THE FIRST LOUDSPEAKER AND
LEAFLET COMPANY – KOREA 1953

SGM Herbert A. Friedman (Ret.) 

Note: This article has been reproduced in part by the Singapore Ministry of Education as a reference document in their curriculum package to be used in the study of the Korean War by their students. In 2016, material from this article was used with permission by the 301st PSYOP Company in a short movie heralding their history – “The 301st Psychological Operations Company (Airborne) Past and Present.”

Early on the morning of Sunday, 25 June 1950, 93,000 North Korean troops with approximately 100 Russian-made tanks attacked South Korea in an attempt to reunite the peninsula by force. The unprepared forces of South Korea were almost pushed into the sea, and the invading communist forces occupied the capital Seoul and much of South Korea.

President Harry S. Truman determined to support the Republic of South Korea militarily and sought United Nations backing. An emergency session of the United Nations Security Council resolved to send troops to Korea. North Korean troops pushed the United Nations Forces into a small defensive perimeter at the tip of the Korean peninsula before American troops, largely from the U.S. and Japan and commanded by General Douglas MacArthur, landed at Inchon and launched a counterattack. Initial success brought the U.N. troops to the Chinese border by late November 1950, but on 29 November, China entered the conflict and pushed the U.N. forces southward. Seoul fell again on 4 January 1951. Another U.N. counteroffensive in February and March drove the North Korean and Chinese troops back to the 38th parallel. Despite much bloody fighting, the battle lines remained stable for another two years. As the fighting moved up and down the peninsula, ravaging the land, there were an estimated three million casualties. Armistice talks began in July 1951 but repeatedly failed to reach agreement. A truce was signed on 27 July 1953 establishing a demilitarized zone along the 38th parallel and creating a framework for a permanent settlement of the war. Talks have continued fruitlessly ever since.

Chart of the PSYOP Order of Battle

Much of the unit’s early history is mentioned by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe in an article titled “1st L&L in Korea, A Photographer’s Record, 1952-53,” Veritas, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2011.

The 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company arrived in Korea in October 1950. By April 1951, they began making loudspeaker broadcasts and propaganda leaflets for use by UN troops.

In the fall of 1950, the Army’s small Technical Information Detachment (TID) of four officers and twenty enlisted was notified that it was to be changed to a Loudspeaker and leaflet Company on 1 September 1950. It was put on alert for Korea and sent from Ft. Riley, Kansas, to Seattle, and then on to Korea, arriving on 4 November 1950.

[Author’s note]: The first-ever PSYOP courses took place under the Army General School at Ft. Riley, Kansas, over six weeks in 1951. In early 1951, the groundwork for a Psychological Warfare School was being laid at the Army General School at Ft. Riley, Kansas, an old cavalry post. Under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel John O. Weaver, the PSYWAR Division of the Army General School was born. By June of 1951, it had not only graduated its first officers’ class, but it was also training several PSYWAR troop units. The formation of graduates of both the psychological officer and non-commissioned officer courses was small in those days, with 45 NCOs graduating in November. Shortly afterwards, several additional units were also added, and two Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet groups and two Loudspeaker and Leaflet Companies had received assignments to Europe and the Far East Command.

The newly activated unit then consisted of eight officers, ninety-nine enlisted men, three printing presses, twelve loudspeakers, and twenty-seven vehicles authorized. The unit administratively fell under the Eighth U.S. Army Special Troops Command, but the G-2 (Intelligence Section) exercised operational control. No priorities were given for equipment, U.S. Army Psywar School-trained personnel, or required language skills.The unit was reorganized in January 1951 and assigned to a newly created Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) operating within G-3 (Operations Section) of the Eighth Army in Korea. The 1st L&L Company became operational April 1951 when it found much of its original equipment lost in Japan, got them shipped to Korea, and collected critical TO&E (Table of Organization and Equipment) equipment to become combat effective. 9 loudspeaker teams were dispatched to divisions in the field. The First L&L Company prepared leaflets in the field throughout the Korean War, serving until 21 February 1955.

Those early days are also mentioned in an undated and unsigned 10-page document in my files. It says in part:

In the early days of 1951, the groundwork for a Psychological Warfare School was being laid at the Army General School at Ft. Riley, Kansas, an old cavalry post. Under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel John O. Weaver, the PSYWAR Division of the Army General School was born. By June of 1951, it had not only graduated its first officers' class, but it was also training several PSYWAR troop units. Shortly afterwards, several additional units were also added, and two Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet groups and two Loudspeaker and Leaflet Companies had received assignments to Europe and the Far East Command.

With the advent of the Korean War, military psychological warfare was carried on under the auspices of the United Nations. It is difficult to measure the effect of PSYWAR by land taken, victories won, enemy troops killed, or the number of prisoners captured. Yet, General Mark Clark, the Commander in Chief of the of the United Nations Forces in the Far East, credited PSYWAR with contributing greatly to the war against the Communists in Korea. Speaking in 1952, General Clark revealed that more than 65% of all prisoners taken were "directly influenced" by the intense United Nations propaganda campaign.

Stephen E. Pease, says in PSYWAR: PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN KOREA, 1950-1953 (Stackpole Books, 1992) about the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company (edited for brevity):

In June 1950, the Army’s only functioning psywar unit was a 20-man Tactical Information Detachment at Ft. Riley. It was quickly expanded and sent to Korea as the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company and attached to the Eighth Arny to provide tactical psywar support.

The 1st L&L was organized in a Headquarters and three platoons: Propaganda, Publications, and Loudspeakers. The small Headquarters held the company leadership and its administrative staff. The 8th Army commander held close control over the 1st L&L by housing its Headquarters and Propaganda Platoon, which planned tactical psywar operations, within its own Headquarters.

The Publications Platoon designed and printed tactical leaflets, often more than three million leaflets each week, and the Loudspeaker Platoon manned the loudspeakers and wrote the scripts. Corps commanders at the front controlled their own loudspeaker sections deployed from the central Loudspeaker Platoon.

The State Department’s U.S. Information Service (USIS) conducted consolidation psywar operations. From Pusan, it ran programs over public address systems, printed newspapers, and hand-outs, and made newsreels for dissemination to civilians under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Korea.

The first goal of radio broadcasts in Korea was to assure the South Korean population that help was on the way and that they were not being abandoned to the Communists. The Eighth Army retained a Psychological Warfare Section under the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations. Overall direction of psychological warfare in the Far East Command came from Col. J. Woodall Greene’s Psychological Warfare Section, which eventually had a staff of 35 people.

Secretary of the Anny Frank Pace was very enthusiastic about psychological warfare. While field commanders had an immediate demand for leaflets, Pace wanted tactical leaflet and loudspeaker work to be supplemented by radio broadcasts powerful enough to reach Chinese forces to the north.

Leaflet Operations

North Korean and Chinese soldiers were blanketed with leaflets. With the UN forces enjoying complete air superiority, the Air Force was free to use B-29 bombers to deliver leaflets anywhere in the Korean Peninsula. Close to the front, the Air Force used small, lumbering C-47 transport planes flying at low altitudes to dump leaflets on enemy front line positions. Leaflets were also delivered to frontline troops by artillery shells. 

Pease describes these the methods of delivery:

Leaflets were delivered most often by aircraft in a special bomb with a hinged side that blew off after a predetermined amount of time.

The bomb was known as the M16-A1 Cluster Adapter of World War II origin. It held 45,000 four-by-five-inch leaflets or 22,500 five-by-eight-inch leaflets and weighed more than 170 pounds when fully loaded. It was dropped by B-26s, B-29s, and probably by the T-6. The B-29 carried thirty-two such bombs, releasing 1,440,000 leaflets in one load! The bomb carried a time delay separation charge. After release at 15,000 to 25,000 feet, the bomb halves separated at 1,000 to 2,000 feet to concentrate the leaflets over a specific target area.

Leaflets were also dropped in huge reels like overgrown rolls of theater tickets, and in bundles that looked like hay bales, a Korean War development. Early in the war, the bundles were opened in the aircraft and the leaflets dumped out by hand. Gusts of wind often blew them back into the planes. Later, blasting caps with delay fuses were fixed to the bundles so they could be thrown out intact, to be popped open clear of the cargo door.

Leaflets were also delivered by special artillery shells and by hand. The 105 mm howitzer shell held 400 four-by-five-inch leaflets. Usually, an empty smoke shell was used; smoke shells were easily modified in the field into leaflet carriers. The range of the gun limited its use to an area close to the front lines, but it could deliver leaflets with precision and in any weather.

Leaflet design had to take account of the ability of the enemy troops to read. Thanks to universal primary school education instituted by the Japanese, the literacy rate of the North Korean troops was high. However, large numbers of Chinese soldiers could not read, or could read with only a limited vocabulary. Much use of graphics was needed, and care had to be taken to use language that was easily understood.

Was psychological warfare effective?

Leaflets, radio broadcasts, and loudspeakers were credited as a major factor in the heavy increase in prisoners after July 1951, and interrogations of Communist prisoners of war showed that one in three were influenced to surrender by leaflets. Interrogations of civilians in North and South Korea further revealed that UN radio broadcasts reached a considerable audience and stirred some civilian opposition to the Communist regime. One authority has determined that Chinese enlisted men were found the most amenable to UN psychological warfare messages, while the hardcore North Korean officer corps were least inclined to believe or act on such appeals.

By and large, junior reserve officers and enlisted draftees were left to design leaflet and radio operations without excessive interference and second guessing by the regular senior army officers at the top. This happened not by chance but because psychological warfare in Korea was ably managed. The recruitment process worked very well, with well-qualified men being selected both among officers and enlisted men.

The Psywarrior – A Weekly Newsletter Printed by the Publications Platoon
VERITAS

Paul A. Wolfgeher mentions the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company in an article entitled “Psychological Warfare” submitted to the Korean War Educator. He says:

The 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company in Korea earned credit for participating in eight campaigns during the Korean War and was awarded two meritorious unit commendations and a Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation (ROKPUC). The 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company served as the Army’s Tactical Psychological Warfare unit until the end of the Korean War. This unit was the first of its kind to serve in a combat zone, with loudspeakers on vehicles and aircraft, and which also disseminated propaganda from the aircraft. Some of the leaflets promised medical treatment for frostbite, undermined faith in their officers, and similarly instilled fear for soldiers’ safety. Another theme told of the mounting enemy dead.

Colonel Alfred H. Paddock Jr. says in his 1982 book, U.S. Army Special Warfare – it’s origins about the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company:

When the North Koreans attacked South Korea in June 1950, the Tactical Information Detachment-organized at Fort Riley, Kansas, in 1947 was the only operational psychological warfare troop unit in the U.S. Army. Sent to Korea in the fall of 1950, it was reorganized as the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company and served as the 8th Army's tactical propaganda unit throughout the conflict. Tactical propaganda, sometimes called combat propaganda, was directed at a specific audience in the forward battle areas and in support of localized operations. Mobile loudspeakers mounted on vehicles and aircraft became a primary means of conducting tactical propaganda in Korea.

One noteworthy example was the use of a loudspeaker mounted on a C-47 aircraft that in 1951 circled over 1,800 Chinese Communist troops and induced them to surrender.

An Introduction to Psychological Warfare

Since the United States had not kept up with the concept of psychological warfare since the end of WWII, this small booklet was issued to the troops about 1950 to explain the background of the specialty, the types and duties of units, and the concept of themes such as symbols, emotive words, sociological information, negative propaganda, and dozens more. The book mentions the concept of the Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company:

This is the unit which the combat soldier can call on for direct support. With its 90 enlisted men and 8 officers this unit conducts tactical propaganda operations of a field army, the word

"tactical" implying direct assistance to the combat soldier during action. The composition of this company is as follows:

Company Headquarters.
Publication Platoon. Responsible for printing leaflets, newsletters, booklets, and whatever else is needed.
Propaganda Platoon. Operates the Intelligence Section, intercepts enemy radio, interrogates enemy prisoners.
Loudspeaker Platoon. Composed on nine teams, each with a Jeep-mounter loudspeaker.

PSYWAR - A Major Weapon

This 15-page information bulletin number 11 is an official publication of the United States Army Europe. It is dated 30 December 1952. The cover depicts a group of Communists in a bullseye as what might be an American B-25 bomber flies over them dropping leaflets. We also see radio towers and loudspeakers. The bulletin starts by saying, "PSYWAR is not a new weapon, it is as old as war itself." The bulletin is meant to be used as a guide to the troops and explain all the facets of PSYWAR. It says regarding the Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company:

A Captain commands the three platoons, Propaganda, Publications, and Loudspeaker, which make up a Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company. The new tactical PSYWAR unit has an authorized strength of eight officers and 99 enlisted men. Flexible organization of the Company allows it to be broken down into small teams which can be assigned to divisions or smaller units.

Prisoner interrogators and intelligence personnel in the Propaganda Platoon aid propaganda specialists in preparing leaflets and broadcasts. The Propaganda Platoon also supervises monitoring of enemy propaganda.

The Publication Platoon corresponds to the Reproduction Company in the Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group. A press Section equipped with light, portable, photo-offset presses print leaflets, posters, and other printed propaganda from plates prepared by the Camera and Plate Section. A Processing Section packages propaganda for delivery.

Teams, or Sections, in the Loudspeaker Platoon are equipped with amplifiers, which can be mounted on jeeps or tanks or set up in forward positions and have a range of more than one mile. Each team has an announcer-linguist, a loudspeaker technician, and a driver. Teams are usually assigned for short periods and for specific missions to combat units.

Psychological Warfare - the War against the Enemy Mind

This 31-page booklet was prepared by the Allied Forces Far East/Eighth Army Truth Information and Education Section at the end of the Korean War to explain how PSYWAR works and what it is. A brief explanation of PSYWAR and Loudspeakers says:

Psychological warfare has become one of the "magic" phrases of present-day conversation. Its name suggests intrigue; it is linked with the mysterious. But PSYWAR, as it is commonly called, is not complicated or difficult to understand. It is merely waging war against the enemy with words and ideas rather than steel. Its users define PSYWAR as "the planned use of propaganda and informational measures. directed at the enemy, and designed to influence his opinions, attitudes and actions in such a way as to support the accomplishment of our national objectives and our military mission." This is an imposing statement at first glance, but just remember this, PSYWAR, like your M1 rifle or the 155mm Howitzer, is a weapon of war, and is designed to hurt the enemy and to help

PSYWAR was quick to get into the fight, and in a matter of months after the outbreak of hostilities, twenty-one loudspeaker teams were in operation with the front-line units. Using powerful ground loudspeakers, these teams roamed the combat lines, directing surrender and "special situation" appeals to the enemy. The effectiveness of this loudspeaker operation is perhaps best evidenced by the harsh and oftentimes severe punishments which the communists dealt out to soldiers caught listening to our loudspeaker broadcasts. These loudspeaker teams, because of their flexibility, were often used effectively in support of artillery as well as infantry operations. For example, loudspeaker teams, coordinated with the artillery and broadcasting from infantry positions would direct appeals to specific enemy groups informing them of the exact time that our "time on target" artillery fire would fall on them. They were advised to stay in their bunkers during the period indicated; to venture out would mean death. In this way such enemy groups learned that their positions were completely "zeroed in" and that our artillery fire could be directed against their positions at will. PSYWAR, exploiting the known enemy vulnerability of fear of our artillery superiority, supported the combat mission by lowering the morale of the enemy.

Major Steve A Fondacaro mentioned the 1st L&L in his 1988 Command and General Staff College Master of Military Art and Science Thesis titled: Strategic analysis of U.S. special operations during the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953. He said in part:

In June, 1947, the Army activated its first operational unit since the war, the experimental Tactical Information Detachment. Consisting of a total of 20 personnel, its loudspeaker and leaflet teams participated in Army training throughout the U.S. over the next three years. It was not until November, 1950 that the first psychological operations unit to conduct missions in Korea, the Tactical Information Detachment from Fort Riley, arrived in  Korea. Responsible for tactical level propaganda, it was redesignated the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company and assigned to the Psychological Warfare Branch, G-2, Far East Command (FECOM) to begin tactical operations. FECOM reassigned the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company to Eighth Army upon creation of the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) in the EUSAK G-3 (Operations) in January, 1951. The Psychological Warfare Section, FECOM, created in June, 1951 was a special staff section of the General Headquarters, and focused on theater-level, strategic operations. 

Later in the war, the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, furnished ground loudspeaker teams to each field division. Audible at a range of up to one mile under good conditions, these teams required sufficient protective cover, a sufficiently quiet environment, and a relatively static situation in order to be effective. The difficulty in identifying targets and creating the proper conditions for the teams to operate resulted in an extremely low broadcast rate: less than one per team per week from June through August, 1951. The ideal targets were hard-hit, isolated enemy soldiers under continuous pressure. The stabilized conditions along the military line of resistance produced few such targets and contributed to the low broadcast rate. 

The December 1951 classified Operations Research Office (ORO) technical memorandum Eighth Army Psychological Warfare in the Korean War talks about the UN Psywar activities from the start of the war up until September 1951. Since the war will go on until 1953, this is not how Psywar looked at the end of the war. However, it is an excellent history of how Psywar started and matured.

The basic organizational pattern for EUSAK psychological warfare places responsibility for its conduct in the G-3 Section within which there is a Psywar Division to which, in turn, the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company is attached operationally. The Division operates one heavy airborne loudspeaker, mounted in a C-47 which performs about 55 missions per month, on average, each involving approximately 100 minutes of actual voice casting. It is supervising the activities of ground loudspeaker teams furnished by the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company spread out along the entire Eighth Army front: normally, there is at least one team per division in the US I, IX, and X Corps, each averaging one tactical mission per week, but there are sometimes as many as 12 teams in being.

In contrast with the EUSAK Psywar Division proper, the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company entered psywar in the Korean war with a well-defined mission which states the mission of the Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company as: "To conduct the tactical propaganda operations of a field army and to provide qualified psychological warfare specialists as advisors to the army and subordinate staffs." The company was to be capable of (1) conducting tactical propaganda against the enemy by the use of leaflets, newssheets, and loudspeakers; and (2) conducting propaganda to friendly elements In enemy-held territory contiguous to the army front.

Weekly Loudspeaker Team Talk

Weekly Loudspeaker Team Talk provided 1st L&L personnel in the field with training materials and news from the rest of the company. Team Talk also quickly became the primary means of distributing tactical information to the loudspeaker teams, including broadcast scripts and leaflet drop schedules.

Psychological Warfare – the War against the Enemy Mind says about leaflet operations in Korea:

PSYWAR was quick to get into the fight, and in a matter of months after the outbreak of hostilities, twenty-one loudspeaker teams were in operation with the front-line units. Using powerful ground loudspeakers, these teams roamed the combat lines, directing surrender and "special situation" appeals to the enemy. The effectiveness of this loudspeaker operation is perhaps best evidenced by the harsh and oftentimes severe punishments which the communists dealt out to soldiers caught listening to our loudspeaker broadcasts. These loudspeaker teams, because of their flexibility, were often used effectively in support of artillery as well as infantry operations. For example, loudspeaker teams, coordinated with the artillery and broadcasting from infantry positions would direct appeals to specific enemy groups informing them of the exact time that our "time on target" artillery fire would fall on them. They were advised to stay in their bunkers during the period indicated; to venture out would mean death. In this way such enemy groups learned that their positions were completely "zeroed in" and that our artillery fire could be directed against their positions at will. PSYWAR, exploiting the known enemy vulnerability of fear of our artillery superiority, supported the combat mission by lowering the morale of the enemy.

Private First Class Wilson, Sergeant Lawrence O’Brien, and Yang Yunn broadcast to the
Chinese near Munye-ri. This loudspeaker team Sergeant was later awarded a Silver Star.
Veritas, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2010

First Lieutenant Marvin R. Warshaw (Ret.), says in the winter 2004 issue of The Falling Leaf:

Fort Riley at the time was headquarters for the Adjutant General’s Publishing and Printing Department. I recruited a staff for my printing company by going to the department, and offering promotions to anyone applying for transfer to my outfit.

As commanding officer of the printing company, I worked with a civilian from a printing press making company; together he and I designed a mobile printing press, sitting on a steel bed that could be jacked up and leveled in the field.

I asked a B-29 squadron leader for permission to modify an empty 500 pound finned bomb casing by cutting the casing in half vertically, and having five shelves welded into half of the casing, so that when the casing was closed and held together by a proximity fuse, the shelves each covered the entire interior diameter of the casing. We used these bombs by inserting what we called “leaflet pies” curled up and held together by a piece of string.

Psychological Warfare

The United States Army produced a classified propaganda film about their PSYWAR forces in the Korean War titled Psychological Warfare - A Combat Weapon in Korea. The first reel was mostly about the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group; the second reel was mostly about the 1st Loudspeaker and leaflet Company.

Tactical Leaflets Printed by the L&L Company's own Presses
which can Operate in Building or in Vans

 

Leaflets can be Dropped by Aircraft or Fired by Artillery
Here a Leaflet Shell is Prepared.

A Historical Look at the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company

1st L & L Patch

1st Loudspeaker & Leaflet Company

I have read reports of the unit’s activities during the war and add some brief summaries from official military records.

Colonel Jack K. Norris says in his U.S. Army War College Paper entitled Tactical Psychological Warfare:

On paper, the 1st L&L Company contained about 100 personnel divided into two platoons and a headquarters element. The heart of the 1st L&L was the “hog callers” (loudspeaker teams)…The loudspeaker platoon contained three loud speaker teams on paper but during the Korean War the 1st L&L operated closer to twenty-one teams on the battlefield.

Charles H. Briscoe discusses the 1st L&L Company in “1st L&L in Korea, a Photographer’s Record 1952-1953,” Veritas, Vol. 3, No. 4, 2007. He says in part:

The 1st L&L mission was to conduct tactical propaganda for a field army and to provide qualified Psywar specialists as advisors to the army and subordinate corps staffs. Dissemination of tactical propaganda was to be done by leaflet, information sheets and loudspeaker…

The Korean War veterans of the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, Eighth U.S. Army, held their first reunion at Ft. Bragg, N.C., in May 2007. Four Psywar veterans who were killed in action in Korea were commemorated when their names were added to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command Memorial Wall.

Members of the First Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company load a Leaflet Bomb

Charles H. Briscoe writes about the company again in Veritas, Volume 7, No. 1, 2011. He adds:

Chinese and Korean propaganda scripts and taped broadcasts were approved by the Projects Branch Chief of the G-3 Psywar Division before being distributed to loudspeaker teams. English, Chinese and Korean translations were done by university-educated writers isolated from reality in Seoul. Most scripts were too sophisticated for majority of the target audience – uneducated conscripted Chinese and North Korean peasants.

The Publications Platoon turned the artwork, photography, and written messages prepared by the Propaganda Platoon into paper leaflets, information sheets, and poster dissemination for loudspeaker teams, Air Force and Army aircraft and artillery. Leaflets were delivered to a nearby Army ordnance company where they were packed into 105 mm artillery shells for shipment to howitzer battalions supporting the front line units. Artillery delivery of leaflets was the most accurate.

Still, the primary means was to airdrop packages of leaflets with time fuses from C-47s. The leaflet packages were shoveled, kicked and thrown out like they had been in WWI and WWII. Some 15 million propaganda leaflets were dumped on enemy front line troops each week by Psywar units.

Leaflet rolls being loaded into 105 mm Smoke shells at the Eighth U.S. Army - Korea
Ammunition Supply Point prior to being shipped to Corps artillery units
VERITAS

My favorite mention of the Company was written by Mark R. Jacobson in his PhD dissertation Minds then hearts: U.S. Political and Psychological Warfare during the Korean War, the Ohio State University, 2005:

Perhaps the most incredulous commentary on the contempt American soldiers had for PSYWAR operations comes from the letters of Corporal Jerry Rose, a Korean War veteran and member of one of the loudspeaker platoons of the 1st L&L. Writing about 40 years after the end of the war, Rose described the conventional units feelings toward the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company:

“Never in the recorded history of warfare, including that of the United States Army, has there ever been a unit that was HATED by BOTH sides.” The loudspeaker platoon’s engendered great feelings among both friend and foe:

“It performed missions at night, and incredibly, in daylight as well, on an almost daily basis – sometimes two in a 24 hour period and it invariably drew fire...most of them a lot of fire. This did not sit well with our troops who were counting points and hoping that a ‘live and let live’ period would result in a rotation home or a cease-fire. When we appeared, everyone headed for the bunkers after giving us a heartfelt finger or drawing it across their throats.”

On at least one mission, the Chinese machine gun and mortar fire traced Rose’s loudspeaker team back to friendly lines, resulting in seven casualties among the infantry unit entrenched nearby. As a result, in Rose’s words, “a sergeant pulled a .45 on us and meant to kill us then and there. He meant it but there were too many witnesses.”

Conversely, the Communists loathed the PSYWAR teams, probably due to their effectiveness; it was lost on the conventional U.S. soldiers that the Chinese offered a $10,000 bounty for any captured PSYWAR personnel and threatened to hang them as war criminals if caught.

The Publications Platoon: 280,663,500 leaflets had been printed by the publications platoon as of December 1953. There were almost twice as many North Korean leaflets printed as Chinese. During the war, leaflets were printed by the three Harris Printing presses of the platoon. Most of the leaflets were coded between 8200 and 8700.

Letter of Commendation on the first Anniversary of the
First Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company in Korea
from the acting Chief of Staff, EUSAK G3

A Loudspeaker Tank used by the First Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company

What are the duties of a Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company? A Korean War era publication of the Fifth L & L says: “The L & L Company is a combat support weapon. It does its job with loudspeakers, set up close to the front line, hurling out messages to the enemy, and with leaflets thrown out by the thousands over enemy troops from airplanes or artillery shells. An L & L Company is also an American propaganda agency. It is the voice of the United States Army addressing the enemy. Its words are as official as the commanding general’s signature. Thus, each broadcast and each written message must be carefully prepared, must be accurate, and must conform to established policy. In a sense, the L & L men are simply the transmitters of messages from a whole people."

What was the Policy Guidance? Early in the war the very first Psychological Warfare guidance was as follows:

l. To speak always from a U.N. and not a U.S. viewpoint.
2. To treat the conflict as aggression and not as civil war.
3. To attack Communism in terms of its visible effects on everyday life and not in ideological and theoretical terms.
4. To concentrate on simple and concrete subjects, simply expressed, with direct bearing on Korea.

1st L&L Impressions (images) Chart

The fact that so many former members kept scrapbooks and samples of the leaflets made this research relatively easy. We know that the greatest leaflet production occurred in the second half of 1952 – 12,500,000 leaflets a month. More leaflets were printed in August of 1952 than any other month – 19,968,000. Twice as many leaflets were printed in Korean than in Chinese. One section in the Report on the Psychological Warfare conducted by Eighth Army Units in Korea show no less than six pages of 1st L&L leaflets starting with leaflet number 8174 dated 17 July 1951 to leaflet number 8449 dated 17 July 1953. We should note that there are missing numbers and some of the leaflets were not printed. To facilitate radio and leaflet propaganda and reach all educational levels of the target audience, members eventually compiled a 4,000 character Chinese-English dictionary used to produce effective propaganda material. The 1st L&L was apparently first assigned to the Far East Command G2 (Intelligence) for tactical operations. It was then assigned to the Eight Army Psychological Warfare Division G3 (Operations) in January 1951.

1st L&L Thanksgiving Dinner Menu and Christmas Card for 1952
VERITAS

It was not only leaflets and posters that the unit printed. Because they have artists and printing presses, PSYOP units are always in demand to print fancy award certificates, personal illustrated stationery, menus, Christmas cards and a host of other objects. Here is the 1952 menu and Christmas card that the unit printed for its members.

In the late stages of the Korean War the Chinese put a bounty of ten thousand dollars in gold for captured loudspeaker personnel and threatened to hang them if captured. In the above painting by 1st L&L artist PFC Richard Zayac, a loudspeaker team working forward of the front lines is attacked and their abandoned equipment has been overrun by Chinese forces.

Veritas, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2010

Another propaganda picture by PFC Richard Zayac. This one shows a small American aircraft dropping thousands of leaflets over the Korean landscape while the enemy rushes to pick them up.

Veritas, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2011

Leaflet 8679

I placed this leaflet here because it is another artistic product of Richard Zayac. I like this leaflet because it is an escape map. Going back as far as WWI propagandists used maps to show the enemy where to go to surrender safely. It is a large leaflet, about 8.5 x 11-inches. This 2 September 1952 map shows the Chinese how to go through their own lines and be welcomed by the Americans. It targets the 113th Chinese Division. 100,000 copies of this leaflet were printed. The text on the front says in part:

This “makes-the-rounds” paper [A Chinese term for leaflet] points to the escape road from Communist ghost hands [A Chinese term for “control”]. Communist Party members of the 113th Division’s 339th Regiment are not invited to look upon this makes-the-rounds paper. This makes-the-rounds paper is given only to those true, hot blooded descendants of Huangdi to look upon. [Huangdi: the “Yellow Emperor,” was the third of ancient China’s mythological emperors, a culture hero and patron saint of Daoism – in other words, this leaflet should only be read by true patriots].

The back says in part:

Obstinate Communist Party members need not walk this road. True descendants of Huangdi, however, should clearly remember the map-pointed road. Walk along this road in the space of one night. The break of day will bring safety.

This was drawn by artist Dick Zayac of the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company. The leaflet depicting a map and routes through the lines was actually reconnoitered by Zayac himself. He wanted to assure himself that the map depicted everything in its proper perspective.

1st L&L artist PFC Richard Zayac

Private First Class Paul A. Wolfgeher checks a print run on the Harris Press
(Photo courtesy of VERITAS magazine)

My old pal Paul A. Wolfgeher who was a printer for the unit during the Korean War said about the 1st L&L:

The 1st L&L evolved from a technical information detachment (TID) of four officers and twenty enlisted men stationed at Fort Riley Kansas. The TID was the PSYWAR detachment of aggressor forces for army maneuvers countrywide. Major Homer Caskey took the technical information detachment overseas. After the TID was expanded to become the First Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, it was subsequently commanded by Majors John T. Dabinett and Douglas Osgood and Captains Herbert Avedon and Oliver W. Rodman.

On 12 April 1952, Captain Herbert Avedon assumed command of the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, the only tactical Psywar unit in Korea supporting the Eighth U.S. Army. In the above picture Captain Avedon sits at his desk in the 1st L&L. Notice the Psywar leaflets posted to the wall behind him.

The Loudspeaker Platoon: The Loudspeaker Platoon was organized on 8 January 1951. Four days after the first three teams were organized they were ready for action. The first team was taken to I Corps Headquarters on 12 January 1951. It was found that very few officers had any knowledge of the use of loudspeakers; consequently the platoon leader recommended that the first team be used for controlling refugees and for familiarization to all divisions in the corps. United Nations advances presented vast targets for Psychological Warfare and the divisions who had the teams at the time of these advances immediately claimed the teams. By 7 April 1951, nine teams were in the field consisting of four officers and 27 enlisted men. Forty-eight combat missions were performed in May 1951. That month, 2,943 enemy soldiers surrendered as a direct result of loud-speaker broadcasts. By June, 11 teams were in action. Two Republic of Korea loudspeaker teams were prepared for duty against guerrillas in South Korea. The signing of the truce on 7 July found all loudspeaker teams in operation on the front lines on that date making “a friendly farewell” to the Chinese Communist Forces.

Paul Wolfgeher who is mentioned often in this article found this newspaper article sometime during the Korean War. He had no knowledge of the source but thought it was good enough to reprint in the 2nd PSYOP Group's PERSPECTIVES. I like it too, so thought I would add it to this article. I have edited the story for brevity since the most important text is how the leaflet is designed, printed, and delivered.

PSYWAR HITS KOREAN ENEMY RIGHT WHERE IT HURTS THE MOST

Psychological warfare (PSYWAR), a weapon as old as history itself, is waged in Korea through the combined efforts of approximately 350 Americans and Koreans. They use propaganda and related measures which are designed to decrease the effectiveness of the enemy in this "hot and cold" war. Standing as the "Heart of PSYWAR" in Korea is the first Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, commanded by Captain Oliver W. Rodman. Th First L&L which arrived in Korea in the early autumn of 1950 as a Tactical Information Detachment, is the first unit of its kind in this, or any other theater, and is the only one to serve in combat.

In preparing each new program which will strike at the morals of the Communist forces, the Intelligence Branch of the Eighth Army Psychological Warfare Division first evaluates the psychological vulnerability of the enemy. This information is passed along to the Projects Branch, whose artists and writers design the propaganda leaflets.

After materials are fused in a finished product, translated, and approved, they are sent to the 1st L&L Company, where the leaflets are reproduced. Meanwhile speaker teams are writing scripts which will elaborate the theme of the leaflets. When reproduction is completed, Captain Rodman calls in the section leaders, who will conduct the operation, and explains the objective of the program. The section leaders return to their headquarters and brief the team chiefs who have written scripts for the coming attack.

On the appointed date, the operation swings into action. Although the Operations Branch of PSYWAR has many ways of disseminating its material, the usual methods are stationary loudspeakers and leaflets dropped from airplanes. In the case of a fluid front. Speakers are mounted on tanks, while loudspeakers rigged to airplanes is another method used in Korea. The use of airplanes is ideal in cases where the civilian population is the object of the message. Planes are seldom used against ground forces because they would be too easy to shoot down.

The use of artillery shells permits the section leaders to pinpoint a target, while leaflets dropped from airplanes cover a general area. As the hour of the proposed operation approaches, the team chiefs move out to their respective units and brief their men on the night's program. In a team there are usually two other members, one who broadcasts and one who can interpret English, Chinse, and Korean.

At advanced airbases, lanes are loaded with leaflets that will be dropped to coincide with the broadcasts. If necessary, artillery pieces will send shells into enemy territory with the same messages. The success of the campaign now depends on the intellectual and emotional make-up of the enemy. Will the ancient folk tunes of his country cause him to stop and think about his home? Can the leaflets make him believe that he is a pawn of a foreign government? Reports from Communist prisoners indicate that they listen to broadcasts and read the leaflets even though they are subject to punishment for doing so.

VICTORY THROUGH INFLUENCE

In 2022, about 10 years after I wrote this article, Dr. Jared M. Tracy, Deputy Command Historian for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command wrote a book titled VICTORY THROUGH INFLUENCE, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, that discussed the history of Psychological Operations in WWI, WWII, and the Korean War. The book mentions the First Leaflet and Loudspeaker Company and I have cut down a 31-page chapter to 500 words and edited for brevity:

The Eight Army created its own PSYWAR section under G3 (Operations) with support from GHQ, Far East Command. The PSYWAR Division was created on 24 January 1951, seven months after the war began. It consisted of Projects, Media, Intelligence, and Administrative Branches, and the 1st L&L Company. Regarding ground leaflet dissemination, the Division loaded leaflets into 105mm artillery shells and transferred them to designated artillery units. In June 1951, the 1st L&L Company assumed that mission and the 314th Ordnance Group took over that mission in January 1952. For aerial operations, small aircraft such as the P-51 Mustang and T-6 Mosquito based at Taegu dropped leaflet for the Eighth Army. They soon had two C-47 aircraft, the Voice and the Speaker reserved for PSYWAR missions, including loudspeaker broadcasts.

The 1st L&L Company evolved out of the Tactical Information Detachment (TID) at Ft. Riley, Kansas. It was redesignated the 1st L&L Company on 4 November 1950. It was authorized three platoons, 107 officers and soldiers, three printing presses, and 12 loudspeakers systems. By 8 January 1951 it was fully organized with a Loudspeaker Platoon consisting of three Loudspeaker Sections, each with an officer and about seven soldiers. In April 1951, three Loudspeaker Teams mounted loudspeakers on an M39 armored utility vehicle, an M4 medium tank and a light tank M24. Eighth Army's PSYWAR Division controlled the 1st L&L Company. The Company's Propaganda Platoon melded with the Divisions Projects Branch to write leaflets, while the Publication Platoon printed them. The Loudspeaker Platoon supported Eighth Army's Corps and Division.

In September 1952, the Loudspeaker teams made 565 broadcasts, in October 700, in November 698, and in December 706. In March 1953, the Loudspeaker teams made 1,051 broadcasts, in April 1,308, in May 1,353, in June 1020, but this was partly because other loudspeakers not controlled by the 1st L&L Company made 1082 broadcasts. Between 12 January 1951 and 27 July 1953, the Loudspeaker Platoon reported having made 14,756 broadcasts, to which 3,688 prisoners taken.

The Publication Platoon printed 7,930,000 leaflets in May 1953. The highest number printed was 13,910,000 in December 1951. In June 1952, the Propaganda Platoon printed 39 different leaflets. In September 1952, they printed 45 different leaflets. In February 1953, 15 different leaflets, and in May 17 different leaflets. The Publication Platoon reported having printed 289,663,500 leaflets of 660 varieties from early 1951 through the armistice.

On 27 December 1954, the 1st L&L Company was inactivated, and its soldiers transferred to the 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company and the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet group.

Command Report – 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company

I have mentioned the First Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company in an earlier article on the psychological operations of the Korean War, but in July 2011, I had the opportunity to study five Command Reports prepared by the company and forwarded to the Headquarters of the Eighth U.S. Army. These classified “secret” booklets are for February, May, June, July and August 1953 and go into great detail about what the company was doing and the results of their operations. For the most part this is highly detailed and very dry data, but it is such a rare chance to see the inner workings of a PSYOP company at war that I thought it deserved a closer look. We will study each monthly report in detail, state those facts that are pertinent, and depict some of the leaflets prepared and disseminated that month. The reader should note that the leaflets were printed in two languages, Korean or Chinese, depending on the target audience and the theme. The vast majority of the leaflets are aimed at enemy military forces, but some are for civilians and some for bandits roaming the countryside. Many of the leaflets use the theme of divide and conquer. The North Koreans were told they had been enslaved by the Chinese who were taking their manufactured products, food and women. The Chinese got the same general message, but were told that they had been enslaved and were the tools of the Soviet Union.

I want to make a quick comment here on something that bothered me when I read these reports. The leaflets generally just have a code number and no unit identification, but they are claimed by the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company in these monthly reports. But, when I read the official end-of-war reports they are usually claimed by Eighth Army G3 (Operations). How can that be?

We know that when the war started the Far East Command (FECOM) started preparing leaflets immediately in mid-1950. The responsibility then went to Eighth Army G2 (Intelligence) and then G3 (Operations.). In November 1950, the first personnel of the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company began to arrive to help with the preparation and printing of psychological Warfare (now psychological operations) leaflets. The 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (RB&L) Group arrived in Tokyo, Japan, on 6 August 1951. In theory there were three different units preparing leaflets.

I then had a revelation. As can be seen by the chart above, the Company is clearly under the control of the Eighth Army G3. So, although the company was always careful to place their name on training and war game leaflets, in Korea their leaflets were claimed by the controlling G3 organization. I believe that the purpose of the Korean War, the 1st L&L Company was the Eighth Army G3.

 

 

PSYOP print facility during the Korean War