U.S. PSYOP IN HAITI
(OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY)

The military campaign was named Operation Uphold Democracy. Plans were made for either a military invasion or a peaceful entry into Haiti. Operations Plan (OPLAN) 2370 was the military offensive with a massive invasion from air and sea with overwhelming force. OPLAN 2380 was developed for a peaceful permissive entry into Haiti. The operation's deployment phase began on 18 September 1994 when the president, through the secretary of defense, issued the order to execute OPLAN 2370.

This operation is discussed in an interesting 1999 British Joint Services Command and Staff College Defense Research Paper by Chef de Bataillon, M. E. Limon. He says in part:

The US government planned a military operation to force General Cedras to resign and to restore President Aristide.The PSYOPS support for this operation was divided in 2 phases; PSYOPS support prior to the invasion and PSYOPS support during the operation.

PSYOPS staffs provided intelligence on regional, social and religious preferences of Haiti. A Military Information Support Team (MIST) was set up in June 94.   Its aims were to assist President Aristide to broadcast towards his country and to fight the Junta’s propaganda. All the products delivered by the MIST had to be approved by President Aristide and the CINCUSACOM (Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command). A series of 900 hours of broadcast were transmitted by the commando SOLO aircraft before any troops had landed on the island.   These messages were carefully combined with popular programs of Haitian music and local news.  To increase the impact of this campaign, 10,000 radio sets were sent to Haiti.   There is no doubt that this operation influenced the final negotiations between General Cedras and Former President Jimmy Carter, which led to the resignation of the Junta on the 16 September 1994.Thus the landing of US troops took place in a relatively peaceful environment. 

    

Former President Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell

Crew of the Leaflet Mission of 15/16 September 1994

The crew was augmented due to the long (26 hour) duty day, so we had some extra bodies. We also had three PSYOP guys from Ft. Bragg with us and a support operator. A normal MC-130H crew was two pilots, one navigator, one electric warfare officer, one flight engineer, and two loadmasters. We also usually had a third pilot to act as safety observer, especially if we were doing night vision landings. I think we had three pilots and three loadmasters, and two Flight Engineers.

Major Dave White, USAF (retired) told me about an early mission he was assigned as a member of the 15th Special Operations Squadron. He said in part:

On 13 September 1994, as a preparatory event leading up to the planned invasion of Haiti, the 15th Special Operations Squadron was tasked to plan a PSYOP leaflet drop on Port-Au-Prince. Crew 1 was assigned to the mission. This was to be the first combat mission flown by the squadron since reactivation and equipping with the MC130H Combat Talon II in October 1992.

We planned the mission on 14 September for execution on the night of 15/16 September. We were briefed on the results of the first leaflet mission over Haiti, flown using standard high-altitude leaflet drop tactics. We were told that target coverage was not optimum, due to unpredictable winds over the island. We therefore determined that a low-altitude airdrop over the city was necessary to ensure target saturation, as well as to enhance the psychological effect of the mission. To ensure accurate wind information and minimize warning to the defenses, the ingress over the Gulf of Gonave was planned for extreme low altitude, varying from 50 to 200 feet. Two passes over the city were planned, with a drop altitude of 500 feet. The first pass would begin with coast-in just east of the Navy base on the southwest edge of the city, followed by a sweeping turn to the northeast. This would cover the eastern and southern portions of the city. The second pass would begin after completing a wide turn to a westerly heading in the valley northeast of the city. This pass would take us just south of the Port-Au-Prince airport and provide coverage of the north part of the city. No opposition from air defenses was expected, as the Haitian air force consisted of a single airworthy Cessna 172. However, small arms and AAA up to 40 mm was expected. All crew members were provided standard side arms, body armor, and survival gear.

On 15 September, we flew to Pope AFB to onload the leaflets and Army personnel, who would assist with the airdrops. Just before takeoff from Hurlburt Field, we were advised that a 40mm anti-aircraft weapon had been positioned to the south of the city on a ridge line. Initially, this appeared to impact our coast-in point and first pass. However, the electric warfare officer determined that the probable position of the weapon was such that the gun crew could not depress the barrel sufficiently to accurately target the aircraft until we were at a safe distance. We therefore chose not to alter our target plan. After an uneventful flight to Pope AFB, we arrived and onloaded the leaflets and Army personnel.

We departed Pope AFB after final mission approval was received. Our plan was to look like a normal C-130 supply flight to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Therefore, we flew our Instrument flight rules clearance on airways southbound. Enroute, we were advised that defensive units had been cleared to "fire at will" at intruding aircraft. (Later, we heard that another aircraft had already made an appearance over the island. It did not drop anything, and nobody ever admitted who it was or what it was doing.) We did an in-flight refueling north of Cuba, and Instrument flight rules was terminated south of Great Inagua. We began our descent on the standard Guantanamo arrival around the east end of Cuba, turning west and descending. We flew the initial part of the Guantanamo arrival for deception purposes, descending to less than 1000 feet. When the electric warfare officer advised that we were below radar coverage, we turned hard left onto the easterly ingress route. Inbound to Haiti, and south of Gonave Island, we descended to 50 feet over the water, using our terrain-following systems. We were also wearing our night-vision goggles (NVGs), which were a great help. During the ingress, Ron Lovett, in the copilot seat, suddenly called for an immediate pullup, which I did without hesitation, to say the least. When I looked up from the terrain-following displays, a large white wooden three mast sailing ship was directly ahead. The terrain-following system had not seen its non-metallic structure, and his warning prevented an early end to the mission. I have always wondered what the occupants of the ship thought as our blacked-out Hercules thundered overhead at less than 200 feet.

The leaflet dropped on Haiti.
Happiness. Democracy. Prosperity. Opportunity. Education

Continuing the ingress, we coasted in at 500 feet Above Ground Level. We released our first leaflets at this time, with the naval base as the target. This was a late change to the mission, added because we had received an intelligence update that Raoul Cedras, the leader of the military junta, was spending the night at the Navy base for security reasons. We felt that our leaflets would provide an effective psychological blow if in fact he was there, and we changed the drop plan accordingly. We then performed a left turn to the northeast, and flew over the eastern half of the city, dropping leaflets continually. These were targeted for the main downtown areas of Port-Au-Prince and were spread by the prevailing easterly winds. During this pass, static lines whipped back into the cargo compartment and entangled one of the loadmasters, Rusty Fine. In the process of freeing him, the static lines pulled a set of NVGs off Mike Clevenger’s helmet, and they departed the aircraft. The goggles fell, harmlessly, into an unknown area of the city.

After the Night Vision Goggles were lost the men made up this fake leaflet as a gag.
It was not dropped over Haiti. The text on the back is:

My Haitian friends, we will reward you with money.
If you find these glasses call 904-844-4736

After crossing the northern outskirts of the city, we flew the short pattern to position for our final run. This was made to cover the north side of the city, particularly the airport area. On this run, we noted the city lights being extinguished, block by block. The loadmasters reported light ground fire from small arms around Port-Au-Prince airport. All the tracers were behind the aircraft, so we took no evasive action. Upon completion of this run, with all boxes expended, we egressed over the gulf on a westbound heading. Time over target was less than ten minutes, although it seemed like more than thirty.

Exiting the gulf, a climb to enroute altitude was initiated and the crew removed their combat equipment in preparation for the long ride home. To make the second in-flight refueling a bit more interesting, Ron Lovett bet me the price of beers for the crew that I could not complete it without illuminating any intermediate position lights on the receiver director array--not an easy task given the lateness of the hour, the post-airdrop letdown, and the crew's jovial efforts to "assist" with the task at hand. The refueling was completed (I won the bet) and we proceeded to recovery at Hurlburt, having flown 11.4 hours in all. No aircraft damage or crew injuries were sustained. After taking a crew picture and completing a debrief with the intelligence shop, we were released to go home with instructions to return to plan our next mission, expected to take place the night after the upcoming invasion. 

When I got home and turned-on CNN, I saw one of our leaflets laying in a Port-Au-Prince street. The news reported complete coverage of the target areas. It was the only time I ever failed in my career goal of staying off CNN, but I was not upset about it.

The Combat Talon

In December 2001, the Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, released the book The Praetorian Starship - The Untold Story of the Combat Talon by retired USAF Colonel Jerry L. Thigpen. The book mentions many leaflet operations so with due respect to the author I will mention one of them in this PSYOP article.

On 13 September the 15th SOS was tasked for its first leaflet drop into Haiti, which was the first combat mission flown by the squadron since its missions into North Vietnam during the late 1960s. Two passes over Port-au-Prince were planned at 500 feet. The first pass would begin with a coastal penetration just east of the Haitian naval base located on the southwest edge of the city. After coast-in, the aircraft would make a sweeping turn to the northeast, dispensing leaflets over the eastern and southern portions of the city. The second pass would begin after completing a wide turn to a westerly heading in the valley northeast of the city. As the aircraft flew over the coastline at 500 feet, the first set of leaflets were released over the Haitian naval base. Late information given to the crew had changed the first target area to the naval base because intelligence sources thought that Cedras might be spending the night at the base. PSYOP planners felt that a direct hit where Cedras was staying would be effective in convincing him that the UN was serious about demanding he leave the country. After the first drop the planned profile was flown, with the aircraft dispensing leaflets over designated areas of the city.

Almost 4000 American paratroopers were on their way to invade Haiti on 19 September 1994 when the Haitian military lost its nerve and agreed to a peaceful transition of government. Lieutenant Colonel David Bentley tells the story in “Operation Uphold Democracy: Military Support for Democracy in Haiti.” He says:

Shortly before the commencement of Uphold Democracy, a last diplomatic effort was attempted. Former President Jimmy Carter, accompanied by Senator Sam Nunn and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, went to Haiti and met with the de facto rulers of Haiti, General Cedras and the illegitimate President Emile Jonaissant. Late in the night of September 18, while airborne forces from Ft. Bragg were en route to Haiti, an agreement was signed calling for Haitian military and police forces to cooperate with the U.S. military and for Cedras and his cronies to retire and leave the country peacefully. The synergy resulting from the combined diplomatic/military approach brought about the agreement which meant that the invasion plans had to be changed literally overnight. While U.S. military forces would have quickly overwhelmed the Haitian military and police, this negotiated solution saved lives on both sides, made the task of securing Haiti for Aristide's return easier, and avoided awakening of nationalist anti-U.S. sentiment which might have occurred had fighting taken place.

This was the bone yard where General Raoul Cedras took people to be executed
Sometimes they were criminals; sometimes they were just in his way

As a result, American troops entered the country peacefully and without bloodshed. TheUnited States military and the multi-national force eventually numbered over 23,000 troops from over a dozen nations. General Cedras and his military staff left Haiti and President Aristide returned on 15 October 1994. The multinational force recovered nearly 33,000 weapons through buybacks, discovering caches, and roadblocks. The flood of refugees from Haiti, 3,000 per day in July 1994, virtually stopped. The United States repatriated more than 13,000 Haitians home.

The general story is told in The Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 1998. It says in part:

Here in particular, American forces had to overcome not only the Marine intervention of 1915-1934, but also the unmistakable impression left by the Harlan County episode that the Americans lacked the resolve to face down elements in Haiti that opposed fulfillment of the Governors Island Accord.

Execution of the PSYOP campaign began in advance of ground operations in September. On August 22-23, for example, the Air Force conducted a leaflet drop at St. More.

[Note: that would be the leaflet below (fourth leaflet) showing a family walking toward a sunrise].

Loudspeaker broadcasts were also made from helicopters

From December 13-17, roughly seven million leaflets were released over Port au Prince, Cap Haitien, and Les Cayes…the Air Force dropped roughly 10,000 radios across parts of Haiti…Both Joint Task Force 180 and 190 incorporated Tactical PSYOP Teams (TPTs) with loudspeakers.

Company A of the 9th PSYOP Battalion was attached to the 82nd Airborne Division for the take-down mission. Support of the 10th Mountain Division went to Company B, 9th PSYOP Battalion, which assigned TPTs to Port au Prince and Cape Haitiens.

Douglas Waller mentions the military-PSYOP connection in an article entitled "How a Spec Ops Campaign Saved Lives," Armed Forces Journal International, June 1995. Some of his comments are:

One reason the casualties were so low: the White House, the Pentagon and the CIA waged what one Department of Defense memo termed an "unprecedented psychological operations campaign."

245th PSYOP Company prepares to deploy to Haiti

The PSYOP units involved in the Operation Uphold Democracy were the 2nd and 4th PSYOP Groups, and the 1st and 9th PSYOP Battalions.

Humiliated in Somalia, the Clinton administration was desperate for the generals to leave Haiti without bloodshed. The White House formed a PSYOP Working Group to decide on themes each week for radio and leaflet messages. A Ft. Bragg team set up a makeshift studio near the Pentagon, which Aristide used to tape speeches for daily broadcasts.

Fearing Aristide might slip in incendiary allusions to torturing opponents as he had in the past speeches, the PSYOP Working Group had Haitian linguists screen each speech. But Aristide, who was being gently coached by US officials ahead of time, never had to be edited. ‘I have come to ring the bell of reconciliation,’ he pledged—exactly the theme the psy-warriors wanted conveyed to assure Haitians he would not seek political revenge when he returned."

Tactical PSYOP Teams would eventually conduct over 760 ground PSYOP missions covering an area from the northern tip of Haiti near Port-de-Paix to the southwestern city of Jeremie. Aerial loudspeaker teams flew 67 missions in support of ground operations, facilitating PSYOP dissemination in the rugged and mountainous regions bordering the Gulf of Gonave and in other denied areas.

Personnel from Basic PSYOP Support Element 22 pose in front of the PSYOP support element headquarters. Standing left to right are CPT Martin C. Schulz (BPSE 22 OIC), Sergeant Daniel Stilson, Sergeant Jon McGinnis, Sergeant Gonzalo F. Villarreal, Sergeant Richard I. Keith, and Staff Sergeant Jon A. Cartier (TPT 221 team leader). Kneeling left to right are Staff Sergeant Marco A. Lopez (TPT 223 team leader) and Sergeant Kevin W. Buchaniec. (Photo courtesy of Veritas magazine)

Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) Headquarters in Haiti

The J.F.K. Special Warfare Center issue of Special Warfare of June 1994 also featured several articles on Joint Task Force Haiti.

They were often effective. When an Angry mob of some 2,000 Haitians surrounded a military headquarters in Gonavies seeking revenge, a mobile loudspeaker team played a Garth Brooks country music tape and lured the curious crowd out of the town.

 

Tactical PSYOP Loudspeaker teams

LTC Arata discusses loudspeaker use:

Next, PSYOP teams would use their loudspeakers and linguists to communicate the consequences of certain actions.  Finally, they would give directions for subsequent actions or movement. Tactical PSYOP teams also helped with the seeking out and capture of several known members of the FRAPH who were wanted by the joint task force headquarters for questioning.  In early October, one task force planned a series of raids on suspected locations of members of an activist political organization and other hostile individuals known as attaches.  The tactical commander decided to use a graduated response tactic that began with TPTs broadcasting surrender messages, followed by a countdown sequence.  Approximately 80% of the individuals at each objective surrendered and the rest offered no resistance when the assault team entered the building.  Not a shot was fired during the entire operation.  Again, a well-planned and well executed PSYOP campaign, in direct support of the tactical commander’s mission and intent, was invaluable to the successful and safe accomplishment of the mission.

In the Special Operations History magazine Veritas, Volume 11, No. 1, 2015, Dr. Jared Tracy wrote about Haiti in an article entitled “A True Force Multiplier – Psychological Operations in Operation Uphold Democracy, 1994-1995. Some of the loudspeaker messages mentioned by Tracy are:

Encouraged pro-Cedras militants to lay down their arms; Neighborhood crime watch; preventing Haitian-on-Haitian crime violence; political reconciliation; No to violence, no to vengeance, yes to reconciliation; Support Aristide; Turn in you weapons for cash.

Some Initial Problems

One of the major PSYOP problems in Haiti was the lack of linguists who spoke Creole. The military did a quick search and found thirty-three linguists throughout the armed forces, many born in Haiti. PSYOP soldiers who had served in Haiti in the past were also tapped to serve during the intervention.

PSYOP loudspeaker team member reads a message from a prepared script

Other problems according to the USASOC Monograph arose when field commanders and staff officers began to impose their views on product development. A PSYOP officer explained: “Haitian is a very abrupt language.” You don't say, “Please move back.” You say, “Move back now or you might be killed.” Several staff officers took issue with the term “killed” and ordered it changed. None of the officers involved had any working knowledge of psychological operations let alone expertise in Haitian language or, culture.

There was also a seeming lack in interest to have PSYOP soldiers enter with the first waves. XVllIth Airborne Corps planners were only willing to dedicate a minimum number of assets to psychological operations. In one instance, a PSYOP unit and its equipment were temporarily displaced from a scheduled flight in favor of a supply of Port-A-Johns. Apparently, “crappers” had priority over trained psychological operators.

Another problem occurred since the original invasion plan called for US forces to capture intact radio stations as well as newspaper equipment. The peaceful landing left those facilities in Haitian hands. The Joint PSYOP Task Force had to request $750,000 to cover operating costs and material expenses over the next six months and immediate funding to cover costs for the first ten days of the operation. The money was forthcoming and it was only a matter of days before PSYOP leaflets, billboard advertisements, and radio messages were having their impact on the Haitian population.

Long Live Peace

One of the songs that were played over the radio in the fall of 1994 by U.S. PSYOP as the American forces spread across Haiti was “Long live Peace.” The song promises democracy, work for all, education and good health.” There is no talk of vengeance, or people’s justice, since that would tear the country apart and discourage international aid. Reconciliation was the key to jobs and economic recovery. Curiously, a Haiti veteran sent this to me after finding it among his papers. He did not remember it and thought it was a poem or a song, and perhaps it was, but from a PSYOP standpoint, it is a song. I assume that the lyrics above were printed out by PSYOP troops and were handed to the people on the streets.

Two Tactical PSYOP Teams distribute printed materials and
radios around Port-au-Prince from their M1025 HMMWVs.
(Photo courtesy of Veritas magazine)

The New York Times of September 15, 1994 featured a Reuters photograph of hundreds of the above leaflets showing deposed President Aristide on the streets of an unidentified Haitian city. The caption is, "A U.S. plane dropped leaflets in Haiti supporting the exiled President." The British Broadcasting Company announced on 14 September that two million leaflets were dropped over Port-au-Prince and two other cities asking the population to support the US invasion and demanding the return of Haiti's ousted President Jean-Bertand Aristide. One published report states that seven million leaflets were dropped on Port-au-Prince, Les Cayes and Cap Hatien from 13-17 September. Another says that three million leaflets were dropped on the night of 14 September. A third report states that the Aristide leaflets were dropped over Port-au-Prince and La Plaine during the early morning hours of 10 September. There seems to be much confusion about where and how many leaflets were dropped, but it is clear that before the Americans hit the beaches, the people of Haiti had been psychologically prepared for the intervention.

Soldiers of the 4th PSYOP Group examine materials being developed for use in Haiti

Veritas mentions several leaflets and gifts. Generic leaflets such as the Aristide portrait were prepared prior to the operation. There was a platoon-sized product development Detachment that printed all of the posters, leaflets and handbooks that were disseminated in Haiti. The PSYOP teams also distributed pro-Aristide buttons, T-shirts and radios. 20,000 calendars were printed and they were extremely popular. Pen, pencils, notebooks, bumper stickers and soccer balls were also popular among the Haitians. US PSYOP teams printed a newsletter entitled the Cap-Hatien Newsletter. By February 1995, ten issues of the newsletter were printed and 60,000 copies had been distributed throughout Cap-Hatien. Although the leaflets were not coded, the Army did have an internal identification code for all their leaflets:

Leaflet 4A-01-02L informed Haitians “U.S. Forces have arrived to restore democracy to your country.”

On 4 October PSYOP teams distributed 1,500 leaflets promoting weapons buyback, 700 leaflets explaining Haitian rights and responsibilities, and 700 miscellaneous leaflets.

Tactical PSYOP Teams broadcated appeals from loudspeakers mounted on their humvees. (Photo courtesy of Veritas magazine)

Stephen D. Brown mentions weapon raids backed by PSYOP in “PSYOP in Operational Uphold Democracy,” Military Review, September–October 1996:

PSYOP-supported “Mountain Strike” operations from 3 to 14 October 1994 were highly successful. Mountain Strikes were raids conducted by 10th Mountain Division units on sites identified by intelligence as FRAPH or attaché safe houses. Mountain Strike commanders regarded TPT input as critical to their maneuver schemes. On each mission, TPTs broadcasted surrender appeal messages with a countdown sequence. In four of five cases, individuals in the safe houses followed instructions and came out with their hands up, If they did not give up right away, they gave up as soon as Multi-National Force soldiers entered the building, No shot was ever fired in any Mountain Strike operation.

On 12 October handbills were disseminated supporting the new police; from 12 to 14 October 2,000 pro-Aristide leaflets were distributed as well as campaign buttons.

In addition to those leaflets prepared for, or used in the actual military landing, dozens of signs, bumper stickers, cards, posters and even T-shirts were prepared during the consolidation phase while the new government was taking power. Many were patriotic in nature and showed the flags of the United States and Haiti in full color, or white doves of peace, clasped hands, and other signs of friendship between the American and Haitian people.

A Propaganda Banner in the Haitian City of Jeremie

And with the help of the United Nations as strong as a Citadel

Corporal Knopf told me about this banner:

Jeremie was the furthest outpost from the Headquarters in Port-au-Prince. We were resupplied by Canadians once a week who arrived in a 2 1/2 ton truck complete with food and supplies which had to be transported by an amphibious landing ship.

Captain Martin C. Schulz poses with Haitian children after handing out leaflets and meeting with a local radio station owner to discuss broadcasting PSYOP products, October 1994. (Photo courtesy of Veritas magazine)

Captain Martin C. Schulz stands among Haitians as one of his Tactical PSYOP Teams broadcasts in the main market square in Le Limbe, Haiti, December 1994. Enthusiastic crowds turned out wherever PSYOP teams appeared. (Photo courtesy of Veritas magazine)