DOMINICAN REPUBLIC PSYOP

Fearing another Cuba on America's doorstep, President Lyndon Johnson ordered U.S. forces to restore order and sent a fleet of 41 vessels to blockade the island. In April, 2015, Stars and Stripes added on the 50th Anniversary of the invasion:

With loyalists and rebels fighting over control of the capital of Santo Domingo and fears of a “second Cuba” to America's south, President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered Marines and paratroopers to the country. The leader of U.S. forces in Santo Domingo was the commander of the 18th Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, Lt. Gen. Bruce Palmer. According to the U.S. Department of State's Office of the Historian, Palmer had a stated and unstated mission.

“Your announced mission is to save U.S. lives. Your unannounced mission is to prevent the Dominican Republic from going communist. The president has stated that he will not allow another Cuba - you are to take all necessary measures to accomplish this mission. You will be given sufficient forces to do the job.”

We seldom hear from the other side in these articles. In this case I heard from a person who told me about his grandfather who took part in the uprising and fought as a member of the Castroite Movimiento Revolucionario 14 de Junio ["14th of June Revolutionary Party"] in the Dominican Republic. The group named itself "14th of June" in honor of the 200 men who had been trained in Cuba and invaded the Dominican Republic to fight Trujillo in 1959. The invasion was a failure and most of the invaders were quickly rounded up and imprisoned and many were later tortured and killed. He said in part:

My grandfather was labelled a Communist and lived much of his life in exile. He was caught like most of the members of his group by Trujillo's Servicio Central de Inteligencia [“Central Intelligence Service”] and spent several years in the prison known as La Cuarenta [“The Forty”] where he was tortured until Trujillo was deposed.

The 14th of June group defended the election of President Juan Bosch who they considered a defender of democracy in Latin America. Bosch was made aware of the overthrow plans of Air Force General Elías Wessin y Wessin by other military members and was advised to fire him immediately. Bosch thought that was unconstitutional and would not do anything he thought to be illegal.

After the U.S. intervention, the Dominicans found themselves ruled by another dictator, Joaquin Balaguer. Soon people were disappearing and being assassinated. Balaguer accused his enemies of being Communists and was given free rein by his friends in the West. The United States eventually pressured Balaguer to give a limited democracy in 1979. Free elections were allowed and the political party initially founded by Bosch put him back in power.

Grandfather returned from exile to the Dominican Republic in 1979. He supported the new Democratic society where everyone has a voice, including the Communists. In CIA documents he was apparently labelled a "hard core" Communist. He was never allowed in the United States because of his Communist background, but ironically, at the end of his life he got as form of cancer that could only be treated in the USA. He was given a humanitarian visa by the American ambassador and was allowed to visit for treatment.

U.S. troops were sent in to stabilize conditions on the island and prevent a takeover by Marxist rebels.

400 Marines were ordered to the Dominican Republic on 27 April as part of Operation Power Pack. The United States convinced the Organization of American States (OAS) to form an inter-American military force to intervene in the Dominican Republic on 28 April 1965. Later, the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) was formally established on May 23. In addition to the United States military presence, the following troops were sent by each country; Brazil 1130, Honduras 250, Paraguay 184, Nicaragua 160, Costa Rica 21 military police, and El Salvador 3 staff officers. The South American troops were so weak, ill-trained and poorly supplied that a Navy Admiral asked that no further OAS troops be deployed in the Dominican Republic "Until they are equipped to exist and function in the field." 2,200 paratroopers of the U.S Army's 3rd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division arrived on 29 April. The 1st Brigade and elements of the 11th Air Assault Division joined them later on 4 May. The 6th Marine Expeditionary Unit was landed in strength. Eventually, a force of 23,000 U.S. troops was in-country. By the end of the operation 27 U.S. troops were killed in action, including 13 82nd Airborne paratroopers.

President Johnson stated in a television address:

The United States Government has been informed by the military authorities in the Dominican Republic that American lives are in danger. These authorities are no longer able to guarantee their safety and they reported that the assistance of military personnel is now needed for that purpose.

82nd Airborne Division Soldiers in Dominican Republic

The American troops occupied the Dominican Republic to stabilize conditions on the island and prevent a takeover by Marxist rebels. By May 14, the American had enforced a safety zone. Road blocks were established and patrols ran continuously.

Major William E. Klein discusses the military aspect of the operation in an article entitled “Stability Operations in Santo Domingo,” INFANTRY, July-August 2004. Readers who are interested in the “Lessons Learned” aspect of the battle within the city of Santo Domingo are urged to read this article. He says in part:

The outbreak was primarily confined to the city of Santo Domingo, where the rebels, influenced by a strong Communist element, had issued guns and ammunition to civilians. Most of the Americans and foreign nationals fled to the Ambassador Hotel, located on the western edge of the city. It was this hotel which was the original objective of the Marines who poured ashore on Red Beach, near Jaina Port, approximately 20 kilometers west of the city. About the same time, two airborne infantry battalions of the 82nd Airborne Division landed at San Isidro airfield, some 12 kilometers east of the city.

Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer Jr., sent in to assume command of the U.S. forces in the Dominican Republic…recommended the rapid establishment of a line of communications between the two units. The plan was approved by higher headquarters on 2 May…in a surprise midnight move, the 82nd Airborne Division, commanded by Major General Robert H. York, stretched five battalions through the city to link up with the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade.

The troopers and Marines began to improve their defensive positions on a continuing basis and controlled the flow of traffic in and out of the rebel zone by sealing off all roads and alleyways, except for seven check points. There was no restriction as to entering or leaving the zone except that weapons and ammunition could not be carried in or out. The rebels tried many tricks at first, such as attempting to run the checkpoints in ambulances without being searched, and later they attempted to hide the weapons underneath wounded they were evacuating. Gradually, their undercover methods were discovered and the arms exodus was reduced substantially.

The Insurgents try to Smuggle Weapons to their Fighters

When one studies history there is often this sense of déjà vu. We see the same actions occurring again and again. Insurgents and guerrillas are often forced to smuggle weapons past a superior military force. In WWII, the Jews in the Warsaw Ghetto used the sewers to move weapons and fight the NAZIs. In Gaza, ambulances were used to move weapons out of sight of the Israelis, and ISIS used women, and sometimes even men dressed as women to move weapons and explosives. Almost all of these deceptions were used by the insurgents in the Dominican Republic. Yates says in part:

No Dominicans (with the exception of national policemen) could enter the corridor with a weapon…The rebels refused to be deterred by U.S. surveillance measures and adopted several ruses to achieve their objective. Guns were placed in automobile gas tanks. Hearses and ambulances loaded with concealed weapons instead of bodies cleared checkpoints without being searched, often as American soldiers removed their helmets out of respect. While all Dominican males entering and exiting the corridor were frisked, females were spared the procedure lest the indignity of it incite a riot. Thus, women and young girls wearing loose-fitting dresses or maternity clothes could easily slip grenades, pistols, and ammunition through the checkpoints.

An American soldier with a mine detector checks a Dominican female

To rectify this problem, American soldiers with mine detectors dutifully passed the device in the vicinity of a young woman's skirt. The rebels decided to go underground via the city's sewer system. A highly successful ploy at first, the Americans eventually realized what was happening and once again devised countermeasures. A Special Forces team acquired a plan of the sewer system and passed it to corps and division. Army engineers emplaced a series of booby traps that included mines, grenades, barbed wire, trip flares, and, according to some sources, chemical agents. Soldiers above ground removed the manhole covers, lowered lights on wires, and began maintaining a 24-hour watch over the open holes.

Yates also mentions the 82nd Airborne Division:

After 4 May 1965, the 82nd Aviation Battalion provided support for units of the division in the form of extensive aerial reconnaissance, medical evacuation, loudspeaker and leaflet drop missions, airlift or personnel and cargo, command control missions, classified missions into the interior for the U. S. Embassy and Special Forces, and provision of airlift for a platoon quick reaction force.

The U.S. Land Forces News

This news sheet was a regular newspaper for the troops taking part in the Dominican Republic action. It was printed by US forces and kept them up to date on current affairs. This issue, the very first one dated 7 May 1965, contained a message from General Palmer, Commander of Joint Task Force 120.

One of the most important missions during these early days was civil affairs. It was crucial to get the starving populace fed, the streets cleaned, water and electrical services restored, medical aid supplied to the needy, and to find adequate solutions to myriad other problems. It was one thing to accomplish these tasks in a peaceful environment and quite another to work at them under the constant harassment of sniper fire.

The situation improved gradually throughout the month of May, and in June the President announced the withdrawal of all the Marines. The 82nd Airborne Division then occupied the entire perimeter and held it until the Latin America contingent began to assume some of the security and peacekeeping missions.

Some 6,500 people from many nations were evacuated to safety. In addition, the US forces airlifted in 8 million tons of relief supplies for Dominican Nationals. The fighting continued until 31 August 1965 when a truce was declared. Most American troops left shortly afterwards, but some remained until September 1966.

Although there is some dispute about the actual numbers, by the end of the invasion, more than 3,000 Dominicans and 24 American servicemen had lost their lives. Another 156 Americans were wounded. Trujillo loyalist Joaquin Balaguer was eventually returned to power and ruled with an iron fist for many years afterwards.

Although the fighting was mostly small arms fire in an urban environment, there was at least one “sea battle.” The Stars and Stripes adds:

Paratroopers with the 2nd Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment sank the 350-foot freighter SS Santo Domingo in the early days of the conflict with a 106 mm recoilless rifle after rebels used the ship to stage attacks on U.S. troops. A telegram from the U.S. State Department the evening of May 6, 1965, noted the incident:

“Despite cease-fire sporadic sniper fire at US forces continues” it read. “Rebels have been using small boats in river as sniper positions. US forces returning fire sank one small boat and set fire to freighter.”

In a later legal battle between the ship's owners and its insurers in New York federal court, court documents detail the freighter had been abandoned by its crew after returning to its namesake port amid the civil war. The court documents, from Flota Mercante Dominicana vs. American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co., said that after the crew fled, the freighter was briefly taken over by members of the national police before again being abandoned, this time to rebel forces.

The new occupants of the ship used it to direct fire at paratroopers who had taken up positions on the other side of the Ozama River. Exchanges of gunfire came to an end when the Americans resorted to the use of 106 mm explosive shells, which burned and sank the ship.

Psychological Operations

LTC Wallace J. Moulis, Commanding Office of the 1st PSYWAR Battalion wrote about Dominican Republic psychological operations in an article entitled "Key to a Crisis," Military Review, February 1966. He says:

Almost before the roar of their aircraft had left their ears, the radio teams with Ray Aylor, Voice of America radio engineer, were rehabilitating a 1000-watt transmitter to begin relaying Voice of America transmission from Greenville, North Carolina. Production of leaflets by mimeograph began even before the arrival of light, mobile presses. Loudspeakers took positions along the Ozama River to bring the voice of the United States to the people.

1st PSYWAR Battalion troops in front of the Radio Broadcast Van – Santo Domingo

Bert H. Cooper Jr. wrote two essays entitled "Teamwork in Santo Domingo" and "Divided Counsels." The essays are reprinted in Department of the Army Pamphlet 525-7-1, The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military Application.

He also wrote in Military Propaganda: Psychological Warfare and Operations. Much of the next few paragraphs are paraphrased from the essays. Some of his comments are:

The situation in Santo Domingo was such that the full resources of the Army 1st Psychological Warfare Battalion were clearly needed by USIA. The downtown offices of USIS/Santo Domingo were in rebel territory, as were most newspapers and commercial printing facilities, the central telephone exchange, and the radio and television studios of Radio San Domingo. Under these circumstances, a temporary base of operations had to be set up in the home of the public affairs officer, chief of USIS/Santo Domingo, which was located five blocks west of the American Embassy on Avenida Cesar Nicolas Penson. The battalion first set up camp in a vacant lot next door, and later moved into a nearby school building.

In addition to providing physical protection for the civilian staff of about twenty U.S. and Dominican personnel at a time when sniper fire was a real hazard, the army provided the bulk of the hardware and operating personnel that USIS/Santo Domingo badly needed; transportable radio transmitters, mobile presses, multilith machines, loudspeaker trucks, and aircraft for use in leaflet and loudspeaker operations. Army personnel also provided intelligence support by monitoring local radio broadcasts of both rebels and loyalists and translating and disseminating the transcripts of these broadcasts.

The deputy commander of the 1st Psychological Warfare Battalion served as liaison officer with the USIS staff. Coordination between army PSTOP troops and USIA and State Department personnel was handled on a day-to-day basis through an ad hoc committee system that grew out of the crisis nature of the situation. An associate director of USIA sent from Washington to coordinate PSYOP and information activities in the Dominican Republic, met at the embassy with the U.S. ambassador and other top-level U.S. representatives on the country team. Later he met with key members of the USIS-army group to report back and to plan the next day's activities. Usually held in the evening in a summerhouse that had been turned into a conference room—and occasionally interrupted by sniper fire— these "repasas," as the nightly staff conferences were nicknamed in Spanish, were informal gatherings at which information was freely exchanged and operational details and problems of the day could be worked out by those immediately involved.

Coordination between the USIA and the army during this period was greatly facilitated by the appointment of a military liaison officer who worked directly with the USIS/Santo Domingo staff. The selection of the psychological warfare battalion's deputy commander for this assignment seems to have been an excellent choice.

He also stated that the most significant organizational achievement of the Dominican operation in the area of communications was the combining of civilian and military talents by the United States Information Agency (USIA) and the Army’s 1st PSYWAR Battalion (later to become the 1st PSYOP Battalion). He called it a classic case of successful interagency cooperation in a crisis situation. In fact, the USIA later presented the 1st PSYWAR Battalion with its Award for Distinguished Service, its highest commendation. The citation reads:

Washington D.C
June 15, 1965
Carl T. Rowan
Director

Each Battalion member received a personal letter of commendation from their commander. Specialist Fourth Class James Robeson, the Battalion S-1 (Personnel) clerk’s letter stated in part:

…The occasion marked the first time on which the United States Information Agency “Distinguished Service Award” has been presented to a military organization. This recognition is due in no small part to your efficient execution of each assigned task with vigor, a sense of urgency, and dedication

The USIA staff in the Dominican Republic was familiar with the country and had the professional and language skills. However, they lacked the communications equipment and facilities that the Army could supply. The military lacked language skills. This is attested to in part by correspondence from SP4 Dave Hagen who was assigned to the 1st PSYWAR Battalion as a broadcast specialist:

I was one of 8 or 9 GI's running a portable radio station called the "Voice of the Security Zone" that went on the air May 5th. We were up and running a few days before that but I was the only announcer (my MOS listed "broadcast specialist") and I did not speak Spanish. We got a civilian in from "VOA" (that is where he said he was from) and were up and running for the next few months.

SP4 Dave Hagen
Courtesy of Psywar.com

Because the main government radio station was in rebel hands, Hagen and his team had to broadcast from a small station in the countryside:

We drove west from the San Isidro Air Base several miles and turned off the main road into a residential area before (I believe) we reached the Ozama River and the Duarte Bridge (a scene of heavy fighting). In this residential area we arrived at a one-acre field with a standing AM radio broadcast tower and a small cement building. The building was empty and there were no signs of any combat in the area. This building was about 10' x 10' which was the perfect size for an AM radio transmitter and its associated equipment. There were no studio facilities in the area. We set up our equipment and used the standing antenna. Overall we had a generator, studio truck, transmitter truck, communications truck, and the antenna tuning truck. As mentioned, we were in a residential area, and the rest of the city block we were located in was all single story houses and some duplexes.

Our unit had a complete radio station in our five trucks.   We did not re-broadcast VOA, we broadcast our own programming. The 1st Psywar consisted of three groups...RB (radio broadcast), Loudspeaker, and Leaflets. We also had an FA unit for support.  All were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Wallace Moulis. Our RB group was commanded by Captain William Perry. We also had two lieutenants, Williams and Pojmanski. We had two Master Sergeants, Tokifuji and Fewles, and three specialists, including myself. We were in a war zone and even slept with our weapons. When things got quiet we tried to win the "hearts and minds" of the kids. We played baseball with them.  Many had mitts and softballs.

Was the radio station successful? Hagen adds:

We were trying to let people know what was happening and that American troops had established a buffer  zone between three warring factions. We also wanted to let them know that we were their friends. We saw both civilians and military listening to us on portable radios. Kids hung around our radio station and women brought us  coffee in the morning.  We seemed to be well liked.  Of course, we were  heavily armed and brought a sense of security to the area of Santo Domingo that  we were in.   At the time, it appeared that our messages helped to end  the fighting.   Reports in the years following the American "intervention"  contend that we were simply trying to stop the spread of Communism. That is true, but we also helped to end a civil war.

In 2015, Dave Hagen spoke again, this time to my friend Lee Richards. To see his complete comments see Psywar.org. He added:

Latin American specialists working for the United States Information Service (USIS) in Santo Domingo could have performed those tasks except that their printing and broadcast equipment were located in buildings now controlled by the rebels. Fully armed, we arrived with our broadcast facilities at San Isidro Air Base near Santo Domingo on 2 May.

On 4 May we were ready to start broadcasting to the Dominican Republic. I was the only announcer (broadcast specialist) with the 4th RB team and did not speak Spanish so we did not start actual broadcasts until 5 May when an employee of the United States Information Agency (USIA) arrived. Our “Voice of the Security Zone” hit the AM airwaves and was powerful enough to be picked up in the surrounding countryside. I was told our broadcasting explained to the population the positive side of the intervention, and the need to restore order and democracy. Civilian specialists wrote scripts and other forms of propaganda under the direction of Mr. Hewson Ryan, associate director of the USIA. Our team was not involved with any "propaganda" planning and was simply tasked with keeping the radio station on the air.

Our radio broadcast equipment consisted of three truck mounted modules and two semi-trailers. The modules contained a communications unit (teletype and voice), an antenna tuning unit, and a power generator. The semis pulled a studio trailer and a transmitter trailer. When the rest of the 1st Psychological Warfare Battalion arrived in the Dominican Republic between 3 and 7 May, it brought with it mobile printing presses and loudspeaker units.

Within a week I was later told, the first pamphlet drop was made over Santo Domingo using two Air Force C-47s. One report stated that by the end of May leaflets were being printed at a rate of 70,000 per day. The printing facilities were in a different location than our broadcasting station so I did not see any of the leaflets. None were air dropped in our area.

Moulis adds:

There was a lively propaganda war on the airwaves of the Dominican Republic. The history of the 193rd USAF Special Operation Wing says:

The efforts of U.S. military forces, operating alongside Dominican Republic governmental troops, were hindered by a rebel-operated radio station, which continually broadcast information to resistance forces.

1st PSYWAR Battalion Trooper hands out newspaper to Dominican civilian.

Stanley Sadler says in Cease resistance: It’s Good for you! A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations, 2nd Edition, 1998:

U.S. PSYWAR radio was able to monitor and answer rebel radio diatribes about "Yanqui imperialismo" and put out the first newspaper since the outbreak of the revolt.

We should point out here that it was not only the U.S. Army fighting the various rebel radio stations. Carl Black was a radioman aboard the Destroyer USS Perry, DD844. The ship was assigned to the naval battle group sent to the Dominican Republic. He told me:

Initially we were in the destroyer screen closest to shore off Santo Domingo. We were notified that an AM radio station had fallen into the hands of the rebels and we were given its frequency and instructed to jam it. Since we had an AM transceiver with over twice the output power of the radio station we came up on their frequency with a deliberately bad transmitter setup and keyed the transmitter. This “bad setup” caused the transmitter to create a variable frequency audio tone osculating in the audio range centered on their frequency.We maintained this until we were notified that the radio station was back in government hands.

Yates says about the radio problems:

Some of the most important clandestine operations during the intervention attempted to silence Radio Santo Domingo (RSD). Although a poor people by U.S. standards, virtually every Dominican family owned a radio and, because of the country's high illiteracy rate, relied on it heavily for information. RSD, with "numerous outlets, studios, and transmitter sites," was the country's national station, capable of being heard throughout the island. In the hands of the rebels, the station became a powerful propaganda weapon-in fact, the "biggest thorn" in the side of the Americans. Langley received a telephone call from a CIA agent with a blunt message. "The difference in Santo Domingo," the agent shouted, "lies in that radio station. If the rebels continue their propaganda they will take over the entire country. The radio must be silenced!"

The problem was that nothing seemed to work. Naval vessels offshore and the Army Security Agency both tried to jam RSD broadcasts, but neither had powerful enough equipment to interfere more than temporarily with the broadcasting range of a commercial station. On 8 and 10 May, Special Forces teams mounted successful air assault operations against RSD transmitter sites at Alto Bandero and La Vega, respectively, thereby reducing the effectiveness of RSD broadcasts in those and surrounding areas. The day after the Special Forces seized the La Vega transmitter, a team of paratroopers and Green Berets slipped into the north and severed telecommunication lines. The operation failed to shut down the radio station, but it did disrupt the telephone system used by the rebels for tactical purposes. By 13 May, Palmer had had enough and requested permission from Washington to mount an overt military operation against RSD. Finally, during Operacion Limpieza, the Government of National Reconstruction captured Radio Santo Domingo.

The insurgents were not above the using tragic American accidents and incidents as anti-American propaganda.PFC Bill Quigley assigned to the 307th Medical Battalion near the Duarte Bridge told me that a US trooper accidentally killed a 10-year old Dominican shoeshine boy when his .45 caliber pistol discharged while he was using it to remove the cap from a bottle of Coca Cola.

The body was held in a building next to the aid station until the family claimed it. Eventually, a Dominican man came for the body, claiming to be an uncle. Unit officers suspected that the "uncle" was really a rebel who wanted to parade the body through the streets as anti-American propaganda. Army Intelligence assigned a warrant officer to interrogate the alleged uncle. After questioning, he confessed that he was not a relative. He was a member of Colonel Caamano Deno’s rebel forces and his mission was to collect the boy's body for propaganda purposes. He was immediately turned over to the Policia Nacional and probably never heard from again.

Speaking of the Duarte Bridge, Specialist Fourth Class Don Sebastian was a member of the 82nd Airborne who arrived in the Dominican Republic on day two of the invasion. He says that he was called to the headquarters of General Robert York; Commander of the 82d Airborne Division shortly after the division took some losses at the battle of the Duarte Bridge. The Dominican Popular Movement, a small Communist party force had distributed Molotov cocktails to the crowds, and the rebel military, well supplied with mortars, machine guns, bazookas and small arms were defending the Duarte Bridge. Both the pro and anti-Government forces wore the same uniform and it was impossible to distinguish friend from foe.

Come get your money

Don says he was called to headquarters by General York and found two finance officers and a jeep full of shopping bags containing $100 bills. His orders were to hand out individual banknotes to individuals near the bridge. Don had no idea why he was given that mission but believes it was to empty the enemy ranks of fighters. When word got out that the Americans were giving out $100 bills Dominican civilians came from everywhere, and many of them were young men of military age who might have been carrying AK-47s just minutes earlier. Could this have been a ploy to clear the area of Dominicans and reduce collateral damage?