CIA wanted clearer directives for its covert actions.

In the fall of 1950, the battle between State and the Military, Defense and CIA went on until the President, tired of the bickering between the various sides formed an independent psychological strategy board in April, 1951. It was made up of all the agencies and answered to the President.

We seem to write often about how the CIA prepared propaganda early in various wars. The CIA was all over Korea, Vietnam and later in Desert Storm they went in before American troops, met and trained some of the Kuwaiti underground and prepared their own "black" propaganda leaflets and posters which were like, but always slightly different from the U.S. Army’s "white" PSYOP material. Richard H. Cummings, the expert on Cold War Radio and operations explains:

The CIA's Special Procedures Branch responsible for covert psychological operations was established on January 1, 1947, within the CIA's Office of Special Operations (OSO), the CIA department responsible for foreign intelligence collection. On February 24, 1947, Director Central Intelligence, Roscoe Hillenkoeter, chose World War II OSS veteran Thomas C. Cassady to head this unit, which was renamed Special Procedures Group (SPG) on March 22, 1947. SPG was replaced by the Office of Special Projects on June 18, 1947.

REPORT ON PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE CONDUCTED BY
THE EIGHTH ARMY UNITS IN KOREA, 25 JUNE 1950 THRU 27 JULY 1953.

This 105-page report was prepared in February 1954 by several branches of the G3 Psychological Warfare Division and by officers from the First Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company. The report provides a chronological history of the events related to psychological warfare operations during the Korean War. The narrative chapters tell of the logistics involved in the production and delivery of the leaflets. You will see some redundance in this article as I mention different reports and often the same data is given This report has a very good introduction to the start of American propaganda in 1950. I have edited the report for brevity:

At the outset of the Korean war Eighth United States Army Psychological Warfare was a G2 (Intelligence) responsibility, but at that time Eighth Army had no assigned psychological warfare operational unit. Within a few days of the North Korean invasion, GHQ - FEC dispatched officers and enlisted men to assist psychological warfare operations in the combat zone. Among the personnel sent over was Mr. James L. Stewart who was the first Chief of Psychological Warfare, G2 Section.

On 24 January 1951, General Order Number 40 was published transferring responsibility for Psychological Warfare from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3 (Operations). A staff was set up in the new G3 Psychological Warfare Division. The acting Chief of Psychological Warfare was Major Alfred L. Dibella.

The Far East Command Printing Plant

G3 Psychological Warfare was located at Taegu during this period, The air section was located at K-37, Taegu, with Captain Rios as the liaison Officer. Captain Brewer, the assistant operations officer, oversaw printing. The First Loudspeaker and Leaflet company began printing leaflets on a limited scale in February 1951, but most of the leaflets were printed in Japan (the Far East Command printing plant) or on local indigenous presses.

In June 1951, the Division was preparing to move to Seoul. The Intelligence Branch of Eighth Army G3 Psywar Division was organized on 1 February 1951, one week after psychological warfare had been transferred from the G2 Section and made a separate division under G3.

The pay for high-quality translators was too low to hire Koreans. After much consideration by higher authorities, a special employee classification of Critical Military Specialist was established on 18 June 1952 to pay Korean interrogators, interpreters, and translators employed by G2 and G3 Psywar.

The MacArthur Legend

Some of the early Korean War leaflets depicted General MacArthur in an attempt to boost the morale of the South Koreans and assure them that an almost infallible and undefeatable military leader was coming to their defense.  

Leaflet 1004

Leaflet 1004 (Korean code 1-SCSK-3) depicted a heroic image of General MacArthur and promises good treatment to any captured or surrendering North Korean troops. The text under the photograph is:

Listen each day at 2100 Korean time over 950 kilocycles to truthful news broadcasts from General MacArthur’s headquarters.

The back is all text:

Personnel of the Armed Forces of North Korea and other persons of North Korea who are taken into custody or fall into the hands of armed forces now under my operational control in connection with hostilities in Korea will be treated in accordance with the humanitarian principals applied by and recognized by civilized nations involved in armed conflict. I will expect similar treatment for American nationals and members of the Armed Forces of the United States, as well as other nationals and members of other Armed Forces, who may join the United States in the Korean conflict, and who may at any time be in North Korean hands. Operating pursuant to resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council, and as commander of forces placed under my command by such resolutions, I will hold responsible any individual acting for North Korea, who deviates from these principles, or who causes, permits, or orders any deviation from such principals. MacArthur.

   

Leaflet 1002

Leaflet 1002 depicts General MacArthur on one side and President Harry Truman on the other. Some of the MacArthur text is:

…All patriotic Koreans will take heart at the news that general MacArthur himself has flown to Korea to give his personal supervision to this international aid…His vast knowledge of the far East, as well as his world famed military genius, will be of tremendous value in the struggle to defend Korean independence and freedom.

Leaflet 1003

This leaflet first attracted my attention because the back shows a flight of USAF F-180 shooting stars. When I looked at the front I found the portraits of a group of allied military leaders and a message meant to booster the morale of the Korean people. There are photographs of Generals MacArthur, Almond, Willoughby, Wright, and Whitney. Some of the text is:

FREE WORLD AIDS KOREA

Under the brilliant and battle-tested leadership of General Douglas MacArthur, powerful aid is on the way from friendly democratic nations around the world. Britain, Australia, New Zealand, India, the Netherlands, Belgium, and China have pledged their support.

The leaflet goes on to mention MacArthur three times in three short paragraphs. I should also point out that the mention of “China” helping South Korea actually indicates “Formosa” or as we now call it, Taiwan.

Leaflet 1017

General MacArthur appears on or is quoted in many other early Korean War leaflets.For instance, leaflet 1017 is in the form of an official letter dated 20 August 1950 on the stationery of the United Nations Command General Headquarters to the Commander of North Korean forces. The enemy commander is told that U.N. forces will treat North Korean prisoners according to the laws of war and it is expected that the North Koreans will treat the U.N. prisoners the same way. It states that there have been reports of U.N. prisoners murdered and if this continues the North Korean commander and his officers will be held personally responsible. The letter is written in English on one side and Korean on the other. The letter is signed simply “Douglas MacArthur.”

Leaflet 1023

This leaflet is in the form of a letter from General MacArthur to the Premier of North Korea explaining the legality of the American response to the North Korea invasion. It says in part:

This is to inform you of the action taken by the United Nations General Assembly on 8 October 1950…I as the United Nations Commander-in-Chief, for the last time, call upon you and the forces under your command, in whatever part of Korea situated, forthwith, to lay down your arms and cease hostilities….

U.S. PSYOP from World War II to the Korean War

At the end of World War II, operational military PSYOP units were disbanded, and official U.S. PSYOP activities were left as the responsibility of the CIA’s Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). Although the military did not relish involvement in PSYOP, some Army personnel were seconded to the CIA, and a very limited PSYOP capability was retained within the military in the form of the very small Tactical Information Department at Fort Riley, Kansas. Prior to the Korean War, the Army had no real PSYOP plans, no doctrine, and almost no trained personnel.

Following the North Korean invasion of the South in 1950, President Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) to handle national PSYOP policy. In June 1951, after a year of the Korean War, the United States Army established a special staff agency, the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW), headed by Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, to supervise its psychological warfare operations. In World War II, McClure had been head of the Psychological Warfare Branch of the Allied Forces Headquarters in North Africa and then the Psychological Warfare Division of SHAEF in London under Eisenhowe                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           r. In April 1952, McClure established the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, which has become the Army’s principal training ground for PSYOP personnel. However, during the Korean War, control of PSYOP operations evolved continually and with various lines of responsibility as the Army adopted ad hoc tactics to cope with its lack of preparedness.

General MacArthur’s PSYOP Organization

Meanwhile, in a farsighted decision in 1947, General MacArthur had activated a small Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) in the G-2 division of General Headquarters, Far East Command (GHQ FECOM) in Tokyo. Major General Charles Willoughby, MacArthur’s G-2 (intelligence), appointed a civilian and retired army colonel, J. Woodall Greene, to head the PWB. (During World War II, Willoughby, then a colonel, had been in charge of MacArthur’s G-2.) Greene was active in psychological warfare in the pacific during WWII. Other members of the group included Colonel C.S. Myers who had eight years experience in PSYWAR in the Southwest Pacific and Lieutenant Colonel F.C. Dahlquist who had directed one of the Sino-American peace teams under General Marshall. In 1950 when Truman announced his decision to send U.S. troops to Korea under U.N. command, MacArthur’s people were ready. Within a day, the six-person PWB had designed, printed, and airdropped the first propaganda leaflets over the enemy. The unit had grown to 35 persons by the end of December, and by summer 1951, PWB had grown to 55 people (mostly civilians, with some military personnel on temporary loan from other organizations) and was renamed the Psychological Warfare Section (PWS) and eventually placed under G-3 (operations) Far East Command. Throughout the war, the PWS retained a dominant strategic role in white PSYOP, and served as coordinator of all United Nations PSYOP activities.

An Air Force printer operates a printing press at the Far East Command Printing and Publications Center

Decades after I wrote this article, Jay Caldwell wrote to say that the unidentified printer at the Far East Command Printing and Publications Center was his father, Airman Second Class Glenn W. Caldwell, 581st Air Resupply and Communications Wing, United States Air Force. The 581st did drop millions of propaganda leaflets on the enemy during the Korean War.

A Psychological Warfare Section was formed in the Eighth Army under Lieutenant-Colonel Hatsel L. Harris. After X Corps became operational, it also formed a Psychological Warfare Section with Major Thomas P. Ewing commanding. The Far East Command Printing and Publications Center commanded by Colonel O. B. Powers printed hundreds of millions of tactical and strategic leaflets on extremely short notice.

A very condensed look at the Allied PSYOP order of battle is:

1. The Far East Command controlled tactical PSYOP operations in the first three months of the war because there was no other trained organization able to do the job. On 16 July 1950, a tactical PSYOP detachment of five specialists from the Far East Command HQ were assigned to the Eighth U.S. Army Korea as a PSYOP team. At first PSYOP was the responsibility of the G2 section (Intelligence). On 24 January 1951, PSYOP was transferred to G3 (Operations). This was called the G3 Psychological Warfare Division. One document states that G3 produced 711 different leaflets, though the total number is not listed and could total well into the millions. The unit had the ability to print millions of copies of each leaflet daily.

2. The 1st Leaflet and Loudspeaker Company deployed to Korea in the spring of 1951 and provided combat or tactical PSYOP support to EUSAK and its subordinate fighting organizations. Army records show that the Company printed 280,663,500 leaflets while in Korea.

Reports from other sources state that the United Nations dropped a total of 2.5 billion leaflets during the Korean War. Of these, there were 1,200 separate messages.

Daniel A. Castro adds in his 2007 Naval Postgraduate School thesis: Do Psychological Operations Benefit from the use of Host Nation Media:

By April of 1952, three organizations were conducting PSYOP operations in the battle for Korea. Strategic PSYOP was conducted by the Psychological Warfare Section, GHQ, FECOM, in Tokyo.

The Psychological Warfare Division, G-3, Eighth Army, eventually located in Seoul, conducted operational and tactical PSYOP with the help of 139 military, civilian and indigenous personnel (which included 10 professional Chinese and Korean translators and interviewers).

Consolidation activities (dissemination of war and morale news in an attempt to bring peace by convincing the populace to support their government) were conducted by the State Department’s U.S. Information Service, based in Pusan. These PSYOP efforts utilized host nation personnel and assets, and were starting to have success against the North Koreans and Chinese. This is evidenced by increasing percentages of enemy POWs responding to PSYOP messages.

Far East Command Printing Plant

During the Korean War the Far East Command had an Adjutant General Administrative Center and Class B Field Printing Plant in Kawasaki city.

A document dated 14 July 1955 discusses the Webendorfer 3-color roll fed press and states that the table of Organization (TO&E) requires that the press be able to print 60 million leaflets a month, or two million each day. The press could produce propaganda products in 10.5 x 16-inches, 8 x 10.5-inches, 5.25 x 8-inches and 4 x 5.25-inches.The presses could be fed by paper rolls or sheets. They could print in one or three colors. The numbers of product printed using the various systems differ, so we list some of the totals here for the reader.

In regard to an individual press, using the paper roll they could print 80,000 three-color leaflets per hour. The daily production of an eight-hour shift was 640,000 leaflets. Using two shifts a day the daily production was about 1,280,000 three-color leaflets. Using two presses with double shifts the plant could produce 2,400,000 leaflets a day.

A printer loads leaflets into a box for dissemination

Using the sheet-fed method they could print 36,000 one-color leaflets per hour. The daily production of an eight-hour shift was 288,000 leaflets. Using two shifts a day the daily production was about 576,000 one-color leaflets or 192,000 three-color leaflets. Using two presses with double shifts the plant could produce 384,000 three-color leaflets a day.

Starting about the Vietnam War, mathematical calculations and formulae proved that the 3 x 6-inch leaflet was the most accurate for air-dropping on a specific target. During the Korean War, the three-color 5.25 x 8-inch leaflet was used most extensively and considered the “standard.” The daily production of this sized leaflet using paper rolls with two presses and two shifts (16 hours) was 2,400,000 leaflets. Using sheet fed paper the total dropped to 384,000 leaflets. One can see that a lot of production was lost in carrying sheets of paper to and from the presses.

Looking at the military staff assigned to the Offset Pressroom we note that the ranking soldier was the Offset Supervisor who was a Master Sergeant. The Offset Foremen were led by a Sergeant First Class. The actual pressmen were Corporals and Privates First Class. Besides the military staff, we note that the majority of the people working in the Offset Section were Japanese nationals.

To give an example of how unprepared the Eighth Army was to prepare propaganda, Major Albert C. Brauer, who served in the Eighth U.S. Army Korea as Chief of the Projects Branch, Psychological Warfare Division, G3 Section (February 1951 to January 1952) was an infantry officer. He prepared a paper for Georgetown University in 1953 entitled Psychological Warfare Korea 1951. He said in regard to the early days of his unit:

Shortly after General Matthew B. Ridgway assumed command of the Eighth United States Army in Korea, December 1950, an increased emphasis on Psychological Warfare was ordered. At that time ten officers and myself were assigned to the Army's reorganized Psychological Warfare Division. With the exception of one officer none of us had had any previous psychological warfare experience. During initial operations, aid was given to us by Mr. Charles Dauthey from the Operation Research Office who had gained some psychological warfare experience against the Japanese in WWII. A member of the Chinese Nationalist Embassy staff was also placed on thirty days temporary duty with the Division. About this time, we were also favored with a three-day visit from Doctor Paul M. A. Linebarger. Dr. Linebarger inspired us all in the possibilities of psychological warfare and gave us many valuable suggestions. Upon his departure he presented us a copy of his book, "Psychological Warfare."

Following his assignment as commander of the U.N. forces in Korea, MacArthur also established a top-secret Joint Services Operation (JSO) to combine U.S., Japanese, and Korean intelligence and counterintelligence activities. This unit was organized and headed by Willoughby. Executive responsibility lay with Major General Holmes E. Dager. The JSO unit probably functioned as a secret group reporting directly to MacArthur, affording MacArthur some personal financial and operational control over PSYOP activities. JSO was assigned a role in psychological warfare and leaflet production, although few details are known.

It is worth noting here that in what must have been an amazing show of complete faith and trust, Korean President Syngman Rhee turned over command of his entire Armed Forces on 14 July 1950 to General MacArthur:

In view of the common military effort of the United Nations on behalf of the Republic of Korea, in which all military forces, land, sea and air, of all the United Nations fighting in or near Korea have been placed under your operational command, and in which you have been designated Supreme Commander United Nations Forces, I am happy to assign to you command authority over all land, sea, and air forces of the Republic of Korea during the period of the continuation of the present state of hostilities, such command to be exercised either by you personally or by such military commander or commanders to whom you may delegate the exercise of this authority within Korea or in adjacent seas.

Basic white information, including war and morale news, was the province of the State Department’s US Information Service, particularly its USIS Korea group. (In August 1953, the Smith-Mundt Act created the US Information Agency (USIA), which then took over USIS as USIA’s overseas agency.)

By April 1952, three organizations were conducting white PSYOP operations for Korea. Strategic operations were conducted by the Psychological Warfare Section, GHQ, FECOM, operating from Tokyo. The Psychological Warfare Division, G-3, HQ, Eighth Army, eventually located in Seoul conducted tactical operations. Consolidation activities (dissemination of war and morale news in an attempt to bring peace by convincing the civilian population to support their government) were conducted by the State Department’s US Information Service, based in Pusan.

Perhaps one of the most important reference documents in regard to Allied PSYOP in Korea is the declassified secret technical memorandum, US Psywar Operations in the Korean War, written by George S. Pettee under the auspices of the Operations Research Office (ORO) of the Johns Hopkins University. Only 200 copies were printed of the working paper which attempted to assess the past operations and effectiveness of US psychological warfare and possible means for gaining an increased effect. This is an early paper, dated 23 January 1951, so the data covers only the very 205 days of the war that started on 27 June 1950 and would continue until 27 July 1953. Some of the information will be repetitious, and that is because conclusions made at this early stage of the war will be made again later in the “Police Action.”

Pettee gives a background to operations. He says that at the start of the war, US PSYOP in the Far East consisted of seven persons working in the Special Projects Branch of Civil Intelligence, G2, General Headquarters, Far East Command. Three days after the start of the war this small group prepared and dropped several million leaflets on Korea. By 31 October the group consisted of 25 personnel. By 11 January 1951 it had 55 members.

An Early Korean War PSYOP Leaflet

Within twenty-four hours after President Harry S. Truman announced U.S. troops would assist the invaded Republic of South Korea; leaflets were dropped over Korea telling of the decision. Buck Sergeant Rocco Trapani of the USAF deployed to Korea 2 July 1950 from Japan. Upon landing he found the above uncoded leaflet on the ground. Although the leaflet bore no code, we now know that it was leaflet 1001. It appears to be among the earliest of U.N. Propaganda leaflets. The leaflet shows the US seal on front and back, and the same message in English on one side and Korean on the other:

THE UNITED NATIONS has appealed to American forces in Japan to assist the peace-loving citizens of the republic of korea in your struggle against the unprovoked aggression from the north. we shall give you every support. Be steadfast, be calm, be courageous, resist firmly. together we shall drive the aggressor from your territory.

Leaflets being handed to the pilot for air drop

Some of Pettee’s more interesting comments are:

There really was no psywar readiness in the Far East Theatre before 25 June 1950. In the first seven months of the war the leaflet product was about 160,000,000 copies with 105 different kinds of leaflets. Ninety percent of the leaflets were delivered by aircraft, ten percent by the artillery of the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division. The leaflets were addressed to four different audiences; enemy troops, enemy civilians, ROK troops and ROK civilians. Pettee recommends that the US should distribute at least 50 million leaflets a month. At least twenty different tactical leaflets should be prepared each month and loudspeakers should be used at a rate of at least 100 missions per week.

Only two trailer-mounted loudspeakers and two air-borne loudspeakers were available, and they have been hampered by a lack of spare parts. Printing presses should be provided to each Corps, and if possible, to each division.

The provision of trained, experienced and competent psywar personnel from the United States has been far from adequate. The military should establish a roster of qualified psywar personnel. [Note: Similar reports from the Vietnam War about 17 years later make the very same complaint about the lack of trained personnel].

The production of leaflets has been adequate for strategic purposes only. The production of tactical psywar materials in Korea has been very small, either for leaflet or for loudspeaker activities. [Note: Strategic psychological operations advance broad or long-term objectives. Global in nature, they may be directed toward large audiences or at key communicators. Tactical psychological operations are more limited, used by commanders to secure immediate and near-term goals. In this environment, these force-enhancing activities serve as a means to lower the morale and efficiency of enemy forces.].

The dissemination of leaflets has been largely by B-29 bombers based at Yokota, Japan. The aircraft and the leaflet bomb are not satisfactory, but they were all that was available. The B-29 can load 32 M-16-A bombs, each containing about 22,500 leaflets. [Note: The bomb was known as the M16-A1 cluster Adapter of WWII origin. It held 45,000 four-by-five-inch leaflets or 22,500 five-by-eight-inch leaflets. The bomb carried a time delay separation charge. After release at 15,000 to 25,000 feet, the bomb halves separated at 1,000 to 2,000 feet to concentrate the leaflets over a specific target area.]. Pettee says that a more effective alternative should be studied and states that some leaflets have been dropped by the Air Force T-6 Texan, Marine F4U Corsair and C-47 Skytrain loudspeaker aircraft.

The enemy psywar operation differs from the American in many respects, and is far more elaborate and intensive in the aggregate. The enemy has attempted, with his resources, to copy our methods of production and dissemination, He has done so only on a small scale however, and has in general relied upon other methods, especially agitation and internal propaganda, for which his resources are ample and highly developed. Enemy psywar uses posters and other media in great variety and with high skill in areas under enemy control.

Jacobson adds:

On 28 June, just 24 hours after President Truman’s announcement that the United States would oppose aggression in Korea, Far East Command had written, translated, printed and dropped over 12,000,000 leaflets over South Korea…During the first thirty days of the war, Far East Command dropped almost 30 million copies of about nine different leaflets over Korea. By 1951, Far East Command had dropped over 160 million leaflets of over 100 different types…By the end of the war about 2.5 billion leaflets had been distributed by air, artillery, and even by hand…As one historian has put it, the Korean War represented a “peak” of U.S. leaflet psywar in terms of artwork and originality.

The structure of clandestine psychological warfare activities in Korea is complex and confusing. The State Department, the CIA, the army, the air force, and the navy wanted control of PSYOP activities, but only the CIA wanted anything to do with black propaganda. Turf battles resulted in bewildering and changing organizational structures. Here we touch only on points of relevance to propaganda leaflet production.

So, how many propaganda leaflets were printed by U.N. forces during the Korean War? According the Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Far East, the total number of leaflets disseminated were 2,460,084,000. Yes, that is two billion. This information was listed in: HQ, USAFFE, SUBJECT: Psychological Warfare Activities, 28 June 1950 through 27 July 1953. In the Report on the Psychological Warfare Conducted By the Eighth Army Units in Korea, 25 June 1950 thru 27 July 1953, Air Operations state that they dropped 1, 411,255,700 leaflets so the rest were probably fired by artillery or disseminated by patrols.

USAF Korean War Pro-PSYOP Booklet

Sometimes the U.S. Government authorized comic books that were really a form of internal propaganda. For instance, in 1951 the United States Government Printing Office and the U.S. Air Force Psychological Warfare Division produced a 5-page booklet entitled Bullets or Words. It was written by Herb Block and drawn by Milton Caniff, best known for his “Steve Canyon” cartoons. The comic discussed the history of psychological operations, the war in Korea and ended with a recruitment advertisement for “Syke-Air,” which the booklet explains is “the U.S. Air Force word for Air Psychological Warfare Activities.”

Colonel Robert L. Gleason implies that the USAF was not ready for the PSYOP war in “Psychological Operations and Air Power: Its Hits and Misses,” Air University Review, March-April 1971:

Although about half a billion leaflets were dropped during the Korean War, postwar surveys indicated that more than one-third of the bundles or leaflet bombs failed to open. Another revealing Korea statistic is that out of 220 different leaflets examined in one postwar analysis, only 22 alluded to or contained themes on air operations or bombardment.This was a far cry from the Japan psywar campaigns of World War II.

In February 1951 the Air Force, becoming painfully aware of its weakness in PSYOP and unconventional warfare, took a giant step in the right direction. It formed three aerial resupply and communications (ARC) wings. These units were equipped with aircraft that included long-range B-29 and SA-16 amphibians. Although their primary mission was the logistical support of friendly guerrilla units, their almost equally important secondary mission was PSYOP.Concurrently, the Air Force initiated a comprehensive program with Georgetown University for training officers in psychological operations. This university instruction was followed by a training period with either the Voice of America or an Army psychological warfare unit. Specialization training was also given ARC wing personnel at a psywar and intelligence school at Mountain Home AFB, Idaho.

Some of the USAF units involved in Korean War psychological operations are mentioned in John Martin Campbell's book, Slinging the Bull in Korea.

He discusses the Air Force's three psychological operation units, the 580, 581 and 582 Air Resupply and Communication Service (ARCS) Wings. He tells us that "Pilots, mechanics and psychological warfare officers were rotated into the war zones in small groups to receive 'on the job' training under the command of the Eighth Army or Fifth Air Force." Each Wing consisted of an Air Resupply Squadron, a Holding and Briefing Squadron, a Maintenance Squadron, an Air Materials Assembly Squadron, a Communications Squadron and a Reproduction Squadron. The aircraft utilized were twelve B-29s carrying thirty-two 175-pound leaflets bombs containing a million and a half 4 x 5-inch leaflets or 225-pound bombs which could carry 30,000 5.5 x 8.5-inch leaflets each. Other aircraft organic to the wing were four C-119 heavy transports, four SA-16 amphibians, and four H-19A helicopters.

Michael E. Haas also mentions the ARCS wings in Apollo's Warriors: United States Air Force Special Operations During the Cold War.

Like the WWII Air commandoes in the CBI, the 581st was a “composite” wing with different types of aircraft…An ARC was the only USAF organization built from the ground up for psychological warfare…The Reproduction Squadron produced covert propaganda material and overt Propaganda leaflets. The squadron was expected to produce up to 4 million 2-color 5 x 7-inch leaflets per day.

Mervyn Edwin Roberts III says in United States Psychological Operations in Support of Counterinsurgency: Vietnam, 1960 to 1965 about the ARCs in Korea:

A concept for a Special Operations Wing was considered for support to theater PSYWAR staff and operations. In January 1951, the Military Air Transport Service was given the mission of organizing, training, and equipping these Special Operations Wings, which for security reasons were designated Air Resupply and Communications Wings of the Air Resupply and Communications Service (ARCS). The 581st Air Resupply and Communications Wing was responsible for conducting leaflet drops as well as supporting unconventional warfare in Korea. The unit’s 581st Operations Squadron operated a variety of platforms for delivering personnel and propaganda, including twelve B-29s, and four each C-119 Flying Boxcars, H-19 Helicopters and SA-16 Albatross amphibious aircraft. The wing also contained the 581st Reproduction Squadron that worked along with the 1st L&L Company to print PSYOP product. From their base in the Philippines, the 581st ARCW rotated elements to Korea to support operations. One unusual segment of the ARCS was the balloon program. Using meteorological research as a cover, ARCS conducted testing and evaluation to clarify the capabilities that the proposed balloon flying squadrons needed‖ to drop leaflets in denied areas. In November 1952, the 1300th ARCW became the only U.S. Air Force PSYOP balloon squadron activated.

 

The 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (RB&L) Group - "The Ganders"

The recruitment of staff for the first PSYOP Group to be deployed to Korea is mentioned in a reunion book entitled Psychological Warfare in Korea - 1952 Life and Times of the First Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group - 50 years Later, Klein, Herguth and McConaughey, RHP Books, 2002:

"The Army, to find enlisted men for jobs that required a university degree, set up a special classification and assignment unit at Ft. Myer, in Arlington, Virginia. Towards the end of 1950, orders went out to send all draftees with college degrees to Ft. Myer after they finished basic training to be interviewed for possible special assignments. It was through this process that draftees with experience in journalism, radio, advertising and graphic arts found themselves in the 1st RB&L Group."

The unit was formed in Ft. Riley Kansas. It was created by Fifth Army General Order #176, April 1951. The first commander was LTC Homer E. Shields, former Chief of Psywar section of the Sixth Army Group, and later executive officer to General McClure, head of the Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). General McClure personally selected Shields for this post.

The Group arrived in Tokyo, Japan, on 6 August 1951. They were headquartered on the 6th floor of Empire House. The enlisted personnel were quartered in the Japanese government Finance Building on B Avenue in the heart of Tokyo. The Officers were billeted in Officer's Clubs around Tokyo.

The group consisted of three companies. Paul Linebarger discusses them in Psychological Warfare, Combat Forces Press, Washington DC, 1954. He says, "The Headquarters and Headquarters Company contained the command, administrative, supervisory and creative personnel necessary for propaganda operations. The 3rd Reproduction Company contained intricate equipment and skilled personnel capable of producing leaflets and newspapers of varying sizes and multiple color. The 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company was designed to replace or augment other means of broadcasting radio propaganda."

The Radio Company had three platoons, each with a complete mobile transmitter that could be attached to more powerful theater elements. In 1953, a Consolidation Company was added to the group when it became clear that there was a need to prepare propaganda specifically aimed at civilians in the rear or in occupied areas under Allied control.

Stephen E Pease says in PSYWAR - Psychological Warfare in Korea 1950-1953, Stackpole Books, Harrisburg PA, 1992,

Its job was to support long-term objectives aimed at both the South and North Korean populaces as well as the Communist Chinese forces and North Korean People's Army.

Charles H. Briscoe writes about the Group in Veritas, Volume 7, No. 1, 2011. He says that the Headquarters Company was based in Tokyo, Japan, with the strength of 19 officers, three warrant officers and 111 enlisted personnel.

The Third Reproduction Company was based in Motosumiyoshi, Japan. Its strength was three officers and 54 enlisted personnel. They were tasked with leaflet production and were authorized cameras, lithographic plates, printing presses and the use of USAF aircraft to include C-47, C-46, B-26 and B-29.

The Fourth Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company was based in Tokyo, Pusan and Seoul. It consisted of 16 officers and 99 enlisted personnel. It was authorized various mobile radio broadcasting systems to transmit Psywar messages in the field in a variety of languages and dialects.

RADIO OPERATIONS

South Korean soldier reads script while recording a broadcast

An Operations research Office report entitled Technical Memorandum Strategic Radio Psywar in FEC by Murray Dyer discusses the Allied propaganda radio in the early stages of the war up until January 1951.

Dyer tells of Major Tom O. Mathews being ordered to produce 30 minutes of radio propaganda against North Korea on 29 June 1950. The Major had no staff, no transmitters, no translators and no news facilities. He was a “can do” officer and at 2100 that evening he broadcast his first program to Korea from a small studio in Radio Tokyo. He was soon broadcasting around the clock from Tokyo. He hired Koreans living in Tokyo as writers and translators. He then found a number of Korean radio technicians who had come under the control of Allied forces on the peninsula. His staff rose to eleven native-borne Koreans. Within a few days of North Korean invasion Mathews had 19 medium and shortwave transmitters of the Japan Broadcasting Corporation sending programs to Korea. It was later learned that many North Koreans found ways of listening to the forbidden broadcasts.

Translators working on leaflets and scripts at the Seoul radio station

Once Seoul was retaken by U.N. Forces, Mathews augmented the station in the capitol city with a 50-kilowatt medium transmitter and a 10 kilowatt short wave transmitter under the command of the General Headquarters. His translators worked on both leaflet and radio texts and were on the air about six hours a day. The Psychological Warfare Branch installed a 500-kilowatt short wave station to serve Pyongyang.

When the station first went on the air the target was the South Korean civilian population. As the United Nations gained ground, propaganda against North Korea was produced. Later, the programs were combined and the target became Korea as a whole. The major theme in the early days was the United Nations determination and ultimate victory. The radio broadcasters were lacking target intelligence. Some of the questions the News people asked are:

What folk songs are known and sung in Korea?
What articles of food do they relish?
What are the winter activities?
What are the summer activities?
What superstitions still hold sway?

It is clear that in the early days the radio personnel did not get the support they needed to produce the kind of texts that might influence a target audience.

A U.S. Army PSYOP Mobile Radio Station during the Korean War

Daniel A. Castro adds:

Throughout the war, many of the millions of PSYOP leaflets that were being dropped on the enemy soon began to be augmented with limited radio broadcasts that utilized Koreans in the PSYOP effort. The first radio station was set up in the destroyed American embassy in Seoul on October 4, 1950. This station began its broadcasts with General Douglas MacArthur's demand that Kim Il-Sung, the chief of the North Korean troops, surrender. As battle lines changed and the Korean War progressed, the station broadcast from mobile trucks and had many names such as: Radio Kilroy, Radio Vagabond, Radio Comet, and Radio Mercury. Such radio stations, albeit possessing a small daily broadcast cycle compared to the Soviets and the Chinese, along with the hundreds of millions of leaflets dropped began to have moderate success with getting North Koreans and Chinese to surrender.

Speaking of radio, in a letter dated 27 January 1951, Colonel C. S. Myers, Military Intelligence Section, Headquarters, Far East Command reported to the Chief, Psychological Warfare Special Staff, U.S. Army, the summary of psychological warfare operations from 17 through 23 January 1951.

Radio Operations:

Radio Pusan continued to broadcast psychological warfare programs eight and one-quarter hours daily. Seven days a week the daily schedule includes 45 minutes of programs relayed from Radio Tokyo. Radio Tokyo continued to broadcast psychological warfare programs for two and three-quarter hours daily.

Loudspeaker Operations:

One C-47 aircraft with loudspeaker was employed on 21 January in two missions over North Korean troops. One mission covered the North Korean Army V Corps units in a 60 square mile area north of Wonju and was made in conjunction with the dissemination of leaflet serial # 8011. The second mission covered three areas north of Andong with instructions concerning a safe route to be used in surrendering. In conjunction with this mission, safe-conduct passes were disseminated.

One loudspeaker section of the leaflet and loudspeaker company has been assigned to IX Corps. Tests have been made with a loudspeaker mounted on a M-24 Tank. It was determined that a speaker which operates satisfactorily from generating equipment functional to the tank can be welded in place within 3 hours.

At the same time, the Chinese were broadcasting to the Korean people one hour a day and the Russians three and one-half hours a day on as many as 13 frequencies.

When the Chinese first attacked southward in October 1950, the UN forbid broadcasting to them because it had not declared war on the Chinese. However, themes to the Korean people included Chinese aims in Korea, Chinese rejection of ceasefire proposals, the claim that Chinese troops were “volunteers,” and Chinese looting and imperialism. By the end of 1950 there were plans for broadcasting to the Chinese for eight hours a day from 6:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m.

When the 1st RB&L Group arrived in Japan in the summer of 1951, it assumed control over all strategic PSYWAR operations in Korea, although the PSYWAR section continued to provide overall direction. The Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company was a direct descendant of the mobile radio companies of World War II and used some of the same equipment. "

Paul M. A. Linebarger says in Psychological Warfare, Infantry Journal Press, Washington D.C., 1948:

Radio in the Korean conflict was used jointly as a strategic and a consolidation medium. From the beginning of the war, radio was the voice of our military policy. An ambitious network, supervised in 1950-51 directly by PWS and thereafter by the 1st RB&L Group, became known and recognized as the Voice of the United Nations Command. The Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) and the Japan Broadcasting System (JBS) transmitted on a cooperative basis, with the U.S. Government buying air time. The 1st RB&L Group's radio unit furnished programming assistance through key stations in Seoul (KBS), Taegu (KBS), Pusan (KBS) and Tokyo (JBS). In addition, the Group furnished technical assistance to KBS in order to keep as many as twelve network stations on the air.

Alfred H. Paddock Jr., lists the duties in greater detail in U.S. Army Special Warfare, University Press of Kansas, 2002:

The 1st RB&L Group was specifically designed to conduct strategic propaganda in direct support of military operations. Directed at enemy forces, populations, or enemy-occupied areas, strategic propaganda was intended to further long-term aims. The Group supervised a radio station network known as the Voice of the United Nations and often produced more than 200 million leaflets a week disseminated by aircraft or by specially designed artillery shells.

Radio Intelligence

General Walker and MacArthur discuss strategy

We mention radio a lot but there was also the devious side of radio as both sides listened to each other’s radio traffic and tried to break their codes. North Korea was not high on the list of American priorities so there were almost no Americans listening to their radio traffic. No Americans were interested until 1949. On 21 April 1950, one intercept site was authorized in Japan to listen to their radio. In June, a second site was authorized and when the war started, they had collected 200 messages. There were two North Korean networks being followed, one military and one police. Within two weeks after the war started there were 12 intercept sites. The Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) began receiving the Korean radio intercepts within an hour of it being broadcast. By 14 July, the first decrypts were delivered to military leaders. By the time that the Americans were desperately trying to hold the Pusan perimeter against the North Koreans, they were getting regular reports on the expected attacks, the morale and ammunition situation of their enemy forces, and their expected movement. This helped General Walton H. Walker hold the perimeter until the tide turned with General MacArthur’s successful landings behind enemy lines at Inchon.

A Korean Worker loads a Leaflet Artillery Shell for his American Allies

Early in the Korean War the military did not have a dedicated artillery leaflet shell. The 105 mm howitzer smoke shell and the British “25 pounder” smoke shell were most suitable to convert to leaflet shells. With the smoke canister removed each shell could hold about 400 4 x 5-inch leaflets. Artillery can disseminate leaflets with great accuracy and is unaffected by weather conditions. They are best used immediately after an artillery bombardment, preferably at dawn or dusk when the enemy can pick up the leaflets without being seen. During the Korean War artillery was the most accurate means of delivery. Between June 1950 and July 1953 the Eighth U.S. Army delivered over 100 million leaflets by artillery, with over 15,000 shells a month being fired at the enemy during peak periods.

A Four-Color Experiment by the 3rd Reproduction Company

U.S. Army Private Charles R. Gaush was a photo-lithographer assigned to the 3rd Reproduction Company, 8239th Army Unit, 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group. He was deployed to Japan in early 1953. He told me about a very difficult printing job his unit did producing a four-color leaflet for Korea. He said:

We did a 5.5 x 8.5-inch job which included a four-color printing from a painting done at HQ in Tokyo. The Harris LTV is a single-color press, so if you want two or more colors, you have to run the sheets as many times as you have colors. My point is that our unit was not equipped to do four-color halftones both because of the difficult photolithography and the printing. However, we had a very smart Section Chief named Master Sergeant William E Stewart and he was anxious to try running it through four times in perfect alignment. We did it and the leaflet turned out perfect and was disseminated. Another problem we had with printing multicolored leaflets was due to the rapid humidity changes which varied the size of the sheets between colors. It was very difficult to keep the image in register. Sometimes it would be a week or so before the pressmen could get to the next color. We managed to turn those leaflets out because of our dedicated men and leaders.

The Printing of leaflets was the responsibility of the 3rd Reproduction Company of the 1st RB&L Group. Leaflets were prepared at the Far East Command Printing and Publication Center outside Yokohama near a railroad station called "Motosumiyoshi." About 250 Americans and 900 Japanese civilian employees worked in the Center. After the leaflets were printed and cut they were rolled and placed inside leaflet bombs by the 3rd Reproduction Company troops. They were then delivered to Tachikawa air base to the planes that dropped them on the Chinese or North Korean troops. From August to September 1951 the Group produced about 13 million leaflets a week. By December 1951 the 50-millionth leaflet was produced. Meanwhile, in Korea, the leaflet missions were planned and organized by the Operations Officer, Kimpo Air Base, Seoul.

The reunion book says about the members of the Group, "The creative psywarriors were all young men, mostly in their early twenties, just starting careers in journalism, advertising and the graphic arts. Their leadership was just slightly older, World War II reservists with only a few years experience in the communications field. Despite their youth, this group produced a cohesive and vital message in the name of the United Nations Command. After leaving the Army, many of these psywarriors went on to successful careers in journalism, TV, advertising, and public relations. A dozen made their mark as university professors."

In regard to the first Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company deployed earlier to Korea, Linebarger says, "The Group's junior partner in the conduct of PsyWar support operations was the Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company. This unit specifically supported an army in the field with adequate propaganda support...its targets were smaller, lived under unusual circumstances, and presented highly vulnerable, rapidly changing propaganda opportunities..."

      

1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company

1st Loudspeaker & Leaflet Company - the Heart of PSY-WAR

From the onset of hostilities in June 1950 until late January 1951, tactical PSYOP operations in the field were confined largely to one man, a lieutenant colonel operating at Eighth Army headquarters as a liaison for FECOM. During this period no operational PSYOP personnel were assigned anywhere within EUSAK. In the fall of 1950, the Army’s small Technical Information Detachment (TID)of four officers and twenty enlisted was notified that it was to be changed to a Loudspeaker and leaflet Company on 1 September 1950. It was put on alert for Korea and sent from Ft. Riley, Kansas, to Seattle, and then on to Korea, arriving on 4 November 1950. The unit was reorganized in January 1951 as the First Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company with a complement of 8 officers, ninety-nine enlisted men, 3 printing presses, 12 loudspeakers, and 27 vehicles, and assigned to a newly created Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) operating within G-3 of the Eighth Army in Korea. PWD then assumed control of tactical PSYOP operations from the PWS, which remained headquartered in Tokyo. The 1st L&L Company became operational April 1951and 9 loudspeaker teams were dispatched to divisions in the field.

The First L&L Company prepared leaflets in the field throughout the Korean War, serving until 21 February 1955. The 1st L&L's Publication Platoon reported printing 280,663,500 leaflets from 1951 to July 1953.

In August 1951, the Army’s First Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group arrived in Japan from Ft. Riley, Kansas, and was attached to the PWS in Tokyo.

Leaflet # 8721  "All are getting wounded and hurt and we don't have proper medical facilities."

Paul A. Wolfgeher mentions the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company in an article entitled "Psychological Warfare" submitted to the Korean War Educator. He says,

The 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company in Korea earned credit for participating in eight campaigns during the Korean War and was awarded two meritorious unit commendations and a Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation (ROKPUC). The 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company served as the Army’s Tactical Psychological Warfare unit until the end of the Korean War. This unit was the first of its kind to serve in a combat zone, with loudspeakers on vehicles and aircraft, and which also disseminated propaganda from the aircraft. Some of the leaflets promised medical treatment for frostbite, undermined faith in their officers, and similarly instilled fear for soldiers’ safety. Another theme told of the mounting enemy dead.

First Lieutenant Marvin R. Warshaw (Ret.), was the wartime commander of the Leaflet Company of the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group. He says in part in correspondence with psywar expert Rod Oakland published in issue number 183 of the Falling Leaf:

Fort Riley at the time was headquarters for the Adjutant General’s Publishing and Printing Department. I recruited a staff for my printing company by going to the department, and offering promotions to anyone applying for transfer to my outfit.

As commanding officer of the printing company, I worked with a civilian from a printing press making company; together he and I designed a mobile printing press, sitting on a steel bed that could be jacked up and leveled in the field.

I asked a B-29 squadron leader for permission to modify an empty 500 pound finned bomb casing by cutting the casing in half vertically, and having five shelves welded into half of the casing, so that when the casing was closed and held together by a proximity fuse, the shelves each covered the entire interior diameter of the casing. We used these bombs by inserting what we called “leaflet pies” curled up and held together by a piece of string.

Private First Class Wilson, Sergeant Lawrence O’Brien, and Yang Yunn broadcast to the
Chinese near Munye-ri. This loudspeaker team Sergeant was later awarded a Silver Star.

Colonel Jack K. Norris says in his U.S. Army War College Paper entitled “Tactical Psychological Warfare:

On paper, the 1st L&L Company contained about 100 personnel divided into two platoons and a headquarters element. The heart of the 1st L&L was the “hog callers” (loudspeaker teams)…The loudspeaker platoon contained three loud speaker teams on paper but during the Korean War the 1st L&L operated closer to twenty-one teams on the battlefield.

Charles H. Briscoe discusses the 1st L&L Company in “1st L&L in Korea, a Photographer’s Record 1952-1953,” Veritas, Vol. 3, No. 4, 2007. He says in part:

The 1st L&L mission was to conduct tactical propaganda for a field army and to provide qualified Psywar specialists as advisors to the army and subordinate corps staffs. Dissemination of tactical propaganda was to be done by leaflet, information sheets and loudspeaker…

The Korean War veterans of the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, Eighth U.S. Army, held their first reunion at Ft. Bragg, N.C., in May 2007. Four psywar veterans who were killed in action in Korea were commemorated when their names were added to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command Memorial Wall.

Charles H. Briscoe writes about the company again in Veritas, Volume 7, No. 1, 2011. He adds:

Chinese and Korean propaganda scripts and taped broadcasts were approved by the Projects Branch Chief of the G-3 Psywar Division before being distributed to loudspeaker teams. English, Chinese and Korean translations were done by university-educated writers isolated from reality in Seoul. Most scripts were too sophisticated for majority of the target audience – uneducated conscripted Chinese and North Korean peasants.

The Publications Platoon turned the artwork, photography, and written messages prepared by the Propaganda Platoon into paper leaflets, information sheets, and poster dissemination for loudspeaker teams, Air Force and Army aircraft and artillery. Leaflets were delivered to a nearby Army ordnance company where they were packed into 105 mm artillery shells for shipment to howitzer battalions supporting the front line units. Artillery delivery of leaflets was the most accurate.

Still, the primary means was to airdrop packages of leaflets with time fuses from C-47s. The leaflet packages were shoveled, kicked and thrown out like they had been in WWI and WWII. Some 15 million propaganda leaflets were dumped on enemy front line troops each week by Psywar units. 

    

"The Speaker" was one of the aircraft used to make loudspeaker broadcasts during the Korean War.
Note the mounted loudspeakers in the open side door.

Loudspeaker

What are the duties of a Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company? A Korean War era publication of the Fifth L & L says: "The L & L Company is a combat support weapon. It does it’s job with loudspeakers, set up close to the front line, hurling out messages to the enemy, and with leaflets thrown out by the thousands over enemy troops from airplanes or artillery shells. An L & L Company is also an American propaganda agency. It is the voice of the United States Army addressing the enemy. Its words are as official as the commanding general’s signature. Thus, each broadcast and each written message must be carefully prepared, must be accurate, and must conform to established policy. In a sense, the L & L men are simply the transmitters of messages from a whole people."

What was the Policy Guidance? Early in the war it was quite different than that mentioned above. The very first PWB guidance was as follows:

1. To speak always from a U.N. and not a U.S. viewpoint.

2. To treat the conflict as aggression and not as civil war

3. To attack Communism in terms of its visible effects on everyday life and not in ideological and theoretical terms.

4. To concentrate on simple and concrete subjects, simply expressed, with direct bearing on Korea.

From the very beginning of the campaign, PSYOP had been based on a weekly plan specifying themes to be used in radio, leaflets and other media. The themes changed frequently according to the tactical situation. The one essential ingredient that never changed was truthfulness.

In the first few months of the war before the Chinese entered the fray the major objectives forwarded from the Intelligence and Research Section were:

1. To weaken the effectiveness and resistance of the North Korean Troops.

2. To bring the truth about the war to the people of North Korea.

3. To bolster the morale of the South Korean troops and civilian population.

There followed a constant stream of new guidance. In order not to infuriate the major Communist powers, PWB Guidance 1 reminded the PSYOP troops not to use the term “puppet” of link China or Russia to the North Koreans. By 10 November PWB #17 finally recognized the Chinese entrance into the war and stated:

Factual reporting of Chinese soldiers in Korea is now authorized, under the following conditions only…

South Korean interpreter prepare to conduct aerial loudspeaker broadcasts

Clayton D. Laurie evaluates early American PSYOP in Korea in a section entitled "Psychological Warfare," in The Encyclopedia of the Korean War, ABC-CLIO, 2000. He says:

Leaflets, radio broadcasts, and loudspeakers were credited as a major factor in the heavy increase in prisoners after July 1951, and interrogations of Communist Chinese prisoners of war showed that one in three were influenced to surrender by leaflets. Interrogations of civilians in North and South Korea further revealed that UN radio broadcasts reached a considerable audience and stirred some civilian opposition to the Communist regime. One authority has determined that Chinese enlisted men were found the most amenable to UN psychological warfare messages, while the hardcore North Korean officer corps were least inclined to believe or act on such appeals.

Pettee is not complimentary in regard to the company. He says that they could have provided excellent propaganda if they were combat ready when they reached Korea. The Army was in such a rush to get them to Korea that they were sent without most of what they needed to perform their mission. Some of his criticisms of the unit are:

The Tactical Information Detachment consisting of four officers and twenty enlisted men sailed from Seattle on 15 September 1950. It's one printing press was under repair in Chicago at the time. It was authorized 3 loudspeakers on vehicles, 3 vans and accessory equipment. It needed tractors for its vans, dark-room equipment, water purification equipment, and other items. On 4 November it was designated the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company and authorized eight officers, 99 enlisted men, 3 presses, 12 speakers and 27 vehicles. By 30 November the equipment was still in Yokohama. Two speakers had arrived, only one of which was operable. At last notice the Company had about 55 personnel. So far as known, the operations of this company as an active psywar unit did not begin before 1951.   

In the Volume 1, number 2, issue of Veritas, the Journal of Army Special Operations History, Charles H. Briscoe talks about the successes of the unit later in the war in an article entitled “Volunteering  for Combat: Loudspeaker Psywar in Korea.”

It was April 1951 before the company was combat effective, and nine loudspeaker teams were dispatched to the divisions on line. By the end of June 1951, the company had eleven loudspeaker teams in action.

Briscoe also mentions the recruiting methods of the Company, quoting Private Gerald Rose. Rose is on a Korean troop train when it suddenly came to a stop:

…a soldier entered the darkened railroad car and asked if anyone had training in psychology.

Rose, who had taken a basic psychology course in college, said, “I have.”

…the shanghaied Rose was put on a train to Seoul.

In less than one year Rose completed 253 tactical loudspeaker missions, was awarded a Bronze Star, a Combat Infantryman’s Badge, and two Purple hearts for wounds received while on loudspeaker teams on the front lines.

Loudspeaker Teams

The March 1953 photograph above is from the World Wide Photo Agency. The title was “PSYWAR in Action.” The text explains in part:

PSYWAR personnel are continuously improving and devising new methods of playing upon the enemy soldier’s fears, jealousies, hope and suspicions in order to lower his fighting ability.

Stanley Sandler evaluates the Korean War leaflets in "Army Psywarriors - A History of U.S. Army Psychological Operations - Part I - Colonial America to Korea" published in Mindbenders, Vol. 8, No.1, 1995. Some of his comments are:

These tactical psywarriors relied on vehicle and aircraft mounted loudspeakers to get their verbal messages across. But, as in previous U.S. wars, the leaflet was still the major medium.

The most impressive psychological weapon of the U.S. Army in Korea, or at least the one that has left the most evidence, was the leaflet. Probably at no time before or since has the Army fielded such effective printed propaganda.

Korean War Army leaflets used the time-tested themes of the ‘happy POW,’ ‘good soldier-bad leaders,’ ‘surrender and you will be well-treated,’ ‘we can crush you,’ and nostalgia for home, family and women.

In addition, Army psychological warriors cleverly worked on latent Chinese anti-Russian feeling, harping on the brutal Soviet ‘liberation’ of Manchuria in 1945, and proclaiming that ‘Stalin will fight to the last Korean.’

Surveys taken in UN POW camps documented the effectiveness of these leaflets in the field as well as loudspeaker broadcasts. But the most stunning psychological warfare victory for the UN was the refusal of no less than 33,000 enemy prisoners of war to return to their homelands, In contrast, a mere 21 U.S. military personnel refused repatriation.

About effectiveness, in a letter dated 27 January 1951, Colonel C. S. Myers, Military Intelligence Section, Headquarters, Far East Command reported to the Chief, Psychological Warfare Special Staff, U.S. Army, Washington, DC on the effectiveness of psychological warfare operations:

Of the reports received during the week on interrogation of prisoners, 35 concerned prisoners captured since 10 December (3 Chinese, 30 North Korean). 12 of this group-all Koreans-commented on psychological warfare factors. 3 of the prisoners had been influenced by leaflets; 5 had not seen leaflets; and 4 remarked they had seen leaflets but were skeptical and still feared that they would be killed if captured by UN Forces. The following comments on psychological warfare factors were extracted from these reports and from preliminary field interrogations:

A North Korean prisoner captured on 7 January said he had wanted to surrender after reading a UN leaflet but had been afraid of being killed by his officers.

Another North Korean prisoner said he had picked up a leaflet in early January and had formed a determination to surrender at the earliest opportunity.

After seeing a surrender leaflet on 14 January, a Chinese soldier deserted his unit and surrendered to UN Forces on 17 January.

A junior lieutenant of the Chinese 38th Army who said that a UN leaflet had influence him to surrender described the morale of his unit as being low because of inadequate clothing and insufficient food. The prisoner said that in the 336th Regiment 10 soldiers died every day from illness, exposure, and other reasons not related to combat. He averred that a member of the 2nd Battalion of the Regiment had shot himself in the leg in the hope of being evacuated to Manchuria. The prisoner also said that the troops in his unit had been to that they would not cross the 38th parallel and that crossing into South Korea occasioned considerable complaints among the troops. A factor in these complaints, he said was increased fear of air attacks in the open country encountered during the southward movement.

Paul M. A. Linebarger observed that:

The airborne loudspeaker was the object of experimentation, but the bulk of loudspeaker broadcasts were made from vehicle mounts, such as tanks, and from emplacements. During the static battle situation of 1951-53, most of the broadcasts were of the latter kind. Range of the voice casts was short, something like two thousand yards under ideal conditions. Personnel and equipment were supplied by the 1st L&L Company, and scripts were prepared by PsyWar Division, G3, EUSAK.

The January 1951 memorandum Psychological Warfare Operations gives examples of such operations. For instance:

One C-47 aircraft with loudspeaker was employed on 21 January in two missions over North Korean troops. One mission covered North Korean Army V Corps units in a 60 square-mile area north of Wonju and was made in conjunction with the dissemination of anti-morale leaflets 8011.The second mission covered three areas northeast of Andong with instructions concerning a safe route to be used in surrendering. In conjunction with this mission, safe-conduct passes were disseminated.

Retired USAF Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Childre flew leaflet drops and loudspeaker missions out of airbase K-16, (Seoul City), from January 1952 to Late May 1952.  The majority of the missions were leaflet drops. The leaflet missions had the leaflets in tied bundles with a dynamite squib and a timed fuse to explode them open at about 500 feet. Because of the uneven terrain some obviously would impact on the ground unopened. The voice missions were usually made at night and lasted for up to four hours. The loudspeaker aircraft was rigged with belly mounted speakers and operated by Korean females.  It required that he orbit low and slow in a race track pattern with 2-minute legs at reduced power to complete the messages. He would complete two orbits and then move to the next site if the speakers were still operating. It was one of his least desirable missions since it always drew lots of ground fire. He says that his electronics were usually shot out before the full mission could be completed.  Often the mission was flown near the front lines and Allied troops would often turn on their searchlights, illuminating the aircraft.  This added additional danger. His missions were with 8th Army personnel on board and directed by the 8th Army. 

Insignia of the 6167th Air Base Group – B Flight
“The Psywarriors”

The Korean War Project website says:

Originating as the 6153rd Air Base Unit in October 1950, this organization operated the Seoul Airdrome except when forced to leave in the face of the Chinese advances in December 1950. From around February 1952, the organization also began flying combat support missions under direct control of Headquarters, Fifth Air Force. Flying unarmed, modified C-46, C-47, and B-26 aircraft, the group dropped flares in front line support and for B-26-night interdiction flights. In addition, its aircraft dropped leaflets and in B-26 and C-47 aircraft fitted with speakers and amplifiers flew "voice" psychological warfare missions. Working in close harmony with ground and air intelligence, the 6167th also performed some agent drops and resupply missions deep behind enemy lines during the hours of darkness. The 6167th Operations Squadron received a Distinguished Unit Citation for actions of May-November 1952. Beginning in early 1953, pilots from the 581st Air Resupply and Communications Wing, a special operations organization based in the Philippines, augmented aircrews of the 6167th Air Base Group.

NOTE: The photographs below were sent to me by Military Historian Mike Sumrell of Fayetteville, NC who stated that they are all copyrighted, and no reader has his permission to copy the photographs or use them in any way.

C-47
Unidentified pilot in the cockpit C-47 while at Leopard Base on the island of
Paengnyong-do, 125 miles behind enemy lines, 2 June 1952

At one point, the Air Force fought to control U.S. Propaganda. They felt that it was their aircraft that dropped the leaflets and sent the loudspeaker messages to the enemy, so why shouldn’t they be the main proponent. The Army later won that battle, but at the present, the Marines have opened their own psychological operations school and many Navy ships carry presses that can print leaflets to be dropped by naval aircraft at sea.

The same unidentified Pilot near the back door on a leaflet mission; July 1952

Wikipedia added:

Formed from the 6167th Air Base Unit in October 1950 to operate flare aircraft, psychological operations, and behind-the-lines agent insertions and resupply drops during the war. Its designation served as a cover for its actual special operations activities. Its 6167th Operations Squadron was augmented by aircrews from the Clark AB, Philippines-based 581st Air Resupply and Communications Wing (581st ARCW), a cover designation for a special operations unit. Aircraft operated were the B-26 Invader, C-46 Commando, and C-47s.

Captain Han of the Korean army and his “kicker.”
They throw and “kick” leaflet bundles out of the aircraft – July 1952

Two SA-16 Albatrosses were sent to K-16 (Seoul Airport) in South Korea by the 581st ARCW to augment B Flight of the 6167th Air Base Group. In addition, four Sikorsky H-19A helicopters were also forward deployed to K-16 in support of the 2157th Air Rescue Squadron (in fact, they were co-located with the 2157th but supported B Flight, as did the two SA-16s).

Combined Command Reconnaissance Activities, Korea (CCRAK) maintained Operational Control of these forces and employed them into North Korea along with B Flight and Special Air Missions detachment aircraft.

Captain “Red” garrison flying C-47 during demonstration – 14 June 1952

The 6167th Operations Squadron operated C-47s and B-26s, equipped for both leaflet drops and psychological warfare voice missions. In 1952–1953, almost all flying operations were nighttime missions and included occasional drops of very young teenaged Korean nationals whose parents were well paid to allow their children to parachute into North Korea. Their assignments were to visually obtain strategic intelligence on production facilities, transportation, troop placement, and other specifics. They were to walk back to the battle lines and, using passwords, pass through to deliver the intelligence gathered to the proper US military authorities.

B flight operations, K16 - 12 June 1952
The Devil & Aircraft painted on the end of the Quonset hut is the Squadron Insignia

Colonel Michael E. Hass, mentioned the 6167th Air Base Group in Apollo’s Warriors: United States Air Force Special Operations during the Cold War, Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1977 (edited for brevity):

Twenty-four years after the close of the Korean War, the U.S. Government finally declassified the Special Operations wartime activities of B Flight, 6167th Operations Squadron, Fifth Air Force. B Flight’s PSYWAR operations were:

Conduct missions assigned by the psychological warfare section of the 5th Air Force and the 8th Army encompassing leaflet drops and speaker missions.

The two Korean girls who do the voice casting over the loudspeakers under plane.
They fly at 7,000 feet and tell the communists to surrender. 14 June 1952.

The use of female voices added insult to injury to the North Korean troops, who fear airpower above all other U.S. weapons encountered in combat.

B Flight’s leaflet drops were made from 7,500 feet, a safer altitude than the much lower levels attempted earlier in the war. B flight eventually dropped its early attempts to use B-25s and C-47s for PSYWAR loudspeaker missions. Flown at 5,000 feet or lower, these flights took the same enemy ground-fire punishment meted out to all loudspeaker flights. B Flight eventually suspended loudspeaker missions with the cryptic note, “Due to battle damage and scarcity of speaker parts, this method of psychological warfare has been curtailed.”

"The Speaker" C47 aircraft

Airman First Class Glenn L. Bloesch was also stationed at K16 (Seoul City Air Base) from January to May 1952. He flew in the two C-47s that were configured for low level voice broadcasting. The aircraft were named “the Speaker” and “the Voice.” He was a radio operator and sometimes the voice transmitter operator on those two aircraft. A Psychological Warfare Division memorandum stated that the “Voice Cast” (loudspeaker) missions were to be flown at an altitude of 5000 feet. Other unit C-47s were used for leaflet drops, flare drops, and dropping of agents behind the lines. To read about an actual PSYOP mission flown by Glenn, click here. Bloesch told me:

The unit emblem resembled a cloaked figure with a batman like mask holding a dagger point down across his chest. We were known as “the Psywarriors.” Our squadron consisted of three flights - A, B, and C.

A flight were very comfortable B-17 bombers that hauled Brigadier Generals from Korea to Japan and back. The tour was 21 months.

We were B flight. When flying broadcast missions, there was an additional crew of Koreans onboard, one to man the audio transmitter while another spoke in different dialects. Our tour was 75 missions over enemy territory.

C flight was cargo flights to Japan and back. The tour of was duty 21 months.

B Flight had its own anthem to the tune of “Hail to our Alma Mater.” Some of the lyrics were:

Here we go our leaflets scattered,
over hill and dale.
Some for their side, some for our side,
some on every trail

Open up another keg boys,
here’s a B Flight toast.
To the boys who drive the Goonies
up and down the coast.

Some of the background on the two aircraft is told by retired Chief Warrant Officer 2 Harry D. Lance on his Internet report: A Short History of The Voice of the United Nations. He says in part:

The Air Force supplied two C-47 aircraft. Sound equipment was obtained from the US Navy and the job of retrofitting two aerial platforms was assigned to FEAMCOM Air Base at Tachikawa, Japan. The Navy equipment was known as Amplifier AN/AIA-4 and had been designed at Western Electric Laboratories near the end of World War Two. There were only two complete sets of the AIA-4 ever produced, each consisting of four 500 watt audio amplifiers and four DC power supplies. Both aircraft were ready by October 1950.

During the early Allied advance, “The Speaker" was sent to Airbase K27 Air Base at Yonpo in North Korea to support the X Corps. With the entrance of the Chinese into the war, in early December the aircraft was relocated to Airbase K16 which was the Seoul Municipal Airport.

Retired Lieutenant Colonel Jim Gibson Ford tells us more in his Internet report: The Voice (A Tactical Operation). Once again, I quote just a few lines:

General Douglas MacArthur and General White, the Air Force Chief-of-Staff  had personally directed the implementation of this project as part of the psychological warfare effort in Korea. The Radio Operators cubical was modified to include a "Broadcast position" to be used by a Korean announcer speaking in the native language of the enemy troops on the ground.

Ford tells of a mission where he spotted what appeared to be a battalion of enemy troops fleeing north at Kuni Re. He wrote several messages for his Korean broadcaster to transmit immediately. One such message was:

If you continue north you will be killed by U.N. planes. Turn around! Go south! Wave white flags! Throw down your arms! Now! You will receive hot food and a good rest place. Just now! Wave white flags! Go south.

Leaflet 8617

Glenn Bloesch sent me some of the leaflets that he dropped on Korea.  Among them were 8617 and 8619. The target of leaflet 8617 is the Chinese Forces fighting in Korea. The text is Chinese. It was produced after a survey made on Chinese prisoners of war indicated that the UN symbol and the Communist symbol are not as well known by the average Chinese soldier. Since these symbols are used with increasing frequency by the UN and the enemy in publications and as insignia, it was felt that an effort should be made to impress upon the common enemy soldier that the UN symbol represents freedom and hope while the Communist symbol represents slavery and death. The result was a bright red hammer and sickle on the front of the leaflet and the text:

This Symbol - The Mark of Slavery and Death

Text on the back is:

WHY SLAVERY -- BECAUSE

1. You are under continued surveillance! Is this not slavery?

2. You are told what to think! Is this not slavery?

3. You are afraid to whom you talk! Is this not slavery?

4. You are afraid to complain about anything! Is this not slavery?

5. You are forced to public self-criticism! Is this not slavery?

WHY DEATH -- BECAUSE

1. Communist tactics are that China has more men than UN has bullets!

2. Communists make your unarmed second waves use weapons of the first wave dead!

3. China cannot defeat the UN in South Korea!

4. Not even Chinese can fight, dig and carry heavy loads day and night forever!

5. Too many of Huang-ti's innocent descendants already are dead in the Korean mountains!

REMEMBER THE COMMUNIST SYMBOL!

IT IS THE MARK OF SLAVERY AND DEATH!

Note: Huang-ti was the first emperor and founder of China.

The 1951 memorandum Psychological Warfare Operations also mentions loudspeaker tanks:

Tests have been made with a loudspeaker mounted on an M-24 tank. It was determined that a speaker which operates satisfactorily from generating equipment functional to the tank can be welded in place within three hours.

A U.S. tank equipped with louspeaker

Briscoe mentions the tank loudspeakers in Veritas. He points out the advantage of the tank in allowing the loudspeakers to move far forward, well into that neutral zone between the friendly and enemy lines. However, there were numerous problems. The engine had to be kept running to power the loudspeakers, and that meant that the loudspeakers had to be set on “maximum” to be heard over the engine. Between the engine and the loudspeaker noise, the tank crew, “buttoned up” inside the tank could not hear approaching danger. The loudspeaker team had to communicate with the crew through the outside telephone, but because of all the noise, they could not hear each other. Meanwhile, the loudspeaker tank became a magnet for attack.

The Headquarters of the Eighth United States Army Awarded the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company an Award of Meritorious Commendation on General Orders #243 dated 28 February 1953. The citation read:

By direction of the Secretary of the Army, under the provisions of AR 220-315, the Meritorious Unit Commendation is awarded to the following unit of the United States Army for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding service during the period indicated: The 1st LOUDSPEAKER AND LEAFLET COMPANY is cited for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding service in support of combat operations in Korea during the period 1 August 1952 to 1 February 1953. The personnel of the 1st LOUDSPEAKER AND LEAFLET COMPANY, the only unit of this kind in the combat zone, performed their duties with determination and aggressiveness. Equipped with bulky public address systems best adapted to vehicular use, the loudspeaker teams hand carried their equipment to isolated peaks on the front in order to render close psychological warfare support to infantry line units. The unit conducted a constant attack by leaflets on the fighting efficiency of the opposing forces. On many occasions the unit operated its presses twenty-four hours daily for extended periods of time in order to satisfy tactical requirements for leaflets. The 1st LOUDSPEAKER AND LEAFLET COMPANY displayed such outstanding devotion to duty in the performance of unusually difficult tasks as to set it apart from and above other units. The devotion to duty, esprit de corps, and loyalty exhibited by the members of this company throughout this period reflect great credit on themselves and the military service of the United States.

Black PSYOP

Morale Poster 8240th Army Unit
GO FORWARD!

In 1951, the Eighth Army authorized a unit with the innocuous name "G3 Miscellaneous Division." G3 is the general staff title for operations. G3 Misc. was to be responsible for the planning, training, and support of unconventional operations.

Original pin back 8240th AU unofficial Spook Badge. These badges came in 3 sizes with 3 different styles of attachment, pin back, clutch back and screw back. These were made using confidential funds and given out to operational types at 8240th HQ in Seoul.

On 10 December 1951, the 8240th Army Unit was activated under Eighth Army G3 Misc. The 8240th consisted largely of its "Guerilla Division", which, as the obscurely named chain of command suggests, was largely a maverick operation engaged in a variety of clandestine activities.

In January of 1952 the Combined Command Reconnaissance Activities, Korea (CCRAK) was activated. This was actually a cover name for the classified designation, "Covert, Clandestine, and Related Activities - Korea." Most of the partisan warfare units came under the command or control of these two organizations. Within these units there were operational areas called wolf packs, unconventional warfare groups in sections, task forces, and even small groups called "donkeys," "white tigers," or "rabbits." There have been several books written on this subject and interested readers can search them out. I recommend Colonel Michael E. Haas's books Apollo's Warriors, Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1997, and In the Devil's Shadow, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2000.

 

Leaflet 1250

Although this leaflet was not prepared specifically for black operations it depicts a South Korean partisan fighting the communist cadres. Such partisan action behind the lines would be almost by definition, “black.” The leaflet depicts a South Korean patriot aiming a rifle at a terrified Communist. It was produced 8 December 1952 to induce the farmers of Huang Hao-do to protect and defend the partisans. Some of the text is:

The partisan is fighting for your liberation from Communist aggression.

Protect the partisan and he will protect you.

Leaflet 8282

This leaflet mentions South Koreans fighting in the North and might be in regard to the 8240th. It pictures anti-Communist partisans attacking a police station and at the far right a policeman. The image was designed by Republic of Korea artists and printed by the Psychological Warfare Division G3 (Operations) of the U.S. Eighth Army. It also bears a Korean code number E-126. The text on the front is:

COOPERATE WITH THE PATRIOTS WHO ARE FIGHTING HEROICALLY FOR THE REALIZATION OF A FREE KOREA!

DOWN WITH KIM IL SUNG, THE GREATEST TRAITOR IN OUR HISTORY!

Haeju Police Station

The back is all text and says in part:

Look! The patriotic struggle of the heroes fighting for the realization of a free Korea!

Do you know the fact that the heroes fighting for the realization of a free Korea are rising up spontaneously everywhere in North Korea and are fighting for freedom?

They are destroying Communist installations, cutting off Communist communication routes and capturing weapons of the North Korean People’s Army and police…Down with Kim Il Sung! Drive out the Chinese Communist rascals.

Meanwhile, the army and the CIA, bitterly vying for control of behind-the-lines actions in Korea, agreed to form a Combined Command Reconnaissance Activities, Korea (CCRAK). This was a cover name for a classified designation, "Covert, Clandestine, and Related Activities – Korea," which was intended to be a joint army and CIA operation with the CIA in overall charge, and with the air force and navy supporting the execution of missions. By January 1952, when CCRAK was activated, actual control ended up with the army’s FECOM-G2. The CIA promptly formed a new unit, JACK, nominally under CCRAK but in reality operating independently. This smoldering distrust continued throughout the Korean War.

In the years following the cease-fire in Korea, PSYOP operations continued occasionally against the North Koreans. In the 1960s, the Seventh Psychological Operations Group, Korea Detachment, headquartered in Okinawa, produced and disseminated leaflets under the code name Operation Jilli (Jilli is Korean for "truth"). Some of these leaflets were printed at Fort Bragg.

LEAFLET OPERATIONS

This International News Photo is titled "PSYWAR IN ACTION." The caption is:

Wars are not only fought with planes and tanks. They are also fought with men’s emotions. In Korea, the unique warriors of our psychological warfare organization bombard enemy soldiers with printed material and radio broadcasts that play upon the enemy’s fears, jealousy, hopes and suspicions. The object of PSYWAR is to lower the fighting ability of the enemy. Unlike the communists, our psychological warfare is based on truth. In the photo, United Nations planes shower communist territory with propaganda leaflets.

A Bill Mauldin Homage
Courtesy Rod Oakland

Bill Mauldin was an American editorial cartoonist who won two Pulitzer Prizes for his work. He was most famous for his World War II cartoons depicting two American soldiers, “Willie and Joe,” weary and bedraggled infantry troopers who stoically endured the difficulties and dangers of duty in the field. These cartoons were widely published and distributed in the American army, abroad and in the United States. One Stars and Stripes cartoon showed the two GI’s firing artillery and saying: “Tell them leaflet people the krauts ain’t got time fer readin' today.” Here, another cartoonist has copied Mauldin’s style and made a cartoon of Communist Chinese surrendering during the Korean War. Mauldin drew the exact same cartoon during WWII showing German soldiers surrendering.

Cartoons for an Illiterate Enemy

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This EUSAK G-3 leaflet to the North Korean Army uses a cartoon character and no text to convey a surrender message to both literate and illiterate troops in an efficient manner. There are six cartoon panels showing the unhappy soldier finding a United Nations leaflet and surrendering. The United Nations knew that many of the North Korean soldiers were illiterate farmers and workers who would be unable to read the text on propaganda leaflets. In fact, we find a note from an Eighth United States Army Korea (EUSAK) officer that discusses that very subject:

One problem we were confronted with was how to effectively reach the sometimes large (80%) illiterate target audience. This so-called "Sad Sack" leaflet, named after a popular G.I. comic character of WWII fame (Stars and Stripes) proved to be the answer. Other leaflets in the same cartoon form were 8407, 8591, 8601, 8610, and 8907.

The American Comic Character "Sad Sack"

The back of the leaflet bears a short simply-written Korean-language text for those troops that can read:

COME OVER!

Cease resistance! Come over to the United Nations side. Do not die for nothing! You safety is absolutely guaranteed! The United Nations will give you good treatment.

COME OVER!

Leaflet 1049

There are many such leaflets aimed at the illiterates among the enemy. I depict three more. Even if you cannot read, the message is clear. In leaflet 1049 entitled “How to surrender and receive U.N. Good treatment,” a North Korean soldier finds a surrender pass and shares it with a friend. He destroys his rifle by beating it on a rock. He surrenders with two friends to UN forces. In the final panel he is comfortable in a POW camp and his injured friend has been medically treated. This leaflet was printed by General Headquarters, Far East Command.

Leaflet 7032

This cartoon is like leaflet 1049 above. Once again it is a safe conduct pass on one side and a 4-panel cartoon showing the enemy how to surrender on the other. This leaflet is for Chinese soldier. In the first panel Chinese soldiers find a leaflet, they throw away their weapons and head toward the UN lines, across the lines they raise their hands and in the last panel they are safely within a UN compound. The back of the leaflet bears a formal safe conduct pass in Chinese, English, and Korean signed by General MacArthur. This leaflet was printed by General Headquarters, Far East Command.

Leaflet 1051

Leaflet 1051 to the North Koreans features an 8-panel cartoon. The title is “Unfulfilled promises.” Without reading a word you can see that the Communists promised you food but delivered empty boxes, promised medicines but again delivered only empty boxes, promised you air cover but so far all you have seen is mosquitoes, and promised you a great victory but all you have seen is falling UN bombs. This leaflet was printed by General Headquarters, Far East Command.

Leaflet 1070

Leaflet 1070 is an example of a perfect leaflet operation as shown on an American propaganda leaflet. Here a North Korean officer surrenders to U.N. forces holding a safe conduct leaflet in his hand. On the back of the leaflet, the same officer returns home to his family alive and well after the war. The text is:

United Nations Forces do not discriminate against the North Korean soldiers who come to the U. N. side.

Whether you are a Communist Party member or an ordinary soldier, you can expect the same treatment promised by the United Nations.

Within 24 hours after President Truman announced that U.S. troops would be sent to assist South Korea, leaflets were dropped over Korea telling the people that U.S. troops were on the way. Within 48 hours, radio broadcasts were being beamed from Tokyo to Korea. One might make a case that propaganda was the first American weapon of this war.

Most of our information on leaflet operations comes from the United States Army later on in the war. One Air Force Officer, Major Norman D. Vaughn wrote of early operations using balloons and twine in My Life of Adventure, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 1995:

Psychological warfare and leafleting were under the same command. We had a mobile printing press that we pulled with a trailer, printing thousands of leaflets right in the field. For a year and a half, I worked with different kinds of balloons. Because of their size and shape, we referred to them as pillow balloons.  We loaded them with leaflets, perhaps a thousand sheets of paper, and then added the helium. The pillow balloons, like all the balloons we used, were open at the bottom. When the balloon reached one thousand feet, the gas would expel from the opening. This helped it drop to a lower altitude. Then it would rip open and dispense its leaflets. The more we helium-filled the balloons and lightened the loads, the further they would go. Our average target was ten to fifteen miles away to reach enemy soldiers on their way to the front and to educate village people everywhere we could …We also dropped loosely tied leaflets from low-flying C-47s, the two-engine cargo planes. These flights were made at night from low altitudes. We tied the leaflets with weak twine, and when the packages flew out of the planes into the slipstream, the twine broke, the packages opened, and leaflets filled the air.

Surrendering enemy soldiers fresh from the battlefield were also used to test Allied leaflets.They were fed, clothed, and told that they were safe and could be completely honest. They were then handed a pointer. On the wall, we had copies of all the leaflets we had sent out within the past few months. Each man pointed to the one which had impressed him most. Eventually, we knew which ones worked best and which ones didn’t work at all.

Jin-Heon Jung says in his 2014 working paper Ballooning Evangelism: Psychological Warfare and Christianity in the Divided Korea:

Inter-Korean propaganda competitions originated during the Korean War when US forces and their allies spread about 2.5 billion leaflets in the areas occupied by or sheltering North Korean and Chinese forces. US General MacArthur commanded that they “bury the enemy in leaflets.” Respectively, North Korean forces spread about 30 million leaflets. A historical study estimates that the quantity of the UN leaflets, circa 2.5 billion, was enough to cover the entire peninsula in a layer 35 leaflets deep. It can thus be argued that the UN leaflet-psywar exhibited capitalist characteristics: namely, not only overproducing and but also over consuming materials to demonstrate “superiority” over the other.

Public Opinion Quarterly notes:

Of the three major media of Psychological Warfare – leaflets, loudspeakers and radio – the first two have been primarily directed against enemy troops. The larger of these two operations, and thus the more effective, has been the leaflet program, directed by Robert M. Spaulding.

During the first 125 days of the operation more than one hundred million leaflets were disseminated, and 70 different leaflets have been produced, each one designed to support one of the three major objectives of the PSYWAR program.

Paul M. A. Linebarger writes that:

As in World War II, leaflets were delivered primarily by two means: aircraft and artillery. B-29s of the Far East Air Force ferried leaflet bombs on night missions deep into strategic areas. Light bombers and liaison craft in support of EUSAK dropped both leaflet bombs and bundles on tactical targets. The leaflet bundle was a Korean war development. It was wrapped, tied, and fused in such a manner that it would open and release its leaflets in mid-air. The 105mm. howitzer remained the principal artillery piece for placing propaganda-loaded shells on pinpoint targets.

Tremendous quantities of leaflets were printed. The 1st RB&L Group on many occasions averaged better than twenty million pieces of printed propaganda every week. To this, the lst L&L Company in Korea added an average of three and a half million leaflets per week.

Air Delivery of Leaflets

B-29 with bomb bay doors open prepared to disseminate leaflets

The workhorse of air delivery of leaflets in the Korean War was the C-47 Transport Aircraft. Also used was the B-29 Superfortress, which could distribute one million leaflets per flight. Some B-26 gunships were equipped with special pods that held several hundred pounds of leaflets, which could be dribbled out at a slow rate or dumped in bulk in a few seconds. By the end of the war, more than 2.5 billion leaflets had been dropped over enemy positions.

What is the main purpose of the leaflet? Wolfgeher explains: "Leaflets are the work-horse of Psywar. After the North Koreans crossed the 38th parallel on 25 June1950, enough leaflets were used in Korea to provide one for every person on earth. Leaflets were dropped by leaflet bombs and timed fused bundles. They were shot across the lines by leaflet shells, and carried and distributed by infantry patrols. The standard size of a leaflet used in Korea was 5 ½ x 8 ½. These leaflets could be retained and passed on from person to person without distortion. The leaflet could be hidden and read later in privacy.

A properly developed and designed message can have a deep and lasting effect on the target audience. The heading of the leaflet is the most important part because it is what your eyes see first. It has to be forceful and short, gain the interest of the target audience, and contain actual facts and details. Color on a leaflet should contrast sharply with the predominant color of the terrain over which the leaflet will be used. It has to stand out so that the individual would want to pick it up. Through intelligence you can learn the favorable colors of the target audience.

Pictures on leaflets showing bombed enemy cities are proof to the soldier that their homeland is subject to air raids. During the Korean War, the leaflet themes centered around the happy POW, good soldiers, bad leaders, surrender, you will be treated well, and nostalgia for home, family, and woman."

The primary means of dispersing leaflets was the leaflet bomb. Fully loaded with 30,000 fliers, a bomb weighed 225 pounds. Before the leaflets were packed into the bomb, a fuse was placed between the two halves of the bomb. The fuse was set to ignite at a predetermined altitude; the fuse detonated the primer cord, which separated the two body sections, detached the fins, and released the leaflets. Wind currents dispersed the leaflets, hopefully over the chosen area.

  

Loading M16A1 Cluster Adaptor Leaflet Bomb

The USAF in Korea: Campaigns, Units, and Stations 1950–1953, Organizational History Branch, Research Division, Air Force Historical Research Agency, 2001, mentions the various squadrons that dropped leaflets over the enemy:

The 92d Bombardment Group, (Medium) arrived in early July 1950, and almost immediately flew a leaflet mission to Seoul.

The 98th Bombardment Wing, (Medium) arrived on 1 April 1951. It took part in support of UN ground forces, and propaganda leaflet drops. The unit’s last bombing mission, flown on 25 July 1953, was followed on the last day of the war with a propaganda-leaflet drop.

The 91st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, (Medium, Photographic) was formed on 15 November 1950, performed target and bomb-damage assessment photo and visual reconnaissance, and conducted electronic “ferret” reconnaissance to determine frequency, location, and other characteristics of enemy ground radar. The squadron also performed shipping surveillance over the Sea of Japan near the Siberian coast and leaflet drops over North Korea.

The 512th Reconnaissance Squadron, (Very Long Range, Weather) conducted shipping surveillance and visual reconnaissance, and accomplished electronic countermeasures reconnaissance until 20 February 1951. In the early days of the conflict, the squadron also dropped leaflets.

The 315th Troop Carrier Wing, (Medium) activated on 10 June 1952, transported between Japan and Korea nearly 55,500,000 pounds of cargo, along with more than 656,000 passengers, paratroopers, and medical evacuees. It also airdropped gasoline, bombs, ammunition, and propaganda leaflets.

The 6167th Air Base Group flying unarmed, modified C–46, C–47, and B–26 aircraft, dropped flares in frontline support and B–26 night interdiction flights. In addition, its aircraft dropped leaflets, and using B–26 and C–47 aircraft fitted with speakers and amplifiers, it flew “voice” psychological warfare missions.

An article entitled "Psychological Warfare in Korea," Public Opinion Quarterly, spring, 1951, adds:

Over friendly territory the leaflets were simply dropped from low flying aircraft in loosely wrapped bundles that came apart in the air. The typical drop was made from altitudes of about 500 to 1,200 feet.

Over hostile territory, the WWII leaflet bomb was replaced by the M-16-A1 cluster adapter, a hollow thin-skinned bomb approximately the size of a standard 500-pound bomb. Each unit carried 22,500 five x eight-inch leaflets, or 45,000 4 x 5 inch leaflets. An airplane normally carried 32 bombs, each of which weighed 170 pounds fully loaded. Thirty-two bombs constitute one aircraft load. Pilots released the bombs at altitudes of 15,000-25,000 feet and the fuse functioned at about 1000 feet to spread the leaflets.

Soldiers load leaflets into leaflet bombs

Similar information is found in a declassified 3 January 1951 working paper entitled "Leaflet Dropping in Korea by the Far Eastern Air Force." In that paper William Daugherty interviews flight crews and reviews the dissemination of leaflets up to that date.

Up until 10 December 1950 the Far Eastern Air Force (FEAF) had assigned just two B-29 bombers for two sorties a week for leaflet operations. As of 12 December 1950 the Special Projects Branch had printed and disseminated over 147,000,000 leaflets. 88% of those leaflets were dropped by B-29s of the 98th Bomb Group stationed in Yokota, Japan. The B-29 carried a maximum of 32 of the cluster bombs, each carrying 22,500 leaflets measuring 5 x 8 inches, or 45,000 leaflets measuring 4 x 5 inches.

South Korean soldiers preparing leaflet bombs

The workhorse of air delivery of leaflets in the Korean War was the C-47 Transport Aircraft. Also used was the B-29 Superfortress, which could distribute one million leaflets per flight. Some B-26 gunships were equipped with special pods that held several hundred pounds of leaflets, which could be dribbled out at a slow rate or dumped in bulk in a few seconds. By the end of the war, more than 2.5 billion leaflets had been dropped over enemy positions.

On 19 December 1950 FEAF agreed to assign one B-29 that could fly a sortie a day. The medium of distribution by the B-29s was the WWII-era M-16 500-pound bomb (cluster adapter) fitted with the M-111-A2 fuse. There were a number of problems with the leaflet bomb. It tended to tumble when released, often losing its tail and thus its accuracy, the casing frequently came apart in the bomb bay, and faulty fuses caused the bombs to split open early, or remain closed all the way to the ground. Because of these faults that became apparent at Aberdeen Proving Grounds and Elgin Air Force Base, two improved bombs were in development. They are the M-105 and the M16A-1.

Daugherty concludes that the M16 bomb is ineffective and inefficient and that if there is a better leaflet bomb in the inventory, then someone needs to motivate the logistics people to get those bombs forward to where they are needed. He also states that the B-29 bomber is a poor medium of dissemination. He recommends other aircraft, artillery dissemination, or troops on the ground be used to distribute propaganda leaflets.

The technical memorandum Eighth Army Psychological Warfare in the Korean War seems to agree that the leaflet bombs were a problem:

The psywar intelligence process in EUSAK, adequate for situational data, is essentially unreliable as a means of determining the crucially Important cultural and psychological peculiarities of the target audiences. EUSAK Psywar does not have, either within its own ranks or at its disposal, a qualified area expert on China or Korea or even any American who knows the language of either of the two countries. The dependence upon native translators of varying degrees of bilingual expertise is a weak link in the chain of preparing psywar output and deprives the psywar organization of any sure means of controlling from moment to moment what it is saying to the enemy. 

EUSAK Psywar dropped an average of more than 14,000,000 leaflets per week during the months of June, July, and August 1951. Approximately 15 percent of the leaflets dropped were prepared and produced at Eighth Army Itself; the remaining 85 percent by the Psywar Section, General Headquarters, in Tokyo.

EUSAK Psywar at no time had at its disposal even the leaflet bomb used in World War II Psywar operations. The leaflet dissemination procedure currently in use was Improvised early in EUSAK Psywar history by the present Air-Ground Liaison Officer and is a further instance of the organization’s successful adjustment to the equipment shortages characteristic of the entire Korean campaign. Leaflets have normally been delivered to the airstrip in bundles of about 2,500 held together with twine. They are initially loaded in the forward area of the C-47, In such fashion that there is a separate pile for each type of leaflet to be "mixed” in the drop. Once the plane is airborne, the personnel who perform the actual dissemination (late teen-age Korean boys) shift the piles to the platform in front and on either side of the rear cargo door (which always remains open during air-drop flights) Meanwhile, the Air-Ground Liaison Officer is in constant consultation with the pilot and copilot: the plane must be cleared to enter the target area; details of the actual strike, the width and depth of the sector to be hit, the direction of flight during the strike, the speed at which the plane is to fly, etcetera, must be worked out with them. When the plane is over the target, a red light beside the cargo door flashes, and the disseminators begin the drop: the bundles, taken from different piles in a specified ratio (to provide the right mix all along the course) are tossed through the open door at specified intervals (equal to the number of seconds the plane is to remain over the target divided by the number of leaflet bundles to be dropped). Approximately ten percent of the bundles are Immediately torn apart by the slipstream and are carried by the wind every which way over the area. The remainder hold together until they hit the ground, where they can be seen billowing up like small artillery bursts; the wind then picks them up and scatters them over a relatively small area.

The drops are known to have been highly inaccurate through an early period of experimentation, leaflets often missing their targets by as much as ten miles. Now, however, the operators claim, based on both observation during actual leaflet drops and of tests conducted in friendly territory, that the drops are about 90 percent accurate. In the present phase of the war, at least, air dissemination of leaflets is not regarded as posing any considerable unsolved problems.

Recommendations for leaflet topics and campaigns are discussed in An Evaluation of Psywar Influence on North Korean Troops, written by the International Public Opinion Research Corporation and subsidized by the Operations Research Office (ORO) of the Johns Hopkins University dated 23 July 1951. This 120-page classified report, with a printing of just 150 copies evaluated the Allied leaflet campaign of the first 205 days of the Korean War after interviewing over 2,000 prisoners of war. It is understood that this is an early survey and as the war continued other recommendations might take priority as the needs and desires of the prisoners was better understood. Some of the recommendations are:

1. Increase the leaflet bombardment of enemy troops. Leaflets have a demonstrable effect in producing surrenders.  However, only half of the respondents in the study had seen them.

2. Coordinate the leaflet bombardment with tactical military operations

3. Emphasize the following themes in leaflets:

a. UN forces treat prisoners well. It is absolutely essential that North Korean troops be convinced that they will not be killed if taken prisoner.

b. The components of good treatment including comfortable sleeping conditions, warm winter clothing and food. There is one other component of good treatment which might be emphasized. This is cigarettes.   The prisoners in camps were crazy for cigarettes and would run out of formations to pick up and hoard cigarette butts. It is possible that a few cigarettes dropped on enemy troops along with the leaflets promising more in POW camps would be extremely effective.

c. Disagreeable aspect of military life avoided such as hard work, marching, and being killed.